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## AUGUSTINE'S DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE AND AUTHORITY.

In a former number of this *REVIEW*<sup>1</sup> we attempted to give a general exposition of Augustine's doctrine of knowledge and authority, which naturally ran up into some account of his doctrine of authority in religion. The more detailed study of this specific subject we were forced, however, to postpone to another occasion. We wish now to take up this topic and to make as clear as possible Augustine's teaching concerning it.

The cardinal facts to bear in mind are that, to speak broadly, with Augustine the idea of Authority coalesces with that of Revelation, the idea of Revelation with that of Apostolicity, and the idea of Apostolicity with that of Scripture. With him therefore the whole question of authority in religion is summed up in the questions whether there is a revelation from God in existence, where that revelation is to be found, and how it is validated to and made the possession of men: while the master-key to these problems lies in the one word apostolicity. Whatever is apostolic is authoritative, because behind the apostles lies the authority of Christ, who chose, appointed and endowed the apostles to be the founders of His Church; and Christ's authority is the authority of God, whose Son and Revelation

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<sup>1</sup> *THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*, July, 1907, pp. 353-397.

He is. The great depository of the apostolic revelation is the Holy Scriptures, and these Scriptures become thus to Augustine the supreme proximate seat of authority in religion. The line of descent is, therefore, briefly, God, Christ, the Apostles, the Scriptures,—the Scriptures being conceived as the embodied revelation of God, clothed with His authority as His inspired word, given to us by His accredited messengers, the apostles. Let us see how Augustine expresses himself on each of these points in turn.

On the actual authority of Scripture he certainly expresses himself in no wavering terms. The Holy Scriptures, he tells us, have been “established upon the supreme and heavenly pinnacle of authority”<sup>2</sup> and should therefore always be read “in assurance and security as to their truth”<sup>3</sup> and all their statements accepted as absolutely trustworthy.<sup>4</sup> To them alone among books had he learned to defer this respect and honor,—most firmly to believe that no one of their authors has erred in any respect in writing:<sup>5</sup> for of these books of the prophets and apostles it would be wicked<sup>6</sup> to have any doubt as to their entire freedom from error.<sup>7</sup> “To these canonical Scriptures only”, he repeats,<sup>8</sup> “does he owe that implicit subjection so to follow them alone as to admit no suspicion whatever that their writers could have erred in them in any possible respect, or could possibly have gone wrong in anything.” The accumulated emphases in such passages, no more than fairly represent the strength of Augustine’s conviction that, as he puts it in another place, “it is to the canonical Scriptures alone that he owes unhesi-

<sup>2</sup> *Ep.* 82 (to Jerome), ii. 5: sanctam scripturam in summo et caelesti auctoritatis culmine collocatam.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*: de veritate ejus certus et securus legam.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*: veraciter discam.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*: i. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Nefarium.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*: ad. fin.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*: iii. 24: sicut paulo ante dixi, tantum modo scripturis canonice hanc ingenuam debeam servitutem, qua eas solas ita sequar, ut conscriptores earum nihil in eis omnino erasse, nihil fallaciter posuisse dubitem.

tating assent.”<sup>9</sup> It is this contention accordingly in its most positive form which he opposes endlessly to the Manichæans in his long controversy with them. He points out to Faustus, for example, that a sharp line of demarcation is drawn between the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments and all later writings, precisely in point of authority. The authority of the canonical books, “confirmed from the time of the apostles by the successions of the bishops and the propagations of the churches, has been established in so lofty a position, that every faithful and pious mind submits to it”. Other writings on the contrary, of what sort soever they may be, may be read “not with necessity of believing but with liberty of judgment”. The same truth may indeed be found in some of these which is found in Scripture, but never the same authority, seeing that none of them can be compared with “the most sacred excellence of the canonical Scriptures”. From what is said by other books we may accordingly withhold belief, unless indeed it is demonstrated “either by sound reason or by this canonical authority itself”; but “in this canonical eminence of the Holy Scriptures, even though it be but a single prophet, or apostle, or evangelist that is shown to have placed anything in his Scriptures, by this confirmation of the canon we are not permitted to doubt that it is true”.<sup>10</sup> Similarly when writing to the Donatist Cresconius,<sup>11</sup> he refuses to treat even Cyprian as indefectible. “For”, says he, “we do no injury to Cyprian when we distinguish his books—whatever they may be—from the canonical authority of the divine Scriptures. For not without reason has there been constituted with such wholesome vigilance that ecclesiastical canon to which belong the assured books of the prophets and apostles, on which we do not dare to pass any judgment at all, and according to which we judge with freedom all other writings whether of believers or of unbelievers”. In a word, Augustine defends the absolute authority of every word of

<sup>9</sup> *De natura et gratia*, lxi. 71: sine ulla recusatione consensum.

<sup>10</sup> *Contra Faustum Man.*, xi. 5.

<sup>11</sup> ii. 31, 39.

Scripture and insists that to treat any word of it as unauthoritative is to endanger the whole. This he argues to Jerome<sup>12</sup> and over and over again to the Manichæans, culminating in a most striking passage in which he protests against that subjective dealing with the Scriptures which "makes every man's mind the judge of what in each Scripture he is to approve or disapprove". "This", he sharply declares, "is not to be subject for faith to the authority of Scripture, but to subject Scripture to ourselves: instead of approving a thing because it is read and written in the sublime authority of Scripture, it seems to us written rightly because we approve it".<sup>13</sup>

With no less emphasis Augustine traces the supreme authority which he thus accords to the Scriptures to their apostolicity. Their authority is according to him due in the first instance to the fact that they have been imposed upon the Church as its *corpus juris* by the apostles, who were the accredited agents of Christ in founding the Church. In laying this stress on the principle of apostolicity, he was, of course, only continuing the fixed tradition of the early Church. From the beginning apostolicity had been everywhere and always proclaimed as the mark of canonicity,<sup>14</sup> and apostolicity remained with him the only consciously accepted mark of canonicity.<sup>15</sup> He says expressly that "the truth of the divine Scriptures has been received into the canonical summit of authority, for this reason,—that they are commended for the building up of our faith not by anybody you please, but by the apostles themselves".<sup>16</sup> The proper proof of canonicity is to him therefore just the proof of apostolicity: and when it has been shown of a declaration that it has been made by an apostle, that is to give it

<sup>12</sup> *Ep.*, xl., 3, 3.

<sup>13</sup> *Contra Faustum Man.*, xxxii. 19.

<sup>14</sup> This has recently been shown afresh by Kunze, *Glaubensregel, Heilige Schrift und Taufbekenntnis* (1899), pp. 114 sq., 249 sq. Cf. Cramer, *Nieuwe Bijdragen*, etc., iii, 155.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Kunze, as cited, p. 302.

<sup>16</sup> *Ep.* 82 (to Jerome), 7: non a quibuslibet, sed ab ipsis apostolicis, ac per hoc in canonicum auctoritatis culmen recepta.

supreme authority.<sup>17</sup> Though one declaration may be from the writings of one apostle and another "from any other apostle or prophet—such is the quality of canonical authority, that it would not be allowable to doubt of either".<sup>18</sup> To say "canonical" writings accordingly is to add nothing to speaking of them as genuine writings of the prophets and apostles.<sup>19</sup> The genuineness of the Christian Scriptures as documents of the apostolic age is, therefore, the point of chief importance for him. "What Scriptures can ever possess weight of authority", he asks with conviction in his voice, "if the Gospels, if the Apostolic Scriptures, do not possess it? Of what book can it ever be certain whose it is, if it be uncertain whether those Scriptures are the Apostles', which are declared and held to be the Apostles' by the Church propagated from those very Apostles, and manifested with so great conspicuousness through all nations?"<sup>20</sup> We are not concerned for the moment, however, with the nature of the evidence relied on to prove these books apostolical: what we are pointing out is merely that to Augustine the point of importance was that they should be apostolical, and that this carried with it their canonicity or authority. Their authority was to him rooted directly in their apostolicity.

How completely Augustine's mind was engrossed with the principle of apostolicity as the foundation of authority is illustrated by a tendency he exhibited to treat as in some sense authoritative everything in the Church for which an apostolic origin can be inferred. The best example of this tendency is afforded by what we may call his doctrine of tradition.<sup>21</sup> This doctrine is, in brief, to the effect that

<sup>17</sup> *Contra Faustum Man.*, xi. 5.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*: *vere*.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, xxxiii. 6.

<sup>21</sup> To Roman Catholic writers Augustine's doctrine of tradition seems that of the Church of Rome. Cf. Schwane, *Dogmengeschichte der patrist. Zeit*, § 89. 9 (pp. 703 sq.), and, though following Schwane closely, yet somewhat more dogmatically, Portalié in Vacant-Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de théol. Cathol.*, i. 2340. Schwane insists that Augustine

where the guidance of the Scriptures fails, the immemorial mind of the universal Church may properly be looked upon as authoritative, on the presumption that what has always been understood by the entire Church is of apostolic origin. Repeated expression is given to this position; for example, in his Anti-Donatist treatise *On Baptism* (c. 400) where he is seeking to defend the validity of heretical baptism and is embarrassed by Cyprian's rejection of it on the plea that Scripture is silent on the subject. Cyprian's principle, "that we should go back to the fountain, that is to apostolical tradition, and thence turn the channel of truth to our own times" he of course heartily accepts;<sup>22</sup> he seeks only to turn it against Cyprian. "Let it be allowed", he says, that the "apostles have given no injunctions" on this point—that is to say, in the canonical Scriptures. It is not impossible, nevertheless, that the custom (*consuetudo*) prevalent in the Church may be rooted in apostolical tradition. For "there are many things which are held by the universal Church and are *on that account (per hoc)* fairly (*bene*) believed to be precepts of the apostles, although they are not found written", *i. e.*, in the Scriptures;<sup>23</sup> or, as it is put in an earlier point, "there are many things which are not found in the letters of the apostles, nor yet in the councils of their followers, which yet *because they have been preserved throughout the whole church (per universam ecclesiam)* are believed to have been handed down and commended by them".<sup>24</sup>

Even when thus arguing for the apostolicity of tradition, however, Augustine never forgets the superior authority of

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joins oral Apostolic tradition to Scripture as necessary both for its completeness and for its interpretation, and that with reference to doctrine as well as usages; yet admits that to Augustine the Scriptures occupy the first place in authority and contain all things necessary to salvation, and that with adequate clearness; and that only the Scriptures are inspired and infallible (cf. loc. cit. p. 233 sq.). Probably even this is assigning to tradition a much greater rôle than Augustine gave it, particularly with reference to doctrine.

<sup>22</sup> *De Bapt. contra Donat.*, v. 26, 37.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, v. 23.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, ii. 7. 12; cf. iv. 6. 9.

Scripture. Perhaps the most instructive passage in this point of view is one in which he is investigating the value of baptism of infants. After appealing to the tradition of the universal Church he proceeds as follows: "And if anyone seeks a divine authority in this matter—although what is held by the universal Church, and that not as a thing instituted by councils but as of primitive inheritance (*nec conciliis institutum sed semper retentum est*) is most properly (*rectissime*) believed to have been handed down by apostolic authority,—we are able in any case (*tamen*) to form a true conjecture of the value of the sacrament of baptism in the case of infants from the circumcision of the flesh . . . "<sup>25</sup> Here, in the very act of vindicating apostolicity, and therefore authority, for universal primitive custom, language is employed which seems to betray that Augustine was wont to conceive "divine authority" (*auctoritas divina*) the peculiar property of Scripture. In another Anti-Donatist treatise—the work against the grammarian Cresconius (c. 406)<sup>26</sup>—we read somewhat similarly that "although no doubt no example" of the custom under discussion "is adduced from the canonical Scriptures, the truth of these Scriptures is nevertheless held by us in this matter, since what we do is the *placitum* of the universal Church, which is commended by the authority of these very Scriptures; and accordingly since the Holy Scriptures cannot deceive, whoever is afraid of being led astray by the obscurity of this question should consult with respect to it that Church which without any ambiguity is pointed out by the Holy Scriptures".

This care in preserving the superior right of Scripture is not to be accounted for as due to the exigencies of the controversy with the Donatists. It reappears in more formal form in purely didactic teaching,—in a reply, for instance, which Augustine made to a series of questions addressed to him by a correspondent on matters of ritual observance.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, iv. 24. 31.

<sup>26</sup> *Opus cit.* i. 23. 39.

<sup>27</sup> *Epp.*, 54 and 55 (to Januarius,—the 40th of that name in Smith and Wace,—about 400).

Here Augustine distinguishes carefully between three varieties of such observances: those prescribed by Scripture, those commended by the practice of the universal Church, those of merely local usage. When an observance is prescribed by the authority of divine Scripture, no doubt can be admitted but that we must do precisely as we read.<sup>28</sup> Similarly also only insane insolence would doubt that we ought to follow the practice of the whole Church, throughout the world.<sup>29</sup> In matters of varying usage in different parts of the Church, on the other hand, we must beware of erecting our own custom into a guide, and should conform ourselves freely to the custom that obtains in the Church where we may chance from time to time to be,—in short, follow Ambrose's wise rule of “doing when we are in Rome as the Romans do”.<sup>30</sup> There is nothing that Augustine deprecates more than the arbitrary multiplication of ordinances, by which, he says, the state of Christians which God wished to be free—appointing to them only a few sacraments and those easy of observance—is assimilated to the burdensomeness of Judaism. He could wish therefore that all ordinances should be unhesitatingly abolished which are neither prescribed by the authority of the Holy Scriptures, nor have been appointed by the councils of bishops, nor have been confirmed by the custom of the universal Church<sup>31</sup>—in which sentence the selection of the terms so that “authority” is ascribed to Scripture alone is not unwitting.

Elsewhere, no doubt, Augustine uses the term “authority” more loosely of the other sources of “custom” also. This is true, for example, of the opening paragraphs of these very letters. Here he carefully draws out the three-fold distinction among ordinances, which he applies throughout. The fundamental principle of the discussion on which he

<sup>28</sup> *Ep.* 54, v. 6: *non sit dubitandum quin ita facere debeamus ut legimus.*

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*; *quid tota per orbem frequentat ecclesia.*

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, ii. 3, where a pleasant anecdote is told of Ambrose's advice to Monnica to follow his example in this.

<sup>31</sup> *Epist.* 55, xix. 35; cf. xiv. 27, where the “authority” of the divine Scriptures and the “consent” of the whole Church are brought together.

is about to enter, he tells us, is that our Lord Jesus Christ has subjected us to an easy yoke and a light burden, laying upon us only few sacraments and those not difficult of observance. He then adds: "But with respect to those not written but traditional matters to which we hold, observed as they are throughout the whole world, what we are to understand is that they are retained as commended and instituted by the Apostles themselves, or by plenary councils, the authority of which in the Church is very useful".<sup>32</sup> The term "authority" happens to be employed here only of what the context tells us is the least weighty of the three "authorities" to the observances commended by which we should yield obedience: the Scriptures, universal primitive custom arguing apostolic appointment, and counciliar enactment. We may look somewhat roughly, perhaps, upon these three "authorities" as representing to Augustine respectively the authority of "Scripture", the authority of "tradition", and the authority of "the Church"; and if so, then these three "authorities"—the Scriptures, Tradition, the Church—took rank in his mind in that order. First and above all is the "authority" of Scripture, which is just the infallible Word of God, whose every word is to be believed and every precept obeyed just as it stands written. Then comes the "authority" of immemorial universal tradition, on the presumption that just because it is immemorially universal it may, or must, be apostolic; and if apostolic then also of divine appointment. Last of all comes the "authority" of the Church itself, for which no claim is made of divine infallibility, since that is an attribute of Scripture alone,—nor even of such constructive apostolicity as may be presumed of immemorial tradition; but only of righteous jurisdiction and Spirit-led wisdom. Neither the individual bishop, nor any body of bishops assembled in council, up to the whole number in the plenary or ecumenical council, though each

<sup>32</sup> *Epist. 54. 1*: illa autem quae non scripta sed tradita custodimus, quae quidem toto terrarum orbe servantur, datur intelligi, vel ab ipsis apostolis, vel plenariis conciliis, quorum est in eccllesia saluberrima auctoritas commendata atque statuta retineri.

and all are clothed with authority appropriate to the place and function of each, is safeguarded from error, or elevated above subsequent criticism and correction. This high altitude of indefectible infallibility is attained by Scripture alone.<sup>33</sup>

An appropriate authority is granted of course to bishops, each in his proper sphere: but no one of them is free from error or exempt from testing and correction by the Holy Scriptures. Its own appropriate authority belongs similarly to councils of every grade: but no one of them can claim to have seen truth simply and seen it whole. If the Donatists appealed to Cyprian and his council, for example, Augustine, while ready to yield to Cyprian all the deference that was his due, did not hesitate to declare roundly, "The authority of Cyprian has no terrors for me",<sup>34</sup> and to assert that no council is exempt from error.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Reuter, *Augustin. Studien*, p. 329: "There is not, to my knowledge, to be found in Augustine, any statement giving *unambiguous* expression to this notion [of the infallibility of the Church]. We read, *Contra Cresconium* ii. 33. 39, 'Since Holy Scripture cannot err'; but I have sought in vain for any declaration corresponding to this with reference to the Church. The assertion, 'Outside the Church, there is no salvation' is nowhere complemented by this other one, 'The Church cannot err'." Reuter proceeds to say that, although this precise formula does not occur, yet "important premisses of it" may be found in the Anti-Manichæan treatises; but here opinions may lawfully differ. On what follows in the text Reuter, pp. 328 sq., 333 sq., may be profitably consulted; cf. also Schmidt, in Liebner's *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie* (1861), vi. 197-255, esp. 234 sq.

<sup>34</sup> *De Bapt. contr. Donat.* ii. 1. 2: *non me terret auctoritas Cypriani*. This does not mean, of course, that he denies all authority to Cyprian; but only that he knows the limits of Cyprian's authority. So, when he says, *De Bapt.* iii. 3. 5. *med*: "No authority (*nulla auctoritas*), clearly, deters me from seeking the truth", he is not proclaiming an abstract indefeasible liberty in seeking the truth, as A. Dorner (*Augustinus*, p. 236) appears to suppose (cf. Reuter, *op. cit.* 335, note 4), but means only to say that Cyprian expressly leaves the path open and does not interpose his authority (whatever that may amount to) to shut off free investigation. Accordingly, he repeats at the end of the paragraph more explicitly: "We have then liberty of investigation conceded to us by Cyprian's own moderate and truthful declaration." The assertion of a zeal for truth which takes precedence of all else, apparently wrongly attributed to this passage, may be more justly found in the remark

For, he explains at length,<sup>35</sup> no one “is ignorant that the Holy Canonical Scriptures, as well of the Old as of the New Testament, are contained within their own determined (*certis*) limits, and that they are so set above all later letters of bishops that with respect to them it is not possible to doubt or to dispute whether anything that stands written in them is true or right, while all the letters of bishops which, since the closing of the canon have been written or are being written, are open to confutation, either by the wiser discourses of some one who happens to be more skilled in the particular matter, or by the weightier authority or more learned prudence of other bishops, or by councils,—if there chances to be anything in them that deviates from the truth.” And as little is anyone ignorant “that the councils themselves which are held in the several regions and provinces must without any evasion yield to the authority of plenary councils which are assembled from the whole Christian world; and that even the earlier plenary councils themselves are corrected by later ones, when by some actual trial, what was closed has been opened, and what was hidden has come to light”. We perceive accordingly that the limiting phrases in the famous passages in which Augustine declares the Holy Scriptures the sole infallible authority in the world are by no means otiose. He means just what he says when he writes to Jerome, “For I confess to your charity that I have learned to defer this respect and honor to those Scriptural books only (*solis*) which are now called canonical, that I believe most firmly that no one of those authors has erred in any respect in writing”;<sup>36</sup> or again when he says in another place, “In the writings of such authors”—that is to say Catholic writers—“I feel myself free to use my own judgment, since I owe unhesitating assent to *nothing*

which occurs in the *Contra. Ep. Man. Fund.* iv. 5, to the effect that “if the truth is so clearly proved as to leave no possibility of doubt, it takes precedence of all things which keep me in the Catholic Church”. Cf. Schmidt, as cited above.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, ii. 3. 4.

<sup>36</sup> *Ep.* 82, 3.

*but the canonical Scriptures".<sup>37</sup>* A presumptive apostolicity may lend to the immemorial customs of the universal Church an authority which only arrogance can resist; and to the Church which was founded by the apostles, and made by them a depository of the tradition of truth, a high deference is due in all its deliverances: but to the Scriptures alone belongs supreme authority because to them alone belongs an apostolicity which coalesces with their entire fabric. They alone present us with what we may perhaps call "fixed apostolicity".

The ground of this conception of apostolicity as the principle of divine authority lies ultimately in the relation in which the apostles stood to Christ. The apostles, as Christ's accredited agents, empowered by His Spirit for their work, are, in effect, Christ Himself speaking. This idea underlies the entirety of Augustine's reasoning, and is very fully developed in a striking passage which occurs at the close of the first book of the *Harmony of the Gospels*.<sup>38</sup> He tells us here that our Lord, "who sent the prophets before His own descent, also despatched the apostles after His ascension. . . . Therefore, since these disciples have written matters which He declared and spoke to them, it ought not by any means to be said that He has written nothing Himself; for the truth is that His members have accomplished only that which they became acquainted with by the repeated statements of the Head. For all that He was minded to give for our perusal on the subject of His own doings and saying, He commanded to be written by those disciples, whom He thus used as if they were His own hands. Whoever apprehends this correspondence of unity and this concordant service of the members, all in harmony in the discharge of diverse offices under the Head, will receive the account which he gets in the Gospel through the narrative constructed by the disciples, in the same kind of spirit in which he might look upon the actual hand of the Lord Himself.

<sup>37</sup> *De natura et gratia*, lxi. 71.

<sup>38</sup> *De consensu Evang.* i. 35. 54.

which he bore in that body that He made His own, were he to see it engaged in the act of writing". Apostolicity therefore spells authority because it also spells inspiration: what the apostles have given the Church as its law is the inspired Word of God. The canonical Scriptures are accordingly "the august pen of the Spirit" of God;<sup>39</sup> and in reading them we are, through the words written by their human authors, learning "the will of God in accordance with which we believe these men to have spoken",<sup>40</sup> seeing that it is "the Holy Spirit who with admirable wisdom and care for our welfare has arranged the Holy Scriptures" in all their details,<sup>41</sup> and has spoken in them in perfect foresight of all our needs and perplexities.<sup>42</sup> Accordingly Augustine makes the Lord declare to him, "O man, verily what my Scripture says, I say"; and this is the reason that we may be assured that the Scripture is true,—because it is He that is true, or rather the Truth Itself, who has given it forth.<sup>43</sup> Thus the circle of the authority of the Scriptures completes itself. The Scriptures occupy the pinnacle of authority because they are the Word of God, just God's congealed speech to us. We know them to be such because they have been given to us as such by the apostles who were appointed and empowered precisely for the task of establishing the Church of God on earth, and who are therefore the vehicles for the transmission to us of the will of God and the Word which embodies that will.

But have the Scriptures which we have and which have acquired canonical authority in the Church, really been given to us by the apostles as the Word of God? How shall we assure ourselves of these Scriptures that they possess that

<sup>39</sup> *Conf.* vii. 21. 27: *venerabilem stilum Spiritus Tui.*

<sup>40</sup> *De Doctr. Christ.*, ii. 5. 6.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, iii. 27. 38: "assuredly the Holy Spirit who through him [the human author] spoke these words, foresaw that this interpretation would occur to the reader. . . . "

<sup>43</sup> *Conf.* xiii. 29. 44: *O homo, nempe quod Scriptura mea dicit, ego dico. . . . O Domine, nonne ista Scriptura tua vera est, quoniam tu verax et veritas edidisti eam?*

apostolicity which lends to them their revelatory character and makes them our supreme authority? The answer returned by Augustine to this question has been most variously conceived, and indeed, out of the several interpretations given it, heterogeneous traditions of his teaching have grown up as discordant at the extremes as the formal principles of Romanism and Protestantism. If we could content ourselves with a simple concrete statement, it doubtless would not be far astray to say briefly that Augustine received the Scriptures as apostolic at the hands of the Church; and that this is the meaning of his famous declaration, "I would not believe the Gospel except I were moved thereto by the authority of the Catholic Church". But the question at once arises whether this appeal to the Church is for conclusive testimony or for authoritative decision. Divergent interpretations at once intervene, and we find ourselves therefore little advanced by our concrete response. The precise question that is raised by these divergent interpretations is whether Augustine validated to himself the Scriptures as apostolic in origin and therefore the revealed Word of God by appropriate evidence, more or less fully drawn out and more or less wisely marshalled; or declined all argument and cut the knot by resting on the sheer enactment of the contemporary Church. In the latter case Augustine would appear as the protagonist of the Romish principle of the supreme authority of the Church, subordinating even the Scriptures to this living authority. In the former he would appear as the forerunner of the Protestant doctrine of the supreme authority of Scripture.

The proper evidence of the apostolicity of the canonical Scriptures is, of course, historical. Apostolicity is a historical conception and its actuality can be established only on historical evidence. When Augustine declares of Scripture that it owes its authority to its apostolicity, he would seem, therefore, already to have committed himself to dependence for the validation of the authority of Scripture upon historical evidence. Many others than the Romanists.

however, have found Augustine defective in his teaching or at least in his practice at this point. Neander remarks that Augustine having been brought by Manichæism into doubt as to which were the true documents of the Christian religion, and not being prepared for a historical investigation to determine the truth of the matter, had nothing left him but to fall back upon the tradition of the Church;<sup>44</sup> and this opinion is echoed by Reuter,<sup>45</sup> and sharpened by Harnack.<sup>46</sup> It is to be observed, however, that, when we have suggested that Augustine's dependence was placed wholly on the "tradition of the Church",<sup>47</sup> as Neander phrases it, we have not removed the ground of his conviction out of the sphere of historical judgments. To say 'tradition' is indeed only to say 'history' over again. And the question at this point is not whether the historical evidence which Augustine rested upon was good historical evidence, but whether he rested upon historical evidence at all, rather than upon the bare authority of the contemporary Church. It will be useful to recall here Augustine's discussion of 'tradition' to which we have just had occasion to advert. We will remember that he expressly distinguishes between 'tradition' and 'Scripture', and decisively subordinates the authority of 'tradition' to that of 'Scripture'. It would certainly be incongruous to suppose him to be at the same moment basing the superior authority of Scripture on the inferior authority of tradition,—in any other sense than that in which fact is based upon its appropriate evidence. We should bear in mind, moreover, that his appeal to 'tradition' was in the instances brought before us distinctly of the nature of an appeal to testimony, and as such was distinctly discriminated from an appeal to the 'Church', speaking, say, through a bishop or a council, and as distinctly preferred to it. His purpose was to validate certain customs prevalent in the Church as

<sup>44</sup> *Katholizismus und Protestantismus* (1863), p. 82.

<sup>45</sup> *Augustin. Studien*, p. 491, note 1.

<sup>46</sup> *History of Dogma*, v. p. 80; cf. Loofs, *Leitfaden*, etc.

<sup>47</sup> die Ueberlieferung der Kirche.

incumbent on all. This he does, not directly by asserting as sufficient the authority of the contemporary Church, as if the Church was as such clothed with the right to determine the practice of its adherents by a mere *ipse dixit*. He proceeds, rather, indirectly, by seeking to establish the apostolicity of these customs by an appeal to the immemorial universality of their tradition in the Church. Obviously 'tradition' is treated here not as authority, but as evidence; and the "authority" thus validated by tradition is treated as superior to the "authority" of the contemporary Church speaking through whatever channels. It certainly would be incongruous to suppose that he was nevertheless consciously basing the authority of Scripture, which was to him superior to that of even tradition, on the bare authority of the Church, which he defines to be inferior to either. His appeal to the 'Church', as by its 'authority' moving men to believe the 'gospel' can scarcely be understood otherwise, therefore, than as a broad statement that the Scriptures are validated as apostolic and therefore authoritative in some way by the Church. What is meant, when this is made specific, is, obviously, that the testimony of the whole Church, borne unbrokenly from the beginning, to the apostolicity of the canonical Scriptures is conclusive of the fact.

In his appeals to the 'Church' after this fashion Augustine certainly had in mind the Church as a whole, as extended through both space and time; and his fundamental contention is that the testimony of this Church is of decisive weight to the origin of her Scriptures in apostolic gift, and therefore to the authority of the Scriptures as an inspired revelation of the divine will. Such an appeal is distinctly of the nature of an appeal to historical testimony. But the nature of this appeal would not be essentially altered were we to omit consideration of the extension of the Church in time and focus attention on its extension in space alone, as many suppose Augustine to have done. To appeal to the testimony of the universal Church is to adduce historical evidence. Even if we do not accord such weight

to this evidence as was obviously accorded to it by Augustine, this difference in our estimate of its conclusiveness should not blind us to its nature. We may smile if we will at the easiness of Augustine's historical conscience, and wonder that he could content himself with testimony so uncontested. But we ought to recognize that in so doing we are criticising his sense of historical values, not disproving that his resort to the Church was precisely for testimony.

Nor is it very difficult to do serious injustice to Augustine's sense of historical values in a matter of this kind. It is very much a matter of times and seasons. An appeal to the testimony of the universal Church at the close of the nineteenth or at the opening of the twentieth century is not altogether without historical value. But we must not fail to bear in mind that an appeal to the testimony of the universal Church at the close of the fourth or the opening of the fifth century is something very different from an appeal to its testimony at the close of the nineteenth or the opening of the twentieth century. Certainly the testimony of the universal Church at the close of the first or the opening of the second century is still treated in wide circles, as in such a thing as the apostolic gift of the Scriptures, conclusive. And it is not an easy matter accurately to estimate exactly the rate at which the value of this testimony decreases with the lapse of time. Are we so sure that its value had depreciated by the close of the fourth century to such an extent as to render an appeal to the Church as witness-bearer, at that period, absurd? The Church to which the Scriptures were committed by the apostolic college, by whom it was founded and supplied with its *corpus juris*,—is not this Church the proper witness to the apostolicity of the Scriptures it has received from the hands of its apostolic founders? And is it strange that it has always been appealed to to bear its testimony to this fact? No doubt, as time passed and the years intervening between the commission of the Scriptures to the Church and its witness-bearing to them increased, this testimony became ever weaker as

testimony. And no doubt as it became weaker as testimony it naturally took to itself more and more the character of arbitrary authentication. No doubt, further, it was by this slow transmutation of testimony into authentication that the Romish conception of Scripture as dependent upon the Church for its authentication gradually came into being. And no doubt still further the change was wrought practically before it was effected theoretically. Men came practically to rest upon the authority of the Church for the accrediting of Scripture, before they recognized that what they received from the Church was anything more than testimony. The theoretic recognition came inevitably, however, in time. So soon as the defect in the testimony of the Church arising from the lapse of time began to be observed, men were either impelled to cure the defect by an appeal to the Church of the past, that is to say by a historical investigation; or else tempted to rest satisfied with the authority of the living Church. The latter course as the line of easiest resistance, falling in, moreover, as it did, with the increasingly high estimate placed on the Church as mediatrix of religion, was inevitably ultimately taken; and the Romish doctrine resulted. Let it be allowed that in this outline we have a true sketch of the drift of thought through the Patristic Church. It still is not obvious that this development had proceeded so far by the close of the fourth century that 'Augustine's appeal to the 'Church' to authenticate the 'Gospel' must be understood as an appeal to the authority strictly so called rather than to the testimony of the Church. On the face of it, it does not seem intrinsically absurd to suppose that Augustine may still at that date have made his appeal to the Church with his mind set upon testimony. And when we come to scrutinize the actual appeals which he made, it seems clear enough that his mind rested on testimony.

Perhaps there is no better way to bring the fact clearly before us than to note the passages quoted by the Romish expositors with a view to supporting their view that Aug-

ustine based the authority of the Scriptures immediately upon the dogmatic authority of the Church. Thus, for example, Professor E. Portalié writes as follows:<sup>48</sup>

“Above Scripture and tradition is the living authority of the Church. It alone guarantees to us the Scriptures, according to the celebrated declaration in the treatise *Against the Epistle of Manichæus called Fundamental*, v. 6: ‘I indeed would not believe the Gospel except the authority of the Catholic Church moved me’. Compare *Against Faustus the Manichæan* XXII. 79; XXVIII. 2.”

We reserve for the moment comment on “the celebrated declaration” from the *Contra Epist. Man. Fund.* and content ourselves with observing that if it indeed implies that Augustine based the authority of Scripture on that of the “living” Church, it receives no support from the companion passages cited. They certainly appeal to the “historical” Church, that is to say adduce the testimony of the Church extended in time rather than the bare authority of the Church extended in space. So clear is this in the latter case<sup>49</sup> that Augustine in it sets the testimony of the Manichæans to the genuineness of their founder’s writings side by side, as the same in kind, with the testimony of the Church to the genuineness of the Apostolic writings. I believe, he says, that the book you produce is really Manichæus’, because from the days of Manichæus until to-day it has been kept in continuous possession and estimation as his, in the society of the Manichæans: similarly you must believe that the book we produce as Matthew’s is his on the same kind of testimony in the Church. To the fixed succession of bishops among the Christians is assigned no different kind of authority than is allowed to the fixed succession of presiding officers among the Manichæans; in both alike this succession is adduced merely as a safeguard for trustworthy transmission. No doubt Augustine represents the testimony of the Church as indefinitely more worthy of credit than that of the Manichæans, but this is a different matter:

<sup>48</sup> Vacant-Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de théologie Catholique*, i. 2341.

<sup>49</sup> *Contra Faustum Manichæum*, xxviii, 2.

*gradus non mutant speciem.* Similarly, in the former citation<sup>50</sup> Augustine's appeal is not specifically to the Church of his time, but to the "holy and learned men" who were living in the time of the writers—real or alleged—of the books in question, who, he says, would be in position to know the truth of the matter. Nothing can be clearer in this case either, than that the point of Augustine's argument turns on the validity of the testimony of the Church, not on the dogmatic authority of the Church.

The note struck by these passages is sustained in all Augustine's discussions of the matter and sometimes swells to an even clearer tone. Take for instance the *argumentum ad absurdum* with which he plies Faustus<sup>51</sup> to the effect that we can never be assured of the authorship of any book "if we doubt the apostolic origin of those books which are attributed to the apostles by the Church which the apostles themselves founded, and which occupies so conspicuous a place in all lands". Clearly the appeal to the Church here is for testimony, not for authorization, as is evidenced very plainly in the sequel. For Augustine goes on to contrast the hardiness of the Manichæans in attempting to doubt the apostolicity of books so attested, with their equal hardiness in accepting as apostolic books brought forward solely by heretics, the founders of whose sect lived long after the days of the apostles; and then adduces parallels from classical authors. There are, he tells us, spurious books, in circulation under the name of Hippocrates, known to be spurious among other things from the circumstance "that they were not recognized as his at the time when his authorship of his genuine productions was determined". And who doubts the genuineness of these latter? Would not a denial of it be greeted with derision—"simply because there is a succession of testimonies to these books from the time of Hippocrates to the present day, which makes it unreasonable either now or hereafter to have any doubt on the subject". Is it not by this continuity of the chain of evidence

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, xxii. 79.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, xxxiii. 6

that any book is authenticated—Plato's, Aristotle's, Cicero's, Varro's—or any of the Christian authors’—“the belief becoming more certain as it becomes more general, up to our own day”? Is not the very principle of authentication this: the transmission of information from contemporaries through successive generations? How then can anyone be so blinded by passion as “to deny the ability of the Church of the apostles—a community of brethren as numerous as they were faithful—to transmit their writings unaltered to posterity, as the original seats of the apostles have been occupied by a continuous succession of bishops to the present day?” Are we to deal with the apostolic writings differently from the natural dealing we accord day by day to ordinary ones,—whether of profane or religious authors?<sup>52</sup>

The matter is not different when at an earlier place in the same treatise<sup>53</sup> he takes up much the same point on which he is arguing in the famous passage “I would not believe the Gospel, etc.”. When Manichæus calls himself an apostle, he says, it is a shameless falsehood, “for it is well known that this heresy began not only after Tertullian, but after Cyprian”. And what evidence can Manichæus or Faustus bring forward, which will satisfy anyone not inclined to believe either their books or themselves? “Will Faustus take our apostles as witnesses? Unless he can find some apostles in life, he must read their writings: and these are all against him. . . . He cannot pretend that their writings have been tampered with; for that would be to attack the credit of his own witnesses. Or if he produces his own manuscripts of the apostolic writings, he must also obtain

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *ibid.* xxii. 19: “Why not rather submit to the authority of the Gospel which is so well-founded, so confirmed, so generally acknowledged and admired, and which has an unbroken series of testimonies from the Apostles down to our own day, that you may have an intelligent belief?” Cf. also xi. 2, xiii. 4, xxxiii. 6 and 9. Because Augustine was deeply impressed by the catholicity of the Church's testimony (as e. g., *De morr. eccles. cath.* xxix. 61) is no reason why we should fail to see that he is equally impressed by its continuity,—that is, by its historical character.

<sup>53</sup> xiii. 4. 5.

for them the authority of the Churches founded by the apostles themselves, by showing that they have been preserved and transmitted by their sanction. It will be difficult for a man to make me believe him on the evidence of writings which derive their authority from his own word, which I do not believe. . . . The authority of our books, which is confirmed by the agreement of so many nations, supported by a succession of apostles, bishops, and councils, is against you. Your books have no authority, for it is an authority maintained by only a few and these the worshippers of an untruthful God and Christ. . . . The established authority of the Scriptures must outweigh every other: for it derives new confirmation from the progress of events which happen, as Scripture proves, in fulfilment of the predictions made so long before their occurrence." Of course this is a piece of polemic argumentation, not a historical investigation: but the gist of the polemic is simply that the Scriptures of the Christians owe their authority to a valid historical vindication of them as of apostolic origin, while the Scriptures of the Manichæans lack all authority because they lack such a validation. Augustine does not think of such a thing as simply opposing the authority of the Church to the Manichæan contentions; and much less of course does he take a roundabout way to the same result, by opposing to them the authority of Scriptures which owe all their authority to the mere *ipse dixit* of the Church. If he speaks of authority as given to sacred books only "through the Churches of Christ", it is clear that this does not mean that these churches communicate to these Scriptures an authority inherent in the Churches, but only that it is by their testimony that that supreme authority which belongs to the Scriptures from their apostolic origin is vindicated to them, as indeed it is confirmed to them by other testimonies also, those, to wit, of miracles and fulfilled prophesy and the consent of the nations and the succession of apostles, bishops, and councils, to confine ourselves to items enumerated here. Surely it cannot be doubted that here also Augustine's appeal to the

Church as authenticating the Scriptures is to the Church as a witness, not as an authorizer.

It is natural to turn from this passage immediately to the closely related one in the treatise *Against Manichæus' Epistle called Fundamental*, in which the famous words, 'I would not believe the Gospel, etc.', occur. If the passage which we have just had before us is rather a piece of sharp polemics than a historical investigation, much more this. Augustine proposes here to join argument with the Manichæans on the pure merits of the question at issue between them. He wishes to approach the consideration of their claims as would a stranger who was for the first time hearing their Gospel: and as they promise nothing less than demonstration he demands that they give him nothing less than demonstration before asking of him assent.<sup>54</sup> He warns them that he is held to the Catholic Church by many bonds, which it will be hard to loosen: so that their task of convincing him on the ground of pure reason will not be an easy one. He has found a very pure wisdom in the Catholic Church—not indeed attained to in this life by more than a few spiritual men, while the rest walk by faith, but nevertheless shining steadily forth for all who have eyes to see it. He has been deeply impressed by the wide extension of the Church. The authority it exercises,—“inaugurated by miracles, nourished by hope, augmented by love, established by antiquity”—has very strongly moved him. The unbroken succession of rulers in the Church possesses for him a great weight of evidence. He confesses that the very name of ‘Catholic’—retained unchallenged amid so many heresies,—has affected him deeply. What have the Manichæans to offer him which would justify him in setting aside these and such inducements to remain a Catholic? Nothing but the “promise of the truth” (*sola veritatis pollicitatio*). The “promise” of the truth, observe: not “the truth” itself. If the latter,—why, Augustine gives up the contest at once. For he allows without dispute, that if they give him truth itself—so clearly

<sup>54</sup> *Contra Epist. Manich. Fundam.* iii. 3.

the truth that it cannot be doubted,—*that* is something that is to be preferred to all these things which he has enumerated as holding him in the Catholic Church,—these and all other things that can be imagined as holding him there. For nothing is so good as truth. But he persistently demands that there must be something more than a “promise” of truth before he can separate himself from the Catholic Church,—or rather, as he puts it, before he can be moved “from that faith which binds his soul with ties so many and so strong to the Christian religion”. It is, then, we perceive, strict demonstration which Augustine is asking of the Manichæans, and he conducts the argument on that basis.

Turning at once to Manichæus's *Fundamental Epistle* as a succinct depository of nearly all which the Manichæans believe, he quotes its opening sentence: “Manichæus, an apostle of Jesus Christ, by the providence of God the Father”. There he stops immediately to demand proof,—proof, remember, not mere assertion. You have promised me truth, he says,—demonstrated truth: and this is what you give me. Now, I tell you shortly, I do not believe it. Will you prove it to me: or will you, in defiance of the whole claim of the Manichæans, that they ask faith of no man save on the ground of demonstration, simply demand of me belief without clear and sound proof? If you propose proof, I will wait for it. Perhaps you will turn to the Gospel and seek there a testimony to Manichæus. But suppose I do not believe the Gospel? Are you to depend for your proof—you who differentiate yourselves from Christians in this, that while they demand faith, you offer them demonstration and ask belief of nothing until you have demonstrated it,—are *you* to depend for your proof on this very faith of the Christians? For observe, my faith in the Gospel rests on the authority of the Catholic Church. And moreover, I find myself in this quandary: the same Church that tells me to believe the Gospel tells me not to believe Manichæus. Choose, then, which you will. If I am to believe the Catholics, then I cannot believe Manichæus—for they tell me not

to. If I am not to believe the Catholics, then, you cannot use the Gospel, because, it was out of the preaching of the Catholics that I have been brought to believe the Gospel. Or if you say I am to believe them in this one matter and not in the other—I am scarcely so foolish as to put my faith thus at your arbitrary disposal, to believe or not believe as you dictate, on no assigned ground. It was agreed that you should not ask faith from me without clear proof—according to your universal boast that you demand no belief without precedent demonstration. It is clear, then, that to render such a proof you must not appeal to the Gospel. “If you hold to the Gospel, I will hold to those by whose teaching I have come to believe the Gospel; by their instructions I will put no credit in you whatever. And if by any chance you should be able to find anything really clear as to the apostolicity of Manichæus you will weaken the authority of the Catholics for me, since they instruct me not to believe you; and this authority having been weakened I shall no longer be able to believe the Gospel for it was through them that I came to believe it.” The upshot of it is that if no clear proof of Manichæus’ apostleship is to be found in the Gospel, I shall credit the Catholics rather than you; while if there is such to be found in the Gospel I shall believe neither them nor you. Where then is your demonstration of the apostleship of Manichæus—that I should believe it? Of course I do not mean I do not believe the Gospel. I do believe it, and believing it I find no way of believing you. You can point out neither in it nor in any other book faith in which I confess, anything about this absurd apostleship of Manichæus. But it is certainly evident that your promise to demonstrate to me your tenets signally fails in this case on any supposition.

This is Augustine’s argument in this famous passage. Undoubtedly the exact interpretation of its implications with respect to the seat of authority in Christianity is attended with considerable difficulty. And it is not altogether strange that the Romanists have seized upon it as subordi-

nating the 'Gospel' to the 'Church': nor even that they have been followed in this, not merely by extreme rationalists predisposed to every interpretation of a Patristic writer which tends to support their notion that the clothing of Scripture with absolute authority was a late and unhistorical dogmatic development,<sup>55</sup> but also by many scholars intent only upon doing complete justice to Augustine's opinions.<sup>56</sup> There are serious difficulties, however, in the way of this interpretation of the passage. One of them is that it would in that case be out of accord with the entirety of Augustine's teaching elsewhere. It is quite true that elsewhere also he speaks of the authority of the Church, and even establishes the Church on the "summit of authority". But in all such passages he speaks obviously of the Church rather as the instrument of the spread of the saving truth than as the foundation on which the truth rests,—in a word as the vehicle rather than the seat of authority.<sup>57</sup> And in general, as we have already seen, Augustine's allusions to the Church as "the pillar and ground of the truth" throw the stress on its function of witness-bearing to the truth rather than found the truth on its bare *ipse dixit*. It is scarcely likely that he has spoken in a contrary sense in our present passage. We must not permit it to fall out of sight that Augustine's point of view in this passage is that of one repelling the Manichæan claim of strict demonstration of the truth of their teaching. His rejoinder amounts to saying that they cannot ground a demonstration upon a Gospel accepted only on faith. The contrast at this point is not between the weakness of the basis on which they accept their tenets and the incomparable weight of the authority of the Church on which Christians accept the 'Gospel'. On the contrary, the contrast is between the great-

<sup>55</sup> Cf. e. g. H. J. Holtzmann, *Kanon und Tradition* (1859), pp. 2, 3.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. e. g. Harnack, *Hist. Dog.* v. 80; Loofs, *Leitfaden d. DG.*; Dorner, *Augustinus*; Kunze, *Glaubenslehre*, etc.

<sup>57</sup> Portalié, as cited, 2413, adduces in proof that Augustine places the Church "above even Scripture and tradition", *De utilitate credendi* xvii. 35, comparing *Ep.* 118, 32.

ness of their claims to demonstration and the weakness of its basis—nothing but the ‘Gospel’ which is accepted on “authority” not on “demonstration”—on “faith” not on “reason”—in effect, on “testimony”, not on “sight”. In a word, the “authority of the Church” is adduced here not as superlatively great—so great that, in the face of it, the Manichæan claims must fall away let them be grounded in what they may; but rather as incongruously inadequate to support the weight the Manichæan must put on it if he is to build up his structure of demonstration. The Manichæan undertakes a demonstration, scorning a faith that rests on authority: and then actually wishes to rest that demonstration on a premise which has no other basis than a faith that rests on authority. He cannot *demonstrate* that Manichæus was an Apostle of Christ on the testimony of a ‘Gospel’ which itself is accepted on the *authority* of the Catholic Church: ‘authority’ being used here in its contrast with ‘reason’, not with ‘testimony’, and in pursuance of Augustine’s general contention that all religious truth must begin with faith on authority and not with demonstration on reason. This being the case, so far is the passage from predication that Augustine esteemed the ‘authority’ of the Church as ‘the highest of all’ as the Romish contention insists,<sup>58</sup> that its very gist is that the testimony of the Church is capable of establishing only that form of conviction known as ‘faith’ and therefore falls hopelessly short of ‘demonstration’.

Such being the case we cannot be surprised that in all ages there has been exhibited a tendency among those more or less emancipated from the Romish tradition to deny that even this famous passage asserts the supreme authority of the contemporary Church. Striking instances may be found for example in William Occam<sup>59</sup> and Marsilius of

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Portalié, as cited, 2413 and 2341.

<sup>59</sup> Occam explains that the ecclesia quae majoris auctoritatis est quam evangelista, est illa ecclesia cuius auctor evangelii pars esse agnoscat (Goldasti mon. tom. 1. fol. 402). That is to say, he understands the Church here as projected through time, and as including even Jesus

Padua<sup>60</sup> in the fourteenth century and in John Wessel<sup>61</sup> in the fifteenth: and examples are not wanting throughout the whole period of papal domination.<sup>62</sup> Of course the early Protestant controversialists take their place in this series. With them the matter was even less than with William Occam and Marsilius a merely academical question. In their revolt from the dogmatic authority of the Church and their appeal to the Scriptures alone as the sole source and norm of divine truth, they were met by the citation of this passage from Augustine. As on its theological side the Reformation was precisely an 'Augustinian' revival, the adduction of Augustine's authority in behalf of the subjection of Scripture to the Church, was particularly galling to them and amounted to a charge that they were passing beyond the limits of all established Christianity. They were indeed in no danger, in casting off the authority of the Church, of replacing it with the authority of any single father. Doubtless Luther spoke a little more brusquely than was the wont of the Reformers, in the well-known assertion: "Augustine often erred; he cannot be trusted: though he was good and holy, yet he, as well as other fathers, was wanting in the true faith". But the essential opinion here expressed was the settled judgment of all the Reformers and is by no means inconsistent with their high admiration of Augustine or with their sincere deference to him. The

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Himself: the historical not the contemporary Church. But he takes "authority" strictly. Cf. Neander, *Hist. of Church*, E. T. v. 40.

<sup>60</sup> Marsilius explains: *Dicit autem Augustinus pro tanto se credere evangelio propter ecclesiae catholicae auctoritatem, quia suae credulitatis initium inde sumpsit, quam Spiritu Sancto dirigi novit: fides enim quandoque incipit ex auditu*,—in which he anticipates the general Protestant positon. Cf. (quite fully) Neander, E. T. v. 27-28.

<sup>61</sup> *De Potestate ecclesiastica* (Opp. p. 759): "We believe in the Gospel on God's account, and on the Gospel's account in the Church and the Pope; not in the Gospel on the Church's account: wherefore that which Augustine says (*Cont. Epist. Man. Fund.* c. 6, etc.), concerning the Gospel and the Church, *originis de credendo verbum est, non comparationis aut praferentive*. For the whole passage and others of like import, see Gieseler, *Ecclesiast. Hist.* iii. 5, § 153, E. T. iii. 468; and cf. Schmidt, *Jahrbücher f. d. Theol.* (1861), vi. 235.

<sup>62</sup> Cf., for example, the instances mentioned by Chamier, below.

gist of the matter is that though they looked upon Augustine as their great instructor, esteeming him indeed the greatest teacher God had as yet given His Church; and felt sure, as Luther expressed it, that “had he lived in this century, he would have been of our way of thinking”; they yet knew well that he had not lived in the sixteenth century but in the fourth and fifth and that in the midst of the marvellous purity of his teaching there were to be found some of the tares of his time growing only too richly. Ready as they were to recognize this, however, they were not inclined to admit without good reason that he had erred so sadly in so fundamental a matter as that at present before us; and they did not at all recognize that the Romanists had made good their assertion that Augustine in saying that “he would not believe the Gospel except as moved thereto by the authority of the Catholic Church” was asserting the Romish theory that the authority of the Church lies behind and above all other authorities on earth—that, as even Schwane puts it, the Church is the representative of God on earth and its authority alone can assure us of the reality of a divine revelation.

Already at the Leipzig disputation with Eck, Luther had been triumphantly confronted with this statement of Augustine's; and in his *Resolutions* on that debate he suggests that Augustine was only giving what was historically true in his own case.<sup>63</sup> Augustine had himself been led to believe the Gospel through the ministration of the Church; and he adduces this fact only that he might bring to bear upon his heretical readers the impressive testimony of the whole Church, which was, of course, of much more moving weight than his own personal witness could be. As a matter of fact, comments Luther, the Gospel does not rest on the Church, but contrariwise, the Church on the Gospel. It was not Luther's way to say his say with bated breath. This is the way he expresses his judgment in his *Table Talk*:<sup>64</sup>

<sup>63</sup> See Köstlin, *Luther's Theology*, E. T. ii. 224. 255, and esp. i. 320-321.

<sup>64</sup> “Of the Fathers”, near the beginning (Bohn's Ed.). Augustine's

"The Pope to serve his own turn, took hold on St. Augustine's sentence, where he says, *evangelio non crederem*, etc. The asses could not see what occasioned Augustine to utter that sentence, whereas he spoke it against the Manichæans; as much as to say: "I believe not *you*, for you are damned heretics, but I believe and hold with the Church, the spouse of Christ". It seemed to Luther, in other words, quite one thing to say that the credit of the Church ought to be higher than that of the Manichæans, and quite another to teach that the authority of the Church was needed to give authority to the Gospel. Perhaps the consentient opinion of the Reformers in this matter is nowhere better stated, in brief form, than in the Protestant *Objections* to the Acts of Ratisbon, which were penned by Melanchthon.<sup>65</sup> "Although therefore", we read here, "the conservation of certain writings of the Prophets and Apostles is the singular work and benefit of God, nevertheless there must be recognized that diligence and authority of the Church, by which it has, in part testified to certain writings, in part by a spiritual judgment separated from the remaining Prophetic and Apostolic Scriptures those that are unworthy and dissentient. Wherefore Augustine commands to us the authority of the primitive Church,<sup>66</sup> receives the writings that are approved by the Catholic consent of the primitive Church; (and) repudiates the later books of the Manichæans. Accordingly he says: '*I would not believe the Gospel except the authority of the Catholic Church moved me*'. He means that he is moved by the consentient testimony of the primitive Church, not to doubt that these books were handed down from the Apostles and are worthy of credit (*fide*)". In a word, according to Melanchthon, Augustine is to be read as appealing to the testimony of the Church not as asserting its authority.

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statement is invoked in the bull, *Exsurge Domine*, published by Leo X in 1520 against Luther.

<sup>65</sup> *Corpus Reff.* iv. 350. A French version is given in the Brunswick ed. of Calvin's works, v. 564.

<sup>66</sup> *Auctoritatem primae ecclesiae.*

In the same line follow all the Reformers, and much the same mode of statement may be read, for example, in Butzer, or Calvin, or Bullinger, or Peter Martyr. "I will not now remember", writes Bullinger,<sup>67</sup> "how by manifest words the standard bearers of that see do write, that the Canonical Scripture taketh her authority of the Church, abusing the sentence of the ancient father St. Augustine, 'I would not have believed the Gospel, if the authority of the early Church had not moved me'." . . . How they abused it Peter Martyr tells us more fully:<sup>68</sup> "But they say that Augustine writes *Against the Epistola Fundamenti*, 'I would not believe the Gospel except the authority of the Church moved me'. But Augustine wished to signify by these words nothing else than that much is to be attributed to the ministry of the Church which proposes, preaches, and teaches the Gospel to believers. For who of us came to Christ or believed the Gospel except as excited by the preaching of the Gospel which is done in the Church? It cannot be inferred from this, however, that the authority of the Gospel hangs on the Church in the minds of the auditors. For if that were true, long ago the Epicureans and Turks had been persuaded . . . ." As was to be expected it was Calvin who gives us the solidest piece of reasoning upon the subject. The gist of what he says is that Augustine was not setting forth the source whence the Gospel derives its authority, but the instrument by which men may be led to recognize that authority. The unbeliever, he remarks, may well be brought to trust the Gospel by the consent of the Church; but the believer's trust in the Gospel finds its authority not in the Church, but in the Gospel itself, and this is logically prior to that of the Church, though no doubt, it may be chronologically recognized last by the inquirer. The Church may thus bring us to the Gospel and commend the Gospel to us; but when we

<sup>67</sup> *Decades*, v. 2 (Parker Soc. ed. iv, p. 67).

<sup>68</sup> *Loci Communes*, Zurich, 1580, i. 251 (iii. 3. 2).

have accepted the Gospel our confidence in it rests on something far more fundamental than the Church. Augustine, he insists, "did not have in mind to suspend the faith which we have in the Scriptures on the will and pleasure (*nutu arbitrioque*) of the Church, but only to point out, what we too confess to be true, that those who are not yet illuminated by the Spirit of God, are by reverence for the Church brought to docility so as to learn from the Gospel the faith of Christ; and that the authority of the Church is in this way an introduction, by which we are prepared for the faith of the Gospel". Augustine is perfectly right, then, he continues, to urge on the Manichæans the universal consent of the Church as a *reason* why they should come believingly to the Scriptures, but the *ground* of our faith in the Scriptures as a revelation of truth is that they are from God.<sup>69</sup>

The Protestant scholastics, of course, developed what had by their time become the traditional Protestant contention, and defended it against the assaults of the Romish controversialists. Who first invented the philological argument that Augustine uses in this sentence the imperfect for the pluperfect "in accordance with the African dialect"—so that he says, not "I would not believe the Gospel, but, historically, "I would not have believed the Gospel"—we have not had the curiosity to inquire. If we may trust the English version of the *Decades*, Bullinger already treats the tense as a pluperfect. Musculus,<sup>70</sup> who devotes a separate section of his *Locus de Sacris Scripturis* to the examination of Augustine's declaration lays great stress on this partici-

<sup>69</sup> *Institutes*, i. 7. 3. Calvin very appositely points out that Augustine in the immediately preceding context represents the proper course to be to "follow those who invite us first to believe what we are not yet able to see, that, being made able by this very faith, we may deserve to understand what we believe, our mind being now inwardly strengthened and illuminated not by men but by God Himself" (c. 5). In these words, Calvin remarks, Augustine grounds our confidence in the Gospel on the internal operation of God Himself upon our minds. Cf. below, note 88.

<sup>70</sup> *Loci Communes*, Basle, 1599, pp. 181-183 (Locus xxi).

ular point, that in it *non crederem* is used for *non credi-dissem*; and Musculus is generally cited by later writers upon it. This is true, for example, of both Whitaker and Chamier, who with Stillingfleet may be mentioned as offering perhaps the fullest and best discussions of the whole matter. Whitaker<sup>71</sup> devotes a whole chapter to it, and after adducing the arguments of Peter Martyr, Calvin and Musculus, affirms that “it is plain that he (Augustine) speaks of himself as an unbeliever, and informs us how he first was converted from a Manichæan to be a Catholic by listening to the voice of the Church”—in which remark he appears to us to be quite wrong. Chamier’s<sup>72</sup> treatment, which also fills a whole chapter, is exceedingly elaborate. He begins by calling attention to the singularity of the passage, nothing precisely to the same effect being adducible from the whole range of Augustine’s writings. Then he cites the opinions of eminent Romanists divergent from the current Romish interpretation,—those of John, Cardinal of Torre Cremara, Thomas Valden, Driedo, Gerson, who represent Augustine as assigning only a *declarative* authority to the Church, or as speaking not of the “living” but of the “historical” Church. “Augustine”, says Driedo, “speaks of the Catholic Church which was from the beginning of the Christian faith”: “by the Church”, says Gerson, “he understands the primitive congregation of those believers who saw and heard Christ and were his witnesses”. All these are good staggers towards the truth, says Chamier: but best of all is the explanation of the passage which is given by Petrus de Alliaco, himself a cardinal, “in the third article, of the first question on the first of the sentences”. In the judgment of this prelate Augustine’s meaning is not that the Church was to him a *principium theologicum*, by which the Gospel was theologically proved to him to be true, but only a “moving cause” by which he was led to the

<sup>71</sup> *Disp. on Holy Scripture* (1610), iii. 8 (Parker Society, E. T., p. 320).

<sup>72</sup> *Panstrat. Cathol.* (Geneva, 1626), vol. 1, pp. 195 sq. (I. i. 7. 10).

Gospel,—much “as if he had said, ‘I would not believe the Gospel unless moved thereto by the holiness of the Church, or by the miracles of Christ: in which (forms of statement) though a cause is assigned for believing the Gospel, there is no *principium prius* set forth, faith in which is the cause why the Gospel is believed’”. In a word, as it seems, Petrus de Alliaco is of the opinion that Augustine’s appeal to the Church is to its testimony rather than to its authority. This opinion, now, continues Chamier, is illustrated and confirmed by weighty considerations brought forward by Protestant writers,—whereupon he cites the arguments of Peter Martyr, Calvin, Musculus, Whitaker, and through them makes his way into a detailed discussion of the passage itself in all its terms. Rivalling Chamier’s treatment in fulness if not equalling it in distinction is that given the passage in Stillingfleet’s *Rational Account of the Grounds of the Protestant Religion*,<sup>73</sup> under the three heads of (1) the nature of the controversy in which Augustine was engaged; (2) the Church by whose authority he was moved; and (3) the way and manner in which that Church’s authority moved him,—certainly a logically complete distribution of the material. The whole argument of scholastic protestatism is brought before us in its briefest but certainly not in its most attractive form, however, in the concise statement given in De Moor’s Commentary on John Marck’s Compend.<sup>74</sup> According to this summary: (1) The Papists in adducing this passage to support their doctrine of the primary authority of the Church deceive themselves by a two-fold fallacy,— (A) They draw a general conclusion from a particular instance: it does not follow that because Augustine did not believe the Gospel except as moved by the authority of the Church, therefore no one can believe the Gospel whom the authority of the Church does not move; (B) They misunderstand Augustine, as if he were speaking of himself at the time of his writing, instead of at the time of his con-

<sup>73</sup> i. 7; *Works* (1709), iv, pp. 210 sq.

<sup>74</sup> *De Moor in J. Marck. Compend* (1761), vol. i, p. 160 (cap. ii. 37. ad fin.).

version. "For where he says, 'I would not believe were I not moved' he is employing, as the learned observe, an African mode of speech, familiar enough to Augustine, in which the imperfect form is used for the pluperfect" . . . "His meaning then is not that believers should depend on the authority of the Church, but that unbelievers should take their start from it"; and in this sense he elsewhere speaks often enough. (2) Augustine is not speaking here of *auctoritas praecipiens, juris et imperii* (injunctionary authority, with a legal claim upon us for obedience) "as the Papists insist,—as if Augustine would have believed solely because the Church pronounced belief to be due": but of *auctoritas dignitatis* (the authority of observed desert), "which flows from the notable manifestations of Divine Providence observable in the Church,—such as miracles, antiquity, common consent (ch. iv.), and which may lead to faith though it is incapable of implanting it in the first instance". (3) "What is noted here, then, is the external motive of faith, but not at all the infallible *principium credendi*, which he teaches in the fourth chapter is to be sought in the truth alone. . . . And it is to be noted that the fathers elsewhere rightly hold that the Holy Scriptures are superior in authority both *in se* and *quoad nos* to the Church. . . ."

Of course it is observable enough from this survey, that the interest of the Protestant scholastics was far more in the dogmatic problem of the seat of authority in Christianity, than in the literary question of the precise meaning of Augustine's words. We must bear in mind that the citations we have made are taken not from studies in literary history but from dogmatic treatises; and that their authors approach the particular question upon which we are interrogating them from a dogmatic point of view, and in a doctrinal interest. There would be a certain unfairness in adducing these citations in a connection like the present, therefore, were there any real occasion to defend the tone in which they are couched. This is by no means the case.

We need not hesitate to recognize nevertheless at once that some of the reasoning employed by them to support their interpretation will scarcely bear scrutiny. It is a counsel of despair, for example, to represent Augustine as employing—"in accordance with the usage of the African dialect"—the imperfect in a pluperfect sense. We may readily confess that the supposition does violence to the context of the passage itself, which requires the imperfect sense; it seems clearly to be the offspring of a dogmatic need rather than of a sympathetic study of the passage. And we are afraid the same must be said of the general conception of the meaning of the passage which has probably given rise to this philological suggestion,—viz., that it is a historical statement of Augustine's own experience and means merely that he himself was led by the Church's authority to the Gospel. He is not writing his autobiography in this passage, but arguing with the Manichæans; and he is not informing them of what had been true of his own manner of conversion but confounding them by asserting what in a given case he, as a reasonable man, would do. There are elements enough of doubtful validity in the argument of the Protestant scholastics, therefore,—as there could not fail to be in the circumstances. But it is quite another question whether their general conception of the passage is not truer than that of their Romish opponents, and whether they do not adduce sound reasons enough for this general conception to support it adequately. It is a matter of common experience in every department of life,—and not least in judicial cases, where the experience has been crystallized into a maxim to the effect that it is best to announce decisions and withhold the reasons—that the decisions of men's judgment are often far better than the reasons they assign for them: and it may — haply prove true here too, that the position argued for by the Protestant scholastics is sounder than many of the arguments which they bring forward to support it.

It must be confessed, meanwhile, that modern Protestant opinion does not show so undivided a front as was the case

during the scholastic period. The majority of Protestant scholars, historical investigators as well as dogmatic systematizers, do, indeed, continue to defend the essential elements of the interpretation for which the Protestant scholastics contended; but even these ordinarily adopt a different line of argument and present the matter from a somewhat different point of view; and there are many recent Protestant scholars, and they not invariably those deeply affected by the rationalism of the day, who are inclined to revert more or less fully to the Romish interpretation. Even Dr. W. G. T. Shedd, who reproduces more of the scholastic argument than is now usual,<sup>75</sup> shows the effect of the change. Even he quotes Hagenbach<sup>76</sup> approvingly to the effect that Augustine "merely affirms" "a subjective dependence of the believer upon the authority of the Church universal, but not an objective subordination of the Bible itself to this authority"; though he proceeds to weaken "the subjective dependence of the believer upon the authority of the Church" so as to leave room for a "private judgment". What in his view Augustine is asserting is the duty of the individual to respect the authority of the Church, because the "Church universal has an authority higher than that of any member", and it is therefore unreasonable for the individual, or a heretical party, to "oppose its private judgment to the catholic judgment". Or rather, what he supposes Augustine to affirm is—as he fortunately weakens the statement in the next sentence,—"the greater probability of the correctness of the Catholic mind, in comparison with the Heretical or Schismatic mind, and thereby the *authority* of the Church in relation to the individual, without dreaming, however, of affirming its absolute *infallibility*,—an attribute which he confines to the written revelation". Augustine's notion of "ecclesiastical authority" is by this expedient reduced to "the natural expectation of finding that the general judgment is a correct one", coupled with "the right of private judgment;

<sup>75</sup> *Hist. of Christ. Doctr.* i. 143-150. Cf. S. Baumgarten: *Untersuchung. theolog. Streitigkeiten*, iii. 2. 8.

<sup>76</sup> *Dogmengeschichte*, § 119.

the right to examine the general judgment and to perceive its correctness with his own eyes". Thus, Dr. Shedd supposes, "Augustine adopts the Protestant, and opposes the Papal theory of tradition and authority". "The Papist's method of agreeing with the catholic judgment", he explains, "is passive. He denies that the individual may intelligently verify the position of the Church for himself, because the Church is *infallible*, and consequently there is no possibility of its being in error. The individual is therefore shut up to a mechanical and passive reception of the catholic decision. The Protestant, on the other hand, though affirming the high probability that the general judgment is correct, does not assert the infallible certainty that it is. It is conceivable and possible that the Church may err. Hence the duty of the individual, while cherishing an antecedent confidence in the decisions of the Church, to examine these decisions in the light of the written word, and to convert this presumption into an intelligent perception, or else demonstrate its falsity beyond dispute. 'Neither ought I to bring forward the authority of the Nicene Council', says Augustine (*Contra Max. Arian.* II. xiv. 3), 'nor you that of Ariminum, in order to prejudge the case. I ought not to be bound (*detentum*) by the authority of the latter, nor you by that of the former. Under the authority of the Scriptures, not those received by particular sects, but those received by all in common, let the disputation be carried on, in respect to each and every particular' ".<sup>77</sup>

What strikes one most in these remarks of Dr. Shedd is that they begin by attributing to Augustine a doctrine of the authority of the Church universal over the individual, which forbids the individual to oppose his private judgment to the catholic judgment: proceed to vindicate to the individual a private judgment in the sense of a right to examine the general judgment that he may perceive its correctness with his own eyes,—that is to say to an active as distinguished from a merely passive agreement with the catholic judgment: and

<sup>77</sup> *Opus cit.* 148-149.

end by somehow or other supposing that this carries with it the right to disagree with and reject the catholic judgment on the basis of an individual judgment. The premise is that it is not reasonable to erect the individual judgment against the Catholic judgment: the conclusion is that it is the duty of the individual to subject the catholic judgment to his personal decisions: the connecting idea is—that the individual ought to be able to give an active and not merely a passive reception to the Catholic decision. The logic obviously halts. But it seems clear that what Dr. Shedd is striving to do is to give due validity to what he considers Augustine to assert in his famous declaration, *viz.*, this, that the individual is subjectively under the authority of the Church; and yet at the same time to vindicate for Augustine a belief in the right of private judgment. He wishes to do justice to the conception of “authority” which he supposes Augustine to have had in mind in this expression, without doing injustice to Augustine’s obvious exercise of freedom of opinion under the sole authority of the Scriptures. It cannot be said that he has fully succeeded, although there is much that is true in his remarks, considered as an attempt to give a general account of Augustine’s estimate of the authority of the Church. But it is of no great importance for our present inquiry whether he has fully succeeded in this particular effort, or not; since, as has already been pointed out, Augustine does not seem to intend in this passage to place the individual subjectively under the “authority of the Church”; but appears to employ the term “authority” in an entirely different sense from that which it bears in such phrases,—the sense namely in which it is the synonym of “testimony” and the ground of “faith”, in distinction from the “demonstration” of “reason” which is the ground of that form of conviction which he calls “knowledge”.

From another point of view of importance Dr. Shedd’s instinct has carried him very near to the truth. We refer to the recognition that informs his discussion that Augustine

did make more of the Church and of the authority of the Church than the Protestant scholastics were quite ready to admit. It is probably the feeling that this is the case which accounts for much of the tendency among recent scholars to concede something to the Romish interpretation of Augustine's doctrine of the authority of the Church. It certainly cannot easily be denied that Augustine does declare in this passage, that the credit we accord the Gospel hangs on the credit we give the Church. In this particular passage, this no doubt means no more than that we are dependent on the Church to accredit to us the Gospel; that it is from the Church's hands and on her testimony that we receive the Gospel as apostolic and divine. But, if we raise the broader question of Augustine's attitude towards the Church in its relation to the reception of the truth it cannot be successfully contended that it was solely as a *motivum credibilitatis* that he reverenced the Church. To him the Church was before all else the institute of salvation, out of which there is no salvation. And although it may be difficult to find expressed in language parallel to this crisp *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, that outside of the Church there can be no right knowledge of God, it nevertheless certainly belongs to the very essence of his doctrine that outside of the Church there can be no effective knowledge of God. The Scriptures may be the supreme authority for faith, and it may be true, therefore, that wherever the Scriptures go, the salvatory truth will be objectively conveyed; but it is equally true that with Augustine this Word of truth will exert no saving power save in and through the Church.<sup>78</sup> As the Church is the sole mediatrix of grace and that not merely in the sense that it is through her offices alone that men are brought once for all to God, but also in the sense that it is through her offices only that all the saving grace that comes to men is conveyed to them,—so that we are with Christ only when we are with His body the Church, and it is only

<sup>78</sup> The distinction between 'habere' and 'utiliter habere' or 'salubriter habere' was made to do yoeman's service as regards baptism, in the Donatist controversy.

in the Church that communion with God can be retained as well as obtained,—it follows that the Word, however well known it may be and however fully it may perform its function of making known the truth of God, profits no man spiritually save in the Church.<sup>79</sup> It seems to be implicated in this that it is part of Augustine's teaching that the revealed truth of God, deposited in the Holy Scriptures, will not profit men even intellectually so that they may come by it to know God save in communion with the Church. Certainly he would never allow that an adequate knowledge could be obtained of that truth which must be chastely and piously sought and the key to which is love—access to which is closed to all but the spiritual man—outside the limits of that Church the supreme characteristic of which is that in it and in it alone is the love of God shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit which He has given unto us.<sup>80</sup>

The reverence which Augustine accordingly shows to the teaching of the Church is both great and sincere. It is no meaningless form when he opens his treatise on the *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*<sup>81</sup> or his great work on *The Trinity*<sup>82</sup> with a careful statement of the faith of the Church on the topics to be dealt with, to stand as a norm of teaching beyond which it would be illegitimate to go<sup>83</sup>—declaring moreover with complete simplicity, “This is my faith, too, since it is the Catholic faith”.<sup>84</sup> There can be no question therefore that he accorded not merely a high value but also a real authority to the teaching of the Church, an authority which within its own limits may well be called a “dogmatic

<sup>79</sup> Cf. A. Dorner, *Augustinus*, pp. 233 sq., and H. Schmidt, in *Jahrbücher f. d. Theologie* (1861), vi. 233.

<sup>80</sup> *De unitate eccles.* ii. 2: “The members of Christ are linked together by means of love that belongs to unity, and by means of it are made one with their Head.”

<sup>81</sup> *De Gen. ad Lit. imperf.* ad init. (Vienna Ed., xxviii. 460).

<sup>82</sup> *De Trinitate*, i. 4. 7.

<sup>83</sup> *De Gen. ad Lit.* i.: *catholicae fidei metas; praeter fidem catholicae disciplinae*; 2: “as the Catholic discipline commands to be believed.”

<sup>84</sup> *De Trinitate*, i. 4. 7. ad fin.

authority". But it needs also to be borne in mind that the organs of this authority were not conceived by him as official but vital—those called of God in the Church to do the thinking and teaching for the Church;<sup>85</sup> that the nature of this authority is never conceived by him as absolute and irreformable but always as relative and correctible—no teaching from any source is to be accepted unhesitatingly as above critical examination except that of the Scriptures only; and that as to its source this authority is not thought of by him as original but derived, dependent upon the Scriptures upon which it rests and by which it is always to be tested and corrected. The Catholic faith as to the Trinity, for example, which is also his faith because it is the Catholic faith, is the faith that has been set forth, not by the organized Church on its own authority, but by "the Catholic expounders of the Divine Scriptures", intent upon teaching "according to the Scriptures"<sup>86</sup> and therefore only on the authority of these Scriptures. If there can be no question, therefore, that Augustine accorded a "dogmatic authority" to the Church, there can be no question either that the "dogmatic authority" he accorded to the Church was subordinated to the authority of the Scriptures, and was indeed but the representation of that authority in so to speak more tangible form. This, it is obvious, is in complete harmony with what we have already had occasion to note, in the matter of Christian observances, as to the relative authority Augustine accorded to the Scriptures, Tradition, the Church—in descending series. Only, it is to be noted that the dogmatic authority of the Church of which we are now specifically speaking expresses itself not merely, and not chiefly, through conciliar decrees, but rather through the vital faith of the people of God, first assimilated by them from the Scriptures, and then expressed for them by the appropriate organs of the expression of Christian thought,

<sup>85</sup> *Epist. 118, v. 32-35*: "armed with the abundant weapons of reason, by means of a comparatively few devoutly learned and truly spiritual men."

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, ad initium.

which in general are the Doctors of the Church. Such being the case, there can no question be raised whether or not the Church may be conceived as the supreme seat of authority in the dogmatic sphere. In many cases the proximate seat of authority it doubtlessly is; but never the ultimate seat of authority. That belongs with Augustine ever and unvaryingly to the Holy Scriptures,<sup>87</sup> witnessed to by the Church as given to it by the apostles as the infallible Word of God, studied and expounded by the Church for its needs, and applied by it to the varying problems which confront it with the measure of authority which belongs to it as the Church of God, the pillar and ground of the truth.

It is, however, in a deeper sense than even this that Augustine thought of the Church in relation to the acquisition of the knowledge of the truth. With Augustine the Church as it is the mediatrix of divine grace, is also the mediatrix of divine knowledge. As such the Church holds a position of the very highest significance between the supreme seat of authority, the Holy Scriptures, and the souls of men. Only in and through the Church can a sound as well as a saving knowledge of the contents of the Scriptures be hoped for; only in and through the Church can the knowledge of God enshrined in the Holy Scriptures avail for the illumination of the intellect with true knowledge of God, no less than for the sanctification of the soul for true communion with God. But, it must be remembered that in speaking thus, Augustine is thinking of the Church not mechanically as an organized body acting through official organs, say the hierarchy, but vitally, as the *congregatio sanctorum* acting through its vital energies as a communion of love. The Church in which alone according to Augustine true knowledge of God is to be had is fundamentally

<sup>87</sup> *Epist.* 164, iii. 6, offers a typical mode of statement: "And with respect to that first man, the father of the human race, that Christ loosed him from hell almost the whole Church agrees; and it is too considered that the Church does not believe this in vain,—whencesoever it has been handed down, although the authority of the Canonical Scriptures is not expressly adducible for it (*etiamsi canonicarum Scripturarum hinc expressa non proferatur auctoritas*)."

conceived as the Body of Christ. And this is as much as to say that the essence of his doctrine of the authority of the Church would not be inaptly expressed by the simple and certainly to no Christian thinker unacceptable formula, that it is only in Jesus Christ that God can be rightly known. The Church of Christ is the Body of Christ, and this Body of Christ is the real subject of the true knowledge of God on earth: it is only therefore as one is a member in particular of this Body that he can share in the knowledge of God, of which it is the subject. This is the counterpart in Augustine of that doctrine of the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti* which was first formulated by Calvin and from him became the corner-stone of the Protestant doctrine of authority: and it differs from that doctrine only because and as Augustine's doctrine of "the means of grace" differs from the Protestant.<sup>88</sup>

Augustine's doctrine of the Church is a fascinating subject on which it is difficult to touch without being carried beyond the requirements of our present purpose. Perhaps enough has already been said to indicate sufficiently for the end in view the place which the Church holds in Augustine's

<sup>88</sup> On Augustine's conception of the Church as a communion of saints, see the fifth of Reuter's *Augustin. Studien*; and compare Schmidt as above cited, esp. from p. 233. On Augustine's relation to the Protestant doctrine of the "testimony of the Holy Spirit" see Pannier, *Le Témoignage du Saint-Esprit* (1893), pp. 67-68. After citing *Tract. iii. in Ep. Joan. ad Parthos*, ii. 13; *De Trinitate*, III. 1-2; *Conf. vi. 5*, and xi. 3, he adds: "There certainly is not yet here the whole of the witness of the Holy Spirit. . . . But St. Augustine has the intuition of a mysterious work which is wrought in the soul of the Christian, of an understanding of the Bible which does not come from man, but from a power external to him and superior to him; he urges the rôle which the direct correspondence between the Book and the reader must play in the foundation of Christian certitude. In this, as on so many other points, Augustine was the precursor of the Reformation, and a precursor without immediate continuers." In point of fact Augustine is just as clear as the Reformers that earthly voices assail only the ears, and that *cathedram in coelo habet qui cordia docet* (*Tract. iii. in Ep. Joan. ad Parthos*, ii. 13). He differs from them only in the place he gives the Church in communicating that grace out of which comes the preparation of the mind to understand, as well as of the heart to believe, and of the will to do.

doctrine of authority. In the sin-bred weakness of humanity, the Church mediates between the divine revelation deposited in the Holy Scriptures and the darkened mind of man; and thus becomes a paedagogue to lead men to the truth. It is in the Church that the truth is known; and this not merely in the sense that it is in the hands of the Church that the Scriptures are found, those Scriptures in which the whole Truth of God is indefectibly deposited; but also in the sense that it is in the Church alone that the mysteries of the faith, revealed in the Scriptures, are comprehended: that it is only in the participation of the graces found in her that men may hope to attain to the vision which is the possession solely of saints. The true knowledge of God belongs to the fellowship of His people, and out of it cannot be attained. And therefore, although Augustine knows of many things which bind him to the Catholic Church and the adduction of which as undeniable credentials giving confidence to those who hold to that Church, he thinks should impress any hearer,—such as the consent of peoples and nations, the just authority it enjoys among men, the unbroken succession of its rulers from the beginning, and the very name of Catholic,—yet the real thing which above all others held him to the Catholic Church was, as he was well aware, that there was to be found in it “the purest wisdom” (*sincerissima sapientia*). He needs indeed to confess that to the knowledge of this wisdom only a few spiritual men (*pauci spirituales*) attain in this life, and even they (because they are men) only very partially (*ex minima quidem parte*), though without the least uncertainty (*sine dubitatione*).<sup>89</sup> The crowd (*turba*) meanwhile walk even in the Church, by faith,—since their characteristic is, not vivacity of intellect, but simplicity in believing,—the Church performing its function to them in holding out the truth to them to be believed. So that even the crowd are made in the apprehension of faith—each according to his ability—to share in the truth of which the Church is the possessor. All

<sup>89</sup> *Contra Epist. Manich. Fund.* i. 4. 5.

the time, however, there is in the Church and in it alone for the few spiritual men both the fulness of truth to be known and the opportunity to know it. The underlying idea is clearly that for the knowledge of the truth there are requisite two things,—the revelation of the truth to be apprehended and the preparation of the heart for its apprehension: and that these two things can be found in conjunction only in the Church. Our thought reverts at once to Augustine's fundamental teaching that the remedy for the disabilities of sinful men is to be found in the two-fold provision of Revelation and Grace. In the Church these two provisions meet, and it is therefore only in the Church that the sin-born disabilities of men can be cured: and only in the Church that men, being sinful, can attain to that knowledge of divine things in which is life.

By this construction, it will not fail to be perceived, Augustine sets the Church over against the world,—or, as he would have phrased it, the glorious city of God over against the earthly city—as the sole sphere in which true knowledge (*sapientia*) is found. Thus there is introduced a certain dualism in the manifestation of human life on earth. Two classes of men are marked off, separated one from another as darkness is separated from light. In the one, at the best only broken lights can play; because it is the natural development of sin-stricken humanity alone that it can offer. In the other may be found the steady shining of that true light which shall broaden more and more to the perfect day. The dualism of this conception of human life is resolved, however, by two considerations. In observing human life in its dualistic opposition we are observing it only in its process of historic development. The dualism is constituted by the invasion of the realm of darkness by the realm of light: and it exists only so long as the conquest of the darkness by the light is incomplete. A temporary dualism is the inevitable result of the introduction of any remedial scheme which does not act immediately and all at once. In the City of God—the Church of God's saints—we perceive the pro-

gress of the correction of the sin-born disabilities of men. Again the opposition of nature and the supernatural as the principles of the opposing kingdoms, must not be pressed to an extreme. With Augustine, as we have seen, all knowledge, even that which in contrast with a higher supernatural, may rightly be called natural knowledge, is in source supernatural: all knowledge rests ultimately on revelation. The problem to him was not, therefore, how to supplant a strictly natural knowledge by a strictly supernatural knowledge: but how to restore to men the power to acquire that knowledge which we call natural—how to correct sin-bred disabilities so that the general revelation of God may be reflected purely in minds which now are blinded to its reflection by sin. For this end, a special revelation, adapted to the needs of sin-disabled minds, is called in. Special revelation is not conceived here, then, as a substitute for general revelation, but only as a preparation for its proper assimilation. The goal is still conceived as the knowledge of God by direct vision; and special revelation is presented only as spectacles through which the blind may trace out the way to the cure. The intervention of God by a special revelation works, therefore, harmoniously into the general scheme of the production of knowledge of God through general revelation. The conception is that, man being a sinner, and unable to profit by general revelation, God intervenes creatively by special revelation and grace,—by special revelation enabling him to walk meanwhile until by grace he is once more prepared to see the Light in its own light. Special revelation, given through the prophets and apostles, is embodied in the Scriptures and brought to bear on man by the Church, in which is found the grace to heal men's disabilities. The Church therefore sets up in the world a City of God in which, and in which alone, man may live free from the disabilities that clog all action in the earthly city.

If we cry out that the remedy is incomplete, the answer is that it were better to say that the cure it is working is as

yet uncompleted. So long as grace has not wrought its perfect work in our souls, there remains a dualism in all the functioning of our souls; so long as grace has not wrought its perfect work in the world there will remain a dualism in the world. But when grace has wrought its perfect work, then, as sin has been removed, the need of special revelation falls away, nay the need of all the instrumentalities by which grace is wrought falls away—the Church, the Scriptures, Christ the Mediator Himself,—and God alone suffices for the soul's requirements. The end to which all is directed and in which all issues, is not the destruction of nature but the restoration of nature: and when nature is restored, there is no longer need of the remedies. "There is nothing", says Augustine with emphasis, "that ought to detain us on the way" in our aspiration to God, in whom alone can we find our rest. And to put the sharpest possible point upon the remark he at once proceeds to apply it to our Lord Himself, who, says he, "in so far as He condescended to be our Way", wished not "to hold us".—the reference being possibly to Jno. 20<sup>17</sup>—"but rather to pass away, lest we should cling weakly to temporal things, even though they had been put on and worn by Him for our salvation, and not rather press rapidly through them and strive to attain unto Himself who has freed our nature from the bondage of temporal things and set it down at the right hand of His Father".<sup>90</sup> The whole soteriological work of our Lord, in other words, is viewed by Augustine as a means to the end of our presentation, holy, and without spot, to the Father, and therefore as destined to fall away with all means when the end is attained.<sup>91</sup> When the

<sup>90</sup> *De Doctr. Christ.* i. 34. 38.

<sup>91</sup> Th. Bret, *La Conversion de S. Augustine* (Geneva, 1900), p. 64, generalizes as follows: "We remark, however, that Augustine is affirmative only in what concerns the activity of Christ as reconciler. The rôle of eternal mediator, of perpetual friend, between the individual and God, was never clearly understood by Augustine. For him Christ came to restore man to his true condition, but, that once attained, the rôle of Saviour passed into the background. The sinner once cleansed of his sins, and placed in an atmosphere of the grace of God, found himself

Mediatorial Christ is viewed thus as instrument, of course the lower means also are so considered. Augustine, even, in a passage in the immediate neighborhood of what we have just quoted, speaks as if a stage of development might be attained even in this life in which the Scriptures, say, might fall out of use as a lame man healed would no longer need his crutch. "A man", says he,<sup>92</sup> "supported by faith, hope and love, and retaining these unshakenly, does not need the Scriptures except for instructing others". He adduces certain solitaries as examples: men in whom I Cor. 13<sup>8</sup> is already fulfilled,—who "by means of these instruments (as they are called)" have had built up within them so great an edifice of faith and love that they no longer require their aid. So clear is it that by him all the means put in action by grace to cure the sin-bred disabilities of man were strictly conceived as remedies which, just because they work a cure, provide no substitutes for nature but bring about a restoration of nature.<sup>93</sup>

Augustine's whole doctrine thus becomes a unit. Man is to find truth within himself because there God speaks to him. All knowledge rests, therefore, on a revelation of God; God impressing on the soul continually the ideas which form the intellectual world. These ideas are taken up, however, by man in perception and conception, only so far as each is able to do so: and man being a sinner is incapacitated for their reception and retention. This sinful incapacity is met in the goodness of God by revelation and grace, the sphere of both of which is the Church. The directly united with the Father without the intervention of the Son." This is only very partially correct; and its incorrectnesses touch on some important elements of Augustine's teaching. But it contains the essential matter.

<sup>92</sup> *De Doctr. Christ.* i. 34. 43.

<sup>93</sup> The general conception—but guarded from the fancy that attainment in this life can proceed so far as to be freed from the necessity of means—is among the inheritances of Augustinians until this day. Cf. e. g. A. Kuyper, *Encyc. of Sacred Theology*, E. T., pp. 368 sq.; and especially H. Bavinck, *Gereform. Dogmatiek*, i. 389 sq., where the necessary cautions are noted. The misapprehensions of Harnack (*Hist. of Dogma*, E. T., v. 99-100) will be obvious.

Church is therefore set over against the world as the new Kingdom of God in which sinful man finds restoration and in its gradual growth we observe the human race attaining its originally destined end. The time is to come when the Kingdom of God shall have overspread the earth, and when that time comes, the abnormalities having been cured, the normal knowledge of God will assert itself throughout the redeemed race of man. Here, in a single paragraph, is Augustine's whole doctrine of knowledge and authority.

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## THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST IN THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

### SECOND ARTICLE.

At the close of a previous article\* it was stated that not merely in the possession of human nature, but also in the acquisition of a certain class of human experiences, is Jesus, the high priest, identified with his people. The passages that chiefly come under consideration here are Chap. ii. 10, 17, 18; iv. 14-16; v. 7-10. Their peculiarity consists in this, that they bring into connection the four ideas of the suffering, the temptation, the sympathy and the perfecting of the high priest of the New Covenant. The precise sense in which these ideas are conceived by the author and the precise relation into which he places them to each other depend on the detail exegesis of the passages cited. It is clear that in a general way the sufferings and temptations of the Saviour result in the development of His sympathy and that they likewise bring about His perfecting for the priestly office. But as soon as we go beyond this general scheme of connection a number of questions emerge: Are the temptations and the sufferings of which the Epistle speaks as entering into the experience of Jesus and as finding their analogy in the experience of the readers, two coëxpressive categories, so that the sufferings He had to undergo proved for Jesus temptations, or conversely the temptations to which He was exposed became to Him a source of suffering? Or are these two different categories, the temptations being wider in extent than the sufferings and being considered from other points of view by the writer? Does the sympathy which arises from these experiences consist of pity, compassion in general, so as to answer to suffering as such, or does there enter into it a specifically ethical element, so that it is concerned with the suffering as a source of ethical danger,

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\* THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, July, 1907, pp. 423-447.

in other words as temptation? Is the perfecting of Christ confined to the production of sympathy out of sufferings and temptations, or does it also have another side, so that we can speak of a development of the ethical and religious nature of the Saviour generally? Finally, does the term *τελειοῦν* “perfecting”, where it is used in connection with these experiences, bear the moral-subjective sense of rendering Jesus perfect in holiness, or does it express the official-objective idea that these experiences somehow fitted, equipped Him for the discharge of his high-priestly work?

In Chap. ii. 10 we have the general thought, that, because Jesus is *ἀρχηγὸς σωτηρίας*, the instrument by whom God leads many sons to glory, it was fit that God should perfect Him through sufferings. Sufferings are here the means to perfecting, but it is not directly stated how this nexus is to be understood. It has been proposed to make the *τελειώσαι διὰ παθημάτων* of verse 10 equivalent in meaning to the “being crowned with glory and honor on account of the suffering of death” spoken of in verse 9. The connecting γάρ at first sight seems to favor the equivalence of the two statements. The sense would then simply be that God used the sufferings, on the principle of “cross and crown”, to introduce Jesus into the state of consummate glory, and *τελειώσαι* would contain no reference to this glory as an equipment for further, either priestly or other service. There are, however, two details of expression which this exegesis fails to explain. The substitution of διὰ c. Gen. for διὰ c. Acc. and that of the plural “sufferings” for “suffering” must both be significant. If the former shows that the perfecting is conceived rather as an end aimed at on the part of God than as a reward reaped on the part of Christ, the latter proves that the “sufferings” come under consideration in their plurality, as successive events, as a course of training leading pedagogically to the *τελείωσις*. Jesus’ sufferings were intended by God to fit or equip, and in so far to perfect, Him for his work as *ἀρχηγὸς σωτηρίας*. But the author does not immediately proceed to explain how

the sufferings served this purpose. Whether they worked through the production of sympathy, or in some other way as a course of ethical training we are not told as yet. More light on this is shed by the relation which verse 10 bears to the following context, and especially to the climax of the latter in verses 17, 18. For it is plain that verse 11 takes out of the specific affirmation of fellowship in suffering expressed in verse 10 the idea of fundamental identification in standing before God in general, and that the following statements by a process of particularizing again bring down this general thought to the point where it reaches its special application to the suffering of human life, the "in all things", as verse 17 expresses it. If this understanding of the progress of thought be correct, it follows that to the *διὰ παθημάτων τελειώσαι* of verse 10 essentially the same meaning must attach as to the more explicit formulas employed in verses 17 and 18 to explain the philosophy of Jesus' suffering and temptation in connection with His priesthood. Now of verses 17 and 18 the meaning cannot be doubtful. The identification between Christ and the readers in suffering fits Him for the discharge of the priesthood: it does this by enabling Him to become "a merciful and faithful high priest". And the quality of mercy thus developed is not mercy in general in response to suffering as such. In two ways the author makes plain that he has in mind a specific ethical sympathy which is concerned with the sufferings of the readers on their moral side, in their bearing on the fact of sin. For *ἔλεήμων* (as well as *πιστός*) is defined by the following: "for the propitiation of the sins of the people". If mercy operates towards the propitiation of sins, there must be some connection between the suffering which excites it and these sins, for otherwise it would exhaust itself in the relief of suffering as such. In the abstract here again more than one possibility suggests itself. The mercy might aim at the removal of sin as the source of suffering. Or it might have reference to sin in its character of suffering, as necessarily involving ethical pain. As

a matter of fact, neither of these two ideas are involved. What is meant verse 18 explains, if we follow the rendering given by the R. V. in the margin: "For having been Himself tempted in that wherein He hath suffered, He is able to succor them that are tempted". Because Christ's sufferings were not sufferings in general, but specifically temptation-sufferings, sufferings which became for him a source of temptation, therefore He can succor those who are in an analogous situation, *i. e.*, tempted to sin by their sufferings. The Aorist participle *πειρασθείς* has a causal force and assigns the temptation-aspect of His sufferings as the ground for His ability to succor. It is not the memory of suffering in general that evokes His sympathy: the thought is much more concrete and specific: the sufferings which He has behind Him and carries with Him as a past experience (notice the perfect tense *πέπονθεν*) enable Him to know what force of temptation suffering exerts to make the sinner fall. His mercy thus grasps the sufferer in his moral capacity, in the very crisis where suffering threatens to issue into sin or actually issues into the same. And thus it becomes to Him the priestly incentive for propitiating the sins that have resulted from the temptation. What verse 17 calls "to propitiate" verse 18 calls "to succor". The latter term in itself might be of wider application, but probably the author in the present case connects the same meaning with it as with the former, understanding it of the priestly succor which consists in the propitiation of sins. It should be observed in this connection that *ἱλάσκεσθαι* does not here denote the single act of atonement on the cross, but the subsequent activity whereby the Saviour continually applies the propitiatory power of His sacrifice. Taken in this wider sense it could be easily replaced by the general term *βοηθῆσαι* "to succor".

In the second passage, iv. 14-16, we reach essentially the same conclusions. The *γάρ* at the opening of verse 15 is intended to guard against the mistaken inference, as if the exalted nature and position of the heavenly high priest

detracted in any way from His sympathy with men in their miserable state as sinners. Christ can sympathize with the “weaknesses” of the readers. The word *ἀσθέεια* may in itself denote “weaknesses” with or without a sinful connotation, *cpr.* Chap. v. 3, where it is connected with the necessity for atonement in the case of the earthly high priests. In the passage before us, however, it is more than likely that the author thinks of weakness with which sin is not necessarily connected, though it may render human nature susceptible to temptation and sin. For it is emphasized that Jesus was “tempted in all points like as we are” and, if sinful weaknesses had been meant, such unqualified affirmation of the likeness between His temptation and that of the readers would hardly have been made. The added phrase *χωρὶς ἀμαρτίας* does not restrict the likeness of the temptation but relates exclusively to the outcome of the latter. Its proper rendering is not “except by manner of appeal to sin in Him” but “without the result of sin in His case”. The analogy, therefore, between Christ’s temptations and those of the readers remains unimpaired. Christ has sympathy with their weaknesses because by experience He knows these weaknesses Himself. But that the weaknesses become the occasion for sympathy from a specifically moral point of view appears here also in more than one way. It was as temptation that the weaknesses entered into the Saviour’s experience, and it is as temptation that they draw forth His sympathy. The readers are assured that His pity goes out towards them as tempted, as potential sinners. Besides this they are exhorted to seek not mere mercy *ἔλεος* but *ἔλεος καὶ χάριν*, a mercy accompanied by forgiveness, whence also “the throne of *grace*” is named as that which they are to approach unto with boldness. We can, however, determine still more closely from the context what the author is specifically thinking of in connection with this temptation of Jesus and of the readers. The words *κρατῶμεν τῆς ὄμολογίας* “let us hold fast the confession”, show that a temptation to apostasy, to a denial of their

Christian state is meant. If we remember that the temptation had its rise in “weakness” of a sinless kind, the conclusion lies near that the sufferings which the readers had to endure for the sake of their faith are referred to. Thus the analogy between Christ’s case and that of the Hebrews appears first in its true completeness. Like they, He had been called upon “to hold fast the confession”, when the human *ἀσθενεία* consisting in the fear of suffering tempted Him to swerve from His appointed path. Having this experience behind Him, He can, when sufferings tempt the readers to the denial of their faith, extend to them the intelligent sympathy which results in mercy and grace. Here also, as in ii. 18, the exercise of this priestly function is described as a “helping”, the supply of *βοήθεια*.

The passage v. 7-10 primarily serves to prove the proposition that Jesus complies with the qualifications of a true high priest, because He did not take the office to Himself in any self-assertive manner, but called of God. As a fact tending to show this the author dwells upon the course of preparation He had to pass through on earth and which issued into His *τελείωσις*. This course of preparation had for its aim that He might be identified with his people. The point of identification here is the experiential knowledge of obedience, as appears from the correspondence between this conception in verse 8 and verse 9: “having learned *obedience*, He became the author of salvation to those that *obey*”. It has been too quickly inferred, however, from this statement that the author of Hebrews ascribes to Jesus a progressive moral development in general and associates this with the *τελείωσις* he predicates of Him. It must be plain to the most superficial reader, that “obedience” here has a very specific meaning: it is obedience to the call of suffering, for the Saviour learned it “from what He suffered”. If in the two preceding passages the suffering appeared as a school in which was learned the strength of temptation as inherent in suffering, here we meet with the positive counterpart to this conception: the suffering as a school of

obedience through the overcoming of the temptation proceeding from it. Because the obedience developed itself in suffering the period of its development is called "the days of His flesh", *i. e.*, the days in which He was subject to the weakness of the natural earthly life, and therefore had to conquer the dread of pain and death which is inseparable from this state. The prayers and supplications which He is said to have offered up were not that He might be saved from death, but that He might be saved out of it; they were expressions of that obedience He was learning, not expressions of a mood of weakness He had to unlearn. For the writer adds that He was heard, He obtained what He prayed for, and this was not escape from death, but salvation through and out of death. From the above it appears how we must understand the statement that "He learned obedience". "Learning" is not here equivalent to acquiring what was not previously there in principle, far less to acquiring that of which the opposite was previously there. Chap. x. 5-7 shows that the writer ascribes to Jesus the spirit of perfect obedience at the very moment of His coming into the world, for he makes Him say in the words of the Psalmist: "Lo, I am come to do thy will, O God", and the will of God here referred to is specifically the will that the Messiah should suffer and die. "Learning" simply means to bring out into the conscious experience of action, that which is present as an avowed principle antecedent to the action. There is a difference between the desire and resolve to obey and the carrying through of this attitude of mind in the concrete circumstances of life, whilst natural inclinations assert themselves in the opposite direction. It should be noticed that the article stands before *ὑπακοήν*, which shows once more that a specific type of obedience is in the author's mind. The contrast also indicated in the words "although being a Son" is not a contrast between sonship and obedience in general, but between sonship and obedience evinced in suffering. It is natural for a son to obey, it is not natural for a son to have to learn obedience

in this way. Now it is this training in obedience that the passage brings into connection with the *τελείωσις* of Christ. Having learned obedience and having been made perfect, He became the author of salvation. It is most natural to take the "having been made perfect" here as resumptive of "having learned obedience", so that it adds not a second qualification to the first, but interprets the fact of the obedience which Christ learned in its significance as a qualification for His office. The rendering strictly ought to be: "having learned obedience and thus been made perfect". This, however, does not yet decide how the author understands the "perfecting". Does he mean to say: having learned obedience and having been made perfect in obedience, He became author of salvation? Or is his meaning rather: having learned obedience and thereby been made *a perfect high priest*, He became author of salvation? The latter is to be preferred, because the emphasis in the context rests on the likeness between the obedience of Christ and that of believers. Because He practiced obedience Himself He can appreciate and reward the obedience of those who follow Him. To introduce the thought of the absolute perfection of the Saviour's obedience would tend to obscure this parallelism. Of course the author conceived of Christ's obedience as absolutely perfect. But here it was out of place to call attention to this. What he affirms is simply, that through the practice of obedience Christ became a perfect high priest, since now He is able to endow with eternal salvation all those who obey Him in however imperfect a degree.

Finally we must, in order to complete our survey of what the Epistle teaches on the *τελείωσις* of Christ, cast a glance at Chap. vii. 28, although this passage is of a different nature from those already discussed. The Saviour's entire separateness from sin and sinners is emphasized as essential to His priesthood. The comparison is between Christ and the Old Testament high priests, and the former is here described not as He was in His earthly life but as He now is in His exalted state. The contrast is twofold: The law

appoints *men*, the word of the oathswearing appoints *a son*; the men appointed are men *having infirmity*, the son appointed is a son *made perfect forevermore*. This second contrast creates some difficulty. The participle perfect, *τετελειωμένον*, undoubtedly implies that a perfecting took place with Christ during His earthly life, that there was a time when He did not yet possess this *τελείωσις*. And the antithetical structure of the sentence seems to require that the “perfecting” consisted in the laying aside of the “infirmity” which clung to the Old Testament high priests: they had weaknesses, He has been made perfect and is now perfect. But this exegesis, simple and inevitable as it may seem at first sight, is excluded by the observation that the author in the present case uses the term *ἀσθενεία* “infirmity”, with a sinful connotation, for it is said that the Old Testament high priests had to offer sacrifices for their own sins, and the *γάρ* of verse 28 shows that it is precisely in this that their “infirmity” consists. It is impossible, therefore, that the statement should mean: “the law appoints high priests having sinful infirmities, the word of the oathswearing appoint a son made perfect of these sinful infirmities”. We shall have to understand the antithesis in a different more pregnant way. Its probable meaning may be best paraphrased as follows: The law appoints as high priests men having infirmity, the word of the oathswearing appoints a Son (who not only has no infirmity but), who has been made a perfect high priest forevermore, by the practice of perfect obedience on earth and by translation into the heavenly world from which all infirmity is excluded. The contrast to “having infirmity” which finds expression in *τετελειωμένον* sums up in a single word the attributes severally enumerated in verse 26, “holy, guileless, undefiled, separated from sinners, and made higher than the heavens”.

We are now able from the passages discussed to answer the questions formulated at the beginning of this article concerning the temptations, the sufferings, the sympathy and the perfecting of the Saviour. Wherever the Epistle

speaks of temptations of Christ it always means to refer concretely and specifically to the temptations that arose from His call to suffer. Of temptations in general it never speaks in connection with Jesus. In thus doing it limits the sphere of the Saviour's temptations to that class of experiences wherein a real appeal to His feelings and desires was possible, and yet the mere presence and force of such an appeal could not endanger his sinlessness. For the inclination to escape from suffering, which made the temptation a real one, is in itself a natural, innocent inclination. It could assert itself in the Saviour's heart and require a positive choice of the will to overbear it and keep it down, without depending for its power on the presence of evil. A great deal that is written in connection with Hebrews on the comforting aspect of the temptations of Christ as analogous to our common experience, does not observe the careful restraint which the writer has imposed upon himself.<sup>1</sup> We further learned that the writer nowhere, not even in iii. 18, speaks of temptation as entailing suffering for Jesus, but always of suffering as involving temptation. Still further, the pity which these experiences of suffering and temptation call out in the Saviour, is not according to the writer's description compassion in general answering to misery as such, but specifically ethical compassion, which views the suffering as a source of moral and religious danger and treats it in that capacity. Finally the "perfecting" of the Saviour which is made so prominent in the Epistle, has two sides: it is perfecting in the sphere of sympathy with exposure to temptation and perfecting in the sphere of appreciation of obedience which overcomes temptation. In both respects the perfecting is an ethical process, since it took place by means of an ethical experience through which the Saviour passed: He became acquainted with the force of temptation and learned the practice of obedience. But so far as the

<sup>1</sup> Compare on this subject: Bornhäuser, *Die Versuchungen Jesu nach dem Hebräerbriefe* in *Theologische Studien* Martin Kähler dargebracht, 1905.

notion of *τελείωσις* in itself and from a formal point of view is concerned, the Epistle does not know this as an ethical but as an official conception. The term nowhere designates that Jesus was made ethically or religiously perfect, that His character was developed in either sense; it always designates that his qualifications for the high-priestly office were perfected, that He received the full-orbed equipment which His priestly ministry requires. The subject of the *τελείωσις* is always the priest, never the man. That the means through which the *τελείωσις* of the priest takes place, lie in the moral sphere, cannot alter this conclusion in the least. The author has nowhere said, and hardly would have said, that in His moral or religious character Jesus was made perfect.<sup>2</sup>

While thus, as we have seen, the Saviour's identification with man was necessary for His priesthood, on the other hand His divine sonship also appears in the Epistle as qualifying Him for the office. In Chap. i. 2, 3 the unfolding of the idea of sonship explains the possibility of Christ's making purification of sins. Only so great a person can discharge so high a function. In Chap. iv. 14 the greatness of Jesus as high priest, His heavenly ministration are summed up in this, that He is the Son of God. A connection between the sonship of Jesus and his high-priesthood is also traced in Chap. v. 5. The author here applies to the case of Christ the second general qualification which a true high priest must possess, viz., that he does not take the honor to Himself, but accepts it at the call of God, even as did Aaron. The office involves so great an honor that a divine appointment is absolutely necessary. The honor lies in the immediateness of approach to God and in the position of authority over others. Now in verse 5 God who appointed Jesus is designated as the one who said unto Him: "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee". Some

<sup>2</sup> Compare for a fuller discussion of this point, especially as to linguistic usage, Kögel, *Der Begriff τελειοῦν im Hebräerbrief*, in *Theologische Studien* Martin Kähler dargebracht, 1905.

assume that the author finds in these words of the Psalm the formal appointment of Jesus to the high-priestly office, so that "God who said" would be equivalent to "God when He said". But the author everywhere distinguishes sonship and priesthood. The correct view is that he wishes to bring out the congruity, from the point of view of honorable position, between the sonship of Christ and His high-priesthood. The same God called Him to the high-priestly office, who had also declared Him to be His Son. In both respects He was possessed of high honor with God. Further, in Chap. vii. 28, the sonship is named as contributing to the perfection of the high-priesthood. The law appoints to the office such as are men, the word of the oath a Son. This, it will be observed, implies a contrast between human nature and sonship: the Son as Son is not human, but divine.

The difficult passage ix. 14 must also be considered in the present connection. Here it is said that Christ "through eternal spirit offered Himself blameless unto God" and this is given as the reason why the readers may confidently believe, that His blood will purify their consciences from dead works. The clause *διὰ πνεύματος* is to be explained from the fact, that the purification which the readers need is a purification in the sphere of the spirit, a purification of the conscience. The Old Testament sacrifices sanctified unto the purity of the *σάρξ*, because they themselves belonged to the sphere of the *σάρξ*; as they were external, ceremonial, so their effect was confined to the sphere of the external, ceremonial. Nevertheless in their own sphere they were truly effective, and from this the author derives *a fortiori* the confidence that the blood of Christ, who offered Himself *διὰ πνεύματος* will be equally effective in the sphere of the spirit.<sup>3</sup> There has been much dispute among expositors as

<sup>3</sup> Intertwined with this is the other thought, that the purification effected by the blood of Christ will be eternal, *i. e.*, absolute, not standing in need of repetition. Verses 13 and 14 are by means of *γάρ* joined to the closing words of verse 12, the words "having found eternal redemption". This, obviously, is the reason why the predicate *αλωντος* is added to *διὰ πνεύματος*; because through *eternal* spirit Christ offered Himself, therefore He found *eternal* redemption.

to whether *πνεῦμα* here occurs with a metaphysical or an ethical connotation. Those who insist upon the former usually find the idea expressed, that through His having eternal spirit Christ was able to keep His life through death, and afterwards to present Himself before God, an interpretation which would make the *πνεῦμα* here identical with the *ζωὴ ἀκαταλύτος* spoken of in vii. 16. Of a reference to any such thought, however, there is no trace in the context. Those who insist upon the ethical connotation of spirit, if they do not understand it directly of the Holy Spirit, associate with it the voluntariness and selfdetermination of Christ's offering. The latter appears to us the correct interpretation in substance. The author evidently is intent upon emphasizing the fact that Christ's offering was free and spontaneous. Hence he does not say that Jesus offered up Himself *as eternal spirit*, which form of statement would have formed the exact counterpart to the offering up of the animals under the Old Covenant; he says that *through eternal spirit* He offered up Himself. And he also further indicates by giving *ἐαυτὸν* the place before the verb, that Christ Himself was the object of the offering, that it was an act terminating on Himself. Both features undoubtedly point in the same direction: the personal initiative, the voluntariness form the most important element in the *πνεῦμα* -character of the offering. Still we should surely misunderstand the author, if we combined these features with the *πνεῦμα* on a purely ethical or even generally psychological principle. He does not mean to say that through His goodness, as a fruit of the *πνεῦμα*, Christ was enabled thus to offer Himself, nor even that through His being spirit in general, as all men are spirit, He could do so. The whole sharp antithesis between the ethical and the metaphysical is foreign to the author's way of thinking. We must take *πνεῦμα* as contrasted with *σάρξ* in accordance with the broad meaning the Epistle as a whole ascribes to this antithesis. The *πνεῦμα* is that which is characteristic of the higher, heavenly world. In its ethical or re-

ligious aspect it has its subsistence and background in a metaphysical sphere of being. If Jesus could voluntarily offer up Himself and thus impart a unique efficacy to His sacrifice, this was because He belonged to the higher world of the *πνεῦμα* to which such absolute self-determination is possible. That this is the true view of the author appears from the addition to *πνεῦμα* of the attribute *αἰωνίος* with which it is impossible to connect a purely ethical meaning. *Αἰωνίος* most frequently in the Epistle has the connotation of what belongs to the heavenly, pneumatic world, it assigns to a sphere and not merely removes limitations of time; *πνεῦμα αἰωνίον*, therefore, is such a spirit as has its home in the heavenly world. A spirit belonging to this sphere imparts to every transaction mediated by it absolute efficacy in that same sphere. But that Christ in this sense has or is *πνεῦμα αἰωνίον*, belongs to the heavenly world is, of course, something that cannot be separated from His Sonship. It is in fact but another name for that Sonship, for as Son also He belongs to that same higher world of divine realities of which His *πνεῦμα* marks Him as the inhabitant. The passage actually implies the deity of the Saviour and the familiar dogmatic thought of His deity imparting transcendent efficacy to His sacrifice, not so much, however, in virtue of the bare fact of its being deity, but rather because in virtue of its specific character of heavenly spirit it suited exactly the sphere in which the purification was to be accomplished and the finality, absoluteness which were required for it.

The sonship of Christ appears also as the determining principle of His priesthood in what the author teaches concerning the Melchizedek-order of this priesthood. In Chap. vii. 3, after having enumerated the various features which render Melchizedek a type of Christ, he declares that Melchizedek was in these features "made like unto the Son of God". This cannot refer to the Son of God in His historic appearance and priestly activity, for of these the Epistle everywhere affirms that they were after the order of Mel-

chizedek. Here on the contrary Melchizedek is declared to have been after the likeness of the Son of God. The Son of God designates Christ in His eternal, heavenly, divine existence, and Melchizedek was made like unto Him, partly in the general greatness which belongs to the delineation of his figure in Scripture (compare verse 4, "consider how great this one was", and verse 7, "without any dispute the less is blessed of the better") partly in the eternity character imparted to this figure by the narrative in Genesis. It is the Son of God as a Person, apart from His office, who thus forms the pattern after which Melchizedek was fashioned, and undoubtedly the author means to affirm the eternity-predicates which he gives to Melchizedek of the latter also as a scriptural personage, antecedently to and apart from his priestly office. The latter half of verse 3 draws a formal inference, "because he was made like to the Son of God (as a person), he abideth (as to his office) a priest continually". The underlying principle on which the writer proceeds is that the dignity of office follows the worth of personality. Hence also the eternity ascribed to both the Son of God as the pattern and to Melchizedek as the copy, is an eternity *a parte ante* as well as *a parte post*, which fits the conception of an eternity of person, while the eternity of office is from the nature of the case restricted to the latter kind. In having no "beginning of days" as well as no "end of life", was Melchizedek made like unto the Son of God. Now, if the greatness and eternity of the Person of the Son of God determined the greatness and eternity-appearance of the figure of Melchizedek, and in consequence also determined the character of Melchizedek's priesthood, and if further the priesthood of Christ was, historically speaking, copied after the order of Melchizedek, then it follows that it is ultimately nothing else but the divine eternal nature of the Son of God by which His priesthood is shaped and from which it derives its unique character. His sonship makes His priesthood what it is in distinction from every other kind of priesthood. As to the

eternity of His life in particular, this is represented as influencing His priesthood in a twofold respect, first in regard to power, second in regard to duration. The former thought is worked out in verses 15-19. It should here again be remembered that *aiōnios* is for the author a predicate of quality as well as of duration. "Eternal" is that which belongs to the heavenly world and partakes of its nature and power. Thus the eternity of Christ's priesthood involves that He was made priest "after the power of an indissoluble life". The life here spoken of is not, as some have thought, the life which Christ received at His resurrection, but the eternal life of the Son of God. It was *akataλύτος* precisely for this reason that it could not be dissolved by death. Its indissoluble character made His priesthood effectual, because it enabled Him to pass through death, and as a heavenly high priest to bring His sacrifice to full fruition. The second thought, the effect of the eternity of His Person on the duration of His priesthood, is worked out in verses 23-25. The Old Testament priests were many in number, because by death they were hindered from continuing; He, because He abideth forever, has His priesthood unchangeable, because He ever lives to make intercession for those who draw near unto God through Him. In this connection it is quite possible that the author meant the *σώζειν εἰς τὸ παντελές* in part at least in the sense of duration of "saving to the uttermost point of time".

X The last question we have to consider is where the author makes the priesthood of Christ begin. This has long been a controversial point. On the one hand it is urged that the Saviour's earthly work, especially its culmination in the sacrifice upon the cross, must to the author's mind have formed an integral part of His priestly ministry. On the other hand, it is said that the Epistle explicitly identifies the beginning of Christ's priesthood with His entrance into heaven. The dispute obtained doctrinal importance through the Socinian controversy. The Socinians were bent upon showing, that the death of Christ was not in any true sense

an atoning sacrifice. It seemed much easier to maintain this position with the death detached from the priesthood than otherwise, because the priestly aspect of the transaction would naturally suggest its atoning significance. Further, by confining the priesthood to the heavenly state, and separating it entirely from the death, it was no longer found difficult to modify its conception also. For the Socinians the heavenly priesthood came to mean no more than a general position of influence with God. The error of this teaching lay not so much in denying that Jesus acted with reference to His death as a priest at the moment of its occurrence, but rather in severing the death from the priesthood generally. The principle to be strenuously maintained is that the priestly activity of Christ in heaven rests on the preceding sacrifice, and therefore derives from the latter a strictly propitiatory character. Where this is once recognized it becomes a matter of secondary importance whether or not the death itself at the time it took place be considered in the light of a priestly act performed by the Saviour Himself, provided the atoning nature of the death be not denied. It has been observed that the slaying of the sacrifice was not under the Old Testament law the work of the priest, but of the offerer. Jesus might therefore be conceived as first acting in the double capacity of offerer and victim, and then acting, in His exalted state, in the capacity of priest on the basis of the preceding sacrifice. The question thus becomes largely one of dogmatic classification. That which Dogmatics subsumes under the one head of the priestly office of Christ could be distributed over the two rubrics of His sacrifice and His priesthood, and yet materially remain the same.

Our concern with the problem is the purely biblio-theological one, as to what the Epistle actually teaches concerning it. The answer is that it contains two sets of statements, the one of which seems to favor the one, the other the other position. We notice in the first place that the high-priestly ministry of Christ is frequently spoken of as

connected with the heavenly sanctuary, from which it would seem to follow that only with His entrance into heaven did His priesthood begin. In the very first passage which explicitly refers to the priesthood of Jesus, ii. 17, His being made like in all things unto his brethren is said to have been for the purpose, that He might be a merciful and faithful high priest. The likeness unto the brethren includes death, consequently the priesthood, as to its actual discharge, could not begin until after the suffering of death had been experienced. It is farfetched to explain that the passage speaks not of the Saviour's becoming a high priest in general, but of His becoming a merciful and faithful high priest, thus placing the former at an earlier point than the latter. In Chap. v. 10 also the implication is that Christ became a high priest after the order of Melchizedek after He had been made perfect, and it would certainly be against the author's intention to say that, while having been a high priest in general before, the Saviour became a high priest after the order of Melchizedek with His entrance into heaven. Again, in Chap. vi. 20, Jesus' entrance into the place within the veil as forerunner marks also the moment when He became (*γενόμενος*) high priest forever after the order of Melchizedek, and here as little as elsewhere is there any reason for distinguishing between a Melchizedek-priesthood and another priesthood in His case. Chap. vii. 26-28 also, as we have already observed, in describing Christ as high priest, describes Him as He exists in His heavenly state, and declares that His appointment by the word of the oath was the appointment of one who had been made perfect forevermore; in other words, it places His ministry after His *τελείωσις*, and Chap. v. 10 places the *τελείωσις* at the close of the earthly life. According to viii. 2 Christ is minister of the heavenly sanctuary, therefore His priesthood could not begin until after He entered that sanctuary. The strongest statement of all, viii. 4, because it seems to deny every connection of His priestly ministry with the sphere of earth, will be discussed presently.

Over against these stand certain other passages, in which the priestly character of Jesus and His acting in a priestly capacity before His entrance into heaven are implied. Not quite conclusive is Chap. i. 3, where it is said that the Son sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high after He had made purification of sins. The making of purification of sins is undoubtedly a priestly act and it precedes here the sitting down at the right hand of God. This does not necessarily prove, however, that it also precedes the entrance into heaven, or that the author identifies it with the death upon the cross. It is quite possible that the writer in connection with the phrase thought of the entrance itself of Christ into heaven, of His appearing before God, of His cleansing, as it elsewhere is expressed, of the heavenly tabernacle, cfr. Chap. ix. 23-28. No more decisive, perhaps, are the statements in ix. 11, 24, where the Saviour is represented as entering into heaven as high priest. It has been argued from this that He must have been a high priest before entering, but the possibility exists that the author looked upon the entrance itself as the first act and in so far the beginning of the high priesthood. The *ἀνίστασθαι* of the "other priest" in Chap. vii. 11 is perhaps most naturally understood of Jesus' historical appearance on earth. The same applies to *παραγενόμενος* in ix. 11. The *ἀγιάζειν* of the people to which Chap. xiii. 12 refers was certainly a priestly act, and it took place when Jesus suffered outside the gate. In Chap. x. 20 the dissolution of the *σάρξ* of Jesus, which happened at His death, is represented as the dedicating of a fresh and living way into the holy place by His blood. The dedicating of the way into the sanctuary is the work of a priest, therefore Jesus acted in a priestly capacity when He shed His blood and let His flesh be dissolved. Those passages also come under consideration in which the act of *προσφέρειν* is ascribed to Christ. From Chap. v. 1 it appears that *προσφέρειν* is a priestly act. Still it cannot be indiscriminately inferred from all such passages that the author conceived of the Saviour as a priest at the

moment of His death. The identification between the *προσφορά* and the crucifixion is not a necessary one and in each case requires special demonstration. For the *προσφέρειν* can also include and even mean exclusively the self-presentation of Christ in heaven, or the application of His blood to the heavenly things, or however this act may be called. An indiscriminate argument, therefore, cannot be drawn from the use of this expression. In Chap. viii. 3 the context immediately shows that under the *προσφέρειν* a heavenly act must be understood, for in verse 2 Jesus is called minister of the true tabernacle which God pitched, not man, and in verse 4 His offering is distinguished from that of the Old Testament priests, because it takes place in heaven. On the other hand it should be remembered, that *προσφέρειν* is in the Septuagint the translation of the entire act of giving the sacrifice to God including the bringing of it to the altar before it is slain. The presumption therefore is that in our Epistle also it will be used sometimes so as to include the self-surrender of our Lord to death on earth. And this presumption is confirmed by at least two passages. In Chap. ix. 25-28, while the *προσφέρειν* includes the appearance of Christ in heaven, it also includes the Saviour's death; the passive participle *προσενεχθείς* requires this, because in His entrance into heaven Jesus was active rather than passive. Further the statement "He was manifested" proves that a visible transaction must be thought of, such as His suffering was, not His entrance into heaven. And this is still further shown by the parallelism drawn in verses 27, 28 between the death of man in general and Christ's having "been offered", as well as by the statement that He will be *seen* again a second time without sin, viz., at the future judgment, the implication being that the first time, the time of His offering He was *seen* with sin, which could only refer to His death. It is also probable that in verses 25, 26, "nor yet that He should offer Himself often—since in that case He would have had to suffer many times since the foundation of the world", the author includes the suffering of Christ in the *προσφέρειν* *έαντον*. But here

we can speak only of probability, because the author may have argued on this wise, that offering in heaven presupposes death on earth, and that for this reason a repeated offering would presuppose a repeated death.

The other passage coming under consideration here is Chap. x. 10. Here we read of a *προσφορὰ τοῦ σώματος*, a form of statement scarcely applicable to the presentation in heaven, because of the latter “the blood” or “Himself” would be the natural object.

We thus undoubtedly find in the Epistle a twofold mode of representation. On the one hand the priesthood of Christ is identified with His ministry in heaven, on the other hand His death is included in the priestly ministry. Some think we must go farther than this and say that the author viewed the entire earthly life in its obedience as a priestly ministry. But this finds no support in the Epistle. The obedience is viewed as a preparation for the priesthood, not as a priestly ministry in itself. It is true that in Chap. v. 7 the verb *προσφέρειν* is used of the prayers and supplications offered by Jesus, and it has been assumed that this ascribes to these prayers and supplications the character of sacrifices. This is, however, far from certain. The word *προσφέρειν*, while describing frequently the presentation of sacrifice, is also commonly used of the bringing of prayers before God without sacrificial connotation. And elsewhere the author speaks of the sacrifice of Christ as having happened once for all.

The question must now be put: How are these two representations related to each other? It has been suggested, by way of solution of the problem, that the author distinguishes between two orders of priesthood both of which were successively possessed by Christ, first the order of Aaron, then the order of Melchizedek. This is the view of Bruce in *The Humiliation of Christ*, though not repeated in his later work, *The Epistle to the Hebrews*. Among the older expositors it is advocated by Riehm. It finds no real support in the Epistle. It would be impossible to point out in which

respect the high-priestly ministry of Jesus, while on earth, and as connected with His death, differed or fell short from being a ministry after the order of Melchizedek. If the essence of the latter be taken to consist in its eternity, its infinite duration in time, then the Saviour possessed this already while on earth. His death could hardly be considered a cessation of His priesthood, since it in itself was a priestly act. But even granting, that before His resurrection He could not have been rightly called "a priest forever", in other respects than that of mere duration His priestly ministry performed on earth certainly partook of the characteristics of the Melchizedek-order. It was eternal in its absoluteness, in its spiritual nature, in its reference to the heavenly world. In all these respects it was the very opposite of the Levitical ministry after the order of Aaron, so that it certainly could in no wise be identified with the latter. Nor is it possible to separate between the high-priestly ministry connected with the death and that performed in heaven, because the latter is but the carrying out of the former, the two constituting one continuous service, inasmuch as Jesus presented before God in heaven the offering brought on earth. For this reason, evidently, Bruce found it necessary to include in the high-priesthood after the order of Aaron not merely the offering up of Jesus on earth, but also, as inseparably connected therewith, Christ's presentation of Himself before God in heaven. But such a view deprives the Melchizedek-priesthood of the one concrete act in which it embodies itself, so far as the sacrifice is concerned, and leaves to it only the continuous intercession as based on the sacrifice. It will have to be admitted, therefore, that the distinction between two orders of priesthood does not solve the difficulty encountered.

The true explanation of the peculiar doctrine of the Epistle on this point must be sought elsewhere. It lies first of all in the Pauline conception of the exalted Lord, who in His exalted state sums up and carries in Himself all the saving power which flows from His work in the flesh, from

His death on the cross. The believer's faith according to Paul does not terminate upon the historical Christ but upon the Christ in glory. Nevertheless in the glorified Christ the believer's faith grasps all the atoning significance of the cross, because the state of glory is the product and crown of the atonement. Here we have something broadly corresponding, it will be seen, to the view of our Epistle. Apply this Pauline idea to the conception of Christ as a priest, and the peculiar representation of Hebrews will naturally result. The emphasis will rest throughout on the exalted state of the Saviour. This for all practical purposes will figure as *the priesthood*. It alone can be the expression of the absolute, final, unchangeable significance of Christ as the author of salvation. In this state the Saviour actually brings to fruition all that He has done to save the people of God. But just as little as in Paul's teaching does this mean that the author possesses no interest for His death on earth. The latter is not only the indispensable presupposition of the ministry in glory, but the ministry in glory is a perpetuated, eternalized proclamation of what the death of Christ meant. Expressed in priestly terminology, this reads that Jesus through His blood has entered into the heavenly sanctuary, that there He makes His blood purify.

But in the practical purpose of the Epistle also there was something that led to this representation. We have found reason to assume that the doctrine of Christ's priesthood was seized upon by the writer, because it furnished a ready explanation of what the readers took offense at, the invisibility and remoteness of the Saviour's mode of existence and activity, and offered a corrective for the religious externalism in which this offense had its root. In other words, Christ is represented as priest to explain, why He must of necessity be withdrawn into the heavenly world and conduct His saving work from that invisible sphere. Of course, it was only the doctrine of a heavenly priesthood, not of priesthood in general, that was adapted to render this prac-

tical service. If Christ could have been a priest on earth, then His remoteness and invisibility remained as unexplained as before. Hence the author is intent not so much on showing that He is a priest, but rather that He must be, if a priest, a priest in heaven, because nothing else, nothing less will suit the dignity of His Person, the absoluteness of His work. It is from this point of view that we can best understand why the author has introduced into the Epistle the peculiar typology, with its contrast between earth and heaven, that is so characteristic of its teaching as a whole. This so-called Alexandrianism of its construction of the religious universe is in reality but another argument it employs to convince the readers that a Saviour visibly existent and operative in the world of sense would be far less exalted and efficient than the Christ who forever lives and rules in the spiritual realm of heaven.

But the question may still be put: Why, if the author was intent upon thus emphasizing the heavenly priesthood of Christ, has he not been consistent in doing so? Why has he in not a few instances placed side by side with this the representation that the Saviour, at least in the great ministry of His death, was also a priest on earth? And how did he reconcile the two apparently discordant representations to himself? The problem would be insoluble, if we had to interpret Chap. viii. 4 as an explicit denial of the possibility of any priestly ministration by Christ on earth: "Now if He were on earth, He would not be a priest at all, seeing there are those who offer the gifts according to the law, who serve that which is a copy and shadow of the heavenly things". This has been understood as implying that when Jesus was on earth He was not yet a priest. But the author in making the statement evidently had not in mind the question of the locality of the performance of any single priestly act, but only the question of the locality or sphere in which the Saviour's priestly ministry is performed *as a whole*. What he means to say is, that, if Christ's priesthood *now* and *as a whole* were exercised on earth, He

could not legitimately be a priest, since the Aaronites are appointed for that and He is not of the family of Aaron. For a priestly ministry entirely exercised on earth would be a carnal, typical ministry, since earth is the sphere of the carnal, typical. But it by no means follows from this, that Jesus could not perform a single priestly act, while yet on earth. The possibility of this would depend altogether on the nature of the act and the circumstances under which it was performed.

The author, therefore, has not by any absolute denial of the possibility of a priestly act on earth, precluded the adjustment of Jesus' death on earth as a priestly act to the heavenly character of His ministry as a whole. In some way or other He must have reconciled these two in his own mind. As to how he did it we can offer only suggestions. Two observations may be made in regard to this. In the first place the author does not so much compare the ministry of Christ to the work of the Old Testament priests in general, but rather to the ministry performed by the high priest on the day of atonement. Now in the law for the day of atonement it is expressly prescribed, that the high priest must with his own hand slay the sacrificial animal, Lev. xvi. 15. Of course, this act was not a menial act, which might just as well have been performed by somebody else, it was in the strictest sense of the word an official, high-priestly act. In analogy with this the author may have looked upon the self-surrender of Christ to death as an act of priestly nature. But the slaying of the animal by the high priest took place outside of the tabernacle, and the analogy would require that Jesus' self-sacrifice also should occur outside the heavenly tabernacle, *i. e.*, on earth. Still from this single act of the high priest outside of the tabernacle it did not follow, that his ministry as a whole pertained to the court, and as little does it follow, that, because Jesus offered Himself up on earth, His ministry as a whole cannot pertain to heaven. The ministry of the high priest under the Old Covenant belonged to the holy of holies,

where he alone could officiate, and so the ministry of Christ belongs to heaven, where He alone can be a priest.

In the second place we must remember that according to our author the heavenly eternal world projects itself into the lower temporal sphere. Even now believers are come to the heavenly city and stand in true communion by faith with the eternal realities. If this applies to believers in general, how much more will it apply to Jesus, the leader and perfecter of faith. And, altogether apart from faith, though He walked on earth, yet in virtue of His origin, nature and destiny He continued to form a part of the celestial order of things. What He did was determined in its reference to sphere or place by what He was, rather than by the locality where it might be performed. It was *διὰ πνεύματος αἰώνιον* that He offered up Himself. The act was performed by a Person who belonged to the heavenly world, in its intrinsic nature it was a heavenly act, it looked forward to a permanent priesthood to follow in heaven, to all intents, therefore, it was an act which fell in the sphere of the *αἰώνιον*. Thus on closer investigation the problem, how an earthly sacrifice can coexist with a heavenly priesthood, is seen to disappear. The sacrifice on the cross was one of the events in which the eternal enters into the temporal, as the headlands of a continent, to use Dr. Davidson's striking figure, project into the ocean.

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## DEUTERONOMY AND THE ARGUMENT FROM STYLE.

"In the ancient world the style was not the man himself, but a garment that he could change at will."—NORDEN.

The higher critics of a certain school invariably represent the case for the division of the Pentateuch into a number of documentary sources as resting not on any single line of investigation but on the converging testimony of a number of different enquiries. Two of these may perhaps be said to enjoy a sort of pre-eminence though for different reasons—the historico-legal and the literary. I have dealt with the former on many previous occasions.<sup>1</sup> In the present paper it is my purpose to treat of the latter with special reference to Deuteronomy. In doing so I shall endeavor to put my case in such a form as to make it intelligible to all educated readers whether they be Hebraists or not. For reasons that will shortly appear this course is very much easier to follow than might generally be supposed.

An enquiry of this sort is the more desirable because I have quite recently given expression to my conviction that the Pentateuch is not primarily a piece of literature. What part, it may naturally be asked, do literary considerations play in determining the form of those portions with which I am chiefly concerned—the legislation and the passages that cannot be detached from that legislation? I am the more ready to essay the task of answering this question because I believe that literary criticism—in the best sense of the term—will form an integral portion of the conservative case of the future. We may fairly presume that long after the

<sup>1</sup> *Studies in Biblical Law. The Churchman* (London, Elliot Stock), December, 1905; May, June, July, September, 1906; March, April, May, 1907. *Bibliotheca Sacra*, January, 1907. *THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*, April, 1907. See also a paper entitled "Hebrew Monotheism" which will appear in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for October, 1907.

Mosaic authenticity of the Pentateuchal legislation is universally recognized certain differences of style, together with the reasons for them, will be noted by those who devote to the Bible loving study. The future historian of Biblical science will doubtless credit the higher critics with having drawn attention to many interesting phenomena even while reprobating the fantastic theories, the inability to weigh evidence and the extravagant exaggerations that have marked their career. And this consideration helps to make clear the nature of the task that must be accomplished if the documentary theory of the Pentateuch is to be dethroned. A successful refutation cannot be merely destructive; it must be also—and principally—constructive. The reason for this is not far to seek. If a hypothesis is proved to be untenable while no explanation is offered of the phenomena for which it was designed to account, another theory must inevitably arise to fill its place. This of course holds good only where the phenomena are real. Where they are simply the creation of an overheated imagination which has been allowed to dwell too long on insignificant details, a little timely ridicule, or the diversion of the mind to another set of facts, or mere lapse of time will be sufficient to remedy the evil. It is because the so-called literary or philological argument of the higher critics is based in part on phenomena of the first class that the work of examining this portion of their case possesses some interest. Unfortunately it must be coupled with the less congenial duty of pointing out the defects in their methods, equipment and reasoning.

Our first task must be to enquire what is meant by the philological or literary argument. The word philology is often used to denote the science of the history of language. It is not in that sense that the higher critics generally use the term when they put forward their "philological" argument for the documentary theory. It is necessary to dwell on this point because many readers who are not Hebraists suppose that there are philological grounds (the term "philological" being used in the sense just indicated) for the

divisive hypothesis. That is not so. Material drawn from the real or supposed history of the Hebrew language is scarcely ever put in the forefront of the critical case. The only striking exception to this statement that occurs to me is to be found in an assertion recently made by Dr. C. A. Briggs.<sup>2</sup>

“The language of the four great documents is so different, that they must have been composed by different writers. The difference of language extends to a very large *vocabulary*, each of these documents having its own Lexicon. And these differences are not merely differences of synonym; they are differences representing different centuries in the historical development of the Hebrew language. These documents of the Pentateuch represent a language that did not exist until centuries after the death of Moses. The evidence for all this has been given only in part in Driver’s *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, and in my *Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, and many other recent works; but it is fully given in our new Hebrew Lexicon, now completed, in which Drs. Brown and Driver and myself have carefully examined and classified the uses of all Hebrew words in the Old Testament according to their historical development in the literature. It is impossible for anyone to study the complete series of these words as we have done, without coming to the conclusion which we have reached in entire concord, that Moses could not have written any one of the great documents of which the Pentateuch is composed.”

This statement is so entirely exceptional that I think it best to postpone consideration of it until we have examined the ordinary critical argument. It will be observed that Dr. Briggs himself admits that “the evidence for all this” is only put forward in part in the recognised books on the subject, and his reference to the new lexicon is too vague to be of much value. It will be best to examine the recognised evidence before attacking the newest critical position.

The following extract from the Oxford Hexateuch gives us a representative statement of the ordinary argument:<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *The Papal Commission and the Pentateuch*, pp. 11 and 12.

<sup>3</sup> *The Hexateuch*, edited by J. Estlin Carpenter and G. Harford-Battersby, 1900, p. 15.

"But it may reasonably be expected that materials of different ages, drawn from separate sources, will be marked by their own characteristics of style or expression. Peculiar turns of phrase, due to the vivacity of oral narrative, or significant of legal precision, or repeated by the impassioned earnestness of the preacher, may be found to coincide with different groups of narrative or law already distinguished from each other by incompatibilities of content. The recurrence of these peculiarities becomes in its turn a warning; and each additional instance, in accordance with the general law of probabilities, brings far more than its own individual weight. Moreover their effect is again heightened if there is reason to believe that they can be in any way connected with other forces of thought and life. The journalist who should lightly talk of 'the tendency not ourselves' or of 'sweetness and light' might safely be placed with Matthew Arnold in the second half of the Victorian age. The teacher who dwelt on 'the silences' and 'the eternities' could not have taught before Carlyle. A cause must be found for the different philosophical vocabulary of Coleridge compared with that of Hume. The devotional utterance of Watts and Doddridge is couched in a different idiom from that of Newman and Faber. In the same way if one group of chapters which there is independent reason to assign to the seventh century, shows marked affinities of expression with Jeremiah, and another group with Ezekiel, it may be possible to explain the resemblances on the hypothesis of the indebtedness of the prophets, but the student must also consider the probability that they may be due to the influences of separate religious schools."

It will be seen that nothing is here said of phonetic evolution or the history of words. The argument is not philosophical in the narrow sense of the word. But attention is drawn to the fact that there may be differences of style, and it is suggested that in certain circumstances there may be some connection between these and other forces of thought and life. We must notice too that in this passage—which gives us a very fair and moderate exposition of the line of argument adopted by most higher critics—several qualifications are introduced. It is first supposed that different groups of narrative or law are already distinguished by incompatibilities of content. That is to say, the writer in the

first instance assigns to the stylistic argument an ancillary character. Then he very fairly admits that resemblances between Jeremiah or Ezekiel on the one hand and certain portions of the Pentateuch on the other may possibly be explained on the hypothesis of the indebtedness of the prophets: and a moment's thought will convince any impartial reader that such a view contains nothing that is improbable. If, for example, Deuteronomy—whether a genuine work of Moses or a recent literary forgery—was discovered (or re-discovered) in the time of Jeremiah, it can occasion no surprise that it should have exercised a powerful influence on his style. A further claim is however made for the argument. “The recurrence of these peculiarities becomes in its turn a warning”; in plain English the Pentateuch is dissected in part on grounds of style.

That an argument from style is necessarily very subjective is a truism that need not be laboured. But experience in refuting other branches of the higher criticism suggests the necessity of enquiring whether in this instance those qualities which should mark all scholarly work have characterised the critical investigations. I can well remember my experiences on first entering on the consideration of the authorship of the Pentateuch. Legal studies had convinced me that there existed a quantity of material from which the authenticity of the Mosaic legislation could be proved, and I read the Oxford Hexateuch for the purpose of ascertaining on what the critics relied. While it was natural to expect that in legal matters the writers would be very much at sea. I yet supposed that in all other respects they would present me with work that would not fall short of the best achievements in other fields of study. As I read on this impression was deepened. I found that their conclusions were the result of centuries of labour. I saw great names cited. Spinoza had discerned certain difficulties in simple narrative. Now if since 1671 the best brains that had studied the Bible had been unable to answer what were alleged to be glaring discrepancies in simple narrative, was it not certain that no

adequate reply could be found? But suddenly I came across assertions that no reverence for great names, no faith in the results of century-long study, no belief in the efficacy of controversy or the efficiency of controversialists could induce me to accept without independent investigation. Thus I read that "in the narrative of the plagues it will be found that one set of stories places the Israelites in Goshen, where the wonders that are wrought in Egypt do not affect them Ex. viii. 22; ix. 26; while another locates them among the Egyptians and secures them miraculous exemption x. 21-23."<sup>4</sup> The results of my investigation of this statement will be found elsewhere:<sup>5</sup> here it is sufficient to point out that a few such assertions rapidly succeed in teaching the most unsuspicious of readers to accept no statement of fact of the higher critics without first testing it for himself. I well remember the horror produced in my mind by the results of my efforts to verify the first batch of improbable statements to which I devoted my attention—a horror which was only heightened by the transparent honesty of the writers who made them. I can offer no account at all of some of the phenomena I have observed, but in some cases a knowledge of the origin of the statements elucidates the mystery: and as this is a matter that must gravely affect the views taken of the higher criticism, it may be well to devote some lines to discussing the subject. As Dr. Driver's Deuteronomy will hereafter be taken as representative of the critical position, it is natural to select illustrations from that work, when possible.

The first cause of error to which attention may be drawn is the habit of borrowing statements from other writers—usually without any indication that they are not original. Here is an illustration:—"There are only *three* facts mentioned in Deuteronomy for which no parallel is to be found in JE: i. 23 the number (twelve) of the spies (Num. xiii. 2-16 P); x. 22 the number of souls (seventy) with which

<sup>4</sup> *Oxford Hexateuch*, I., p. 32.

<sup>5</sup> *Studies in Biblical Law*, pp. 34-5, and *Bibliotheca Sacra*, January, 1907, p. 12.

Jacob came down into Egypt (Gen. xlvi. 27, Ex. i. 5 P); and x. 3 acacia-wood as the material of the Ark (Ex. xxv. 10 P)."<sup>6</sup> Dr. Driver is here arguing for the dependence of Deuteronomy on those portions of the Pentateuch which he assigns to the "sources" called JE and its independence of the other "source" called P. Now whether the Pentateuch should be divided between these (or any) sources is a matter of opinion: but once the division is effected the question whether D mentions only three events that are not to be paralleled from JE is a question of fact. Though I have not searched Deuteronomy for the purpose, I can with the help of Dr. Driver's own notes suggest at least four more, viz: iii. 27, the permission to view the promised land from afar (see Driver, p. 60); viii. 2, the period (forty years) spent in the wilderness (see Driver, p. 106); ii. 2-14, the fact that the years in the wilderness were spent in wandering, Num. xxxii. 13 P, cf. Num. xiv. 33 (P) where some read "wanderers" for "shepherds"<sup>7</sup>; and xxix. 12 (13) the promise to be to Abraham for a God. The last two instances are remarkable for different reasons. The wandering is a test case of first-rate importance, for in Dr. Driver's opinion JE represents the Israelites as having remained stationary at Kadesh for some 38 years (see Driver, pp. 32-3) and is in hopeless conflict with Deuteronomy. I have elsewhere<sup>8</sup> shown that the text of Numbers—not JE or P—is quite consistent with that of Deuteronomy, and that the contradiction has in fact been created by the documentary theory: but for the purpose of testing Dr. Driver's statements we must, of course, postulate his position and assume that there are three irreconcilable documents JE, D and P. On that assumption it is vital to the purpose in hand to note that D agrees with P and contradicts JE.

The other point is also very instructive. In commenting on Deut. xxix. 12 (13)<sup>9</sup> Dr. Driver expressly admits that

<sup>6</sup> Driver, *Deuteronomy*, p. xvi.

<sup>7</sup> This only involves the change of a single letter in Hebrew.

<sup>8</sup> *The Churchman*, June, 1906, pp. 355-359.

<sup>9</sup> P. 323.

the promise 'to be to Abraham for a God' is found in Gen. xvii. 7, 8 (P), but hastens to add that "there is no mention of a corresponding promise to Isaac or Jacob". The next sentence must be transcribed: "But no doubt the reference is to passages such as Gen. xxii. 16-18, xxvi. 24, xxviii. 13f (JE), the conditions involved tacitly in the promises there recorded being converted here into a formula expressing them distinctly." So that when on his own showing a reference is to P, Dr. Driver finds an allusion to something "involved tacitly" in passages which might contain the desired statements but unfortunately do not. Attention should here be directed to the bias that characterises this note. It affords the key to many problems and goes far to explain the general untrustworthiness of the work of the higher critics.

Now at first sight Dr. Driver's statement appears quite inexplicable. What, it may be asked, could have led him to assert that only three facts were mentioned in Deuteronomy for which no parallel is to be found in JE, if in his own notes he recognised that there were actually many more? The answer is that the writings which pass under Dr. Driver's name are in fact often composite. It is not usual to dissect the publications of contemporary writers in the way in which the higher critics dissect the Pentateuch: but this should not blind us to the facts of the case. When Dr. Driver makes his assertion about the three facts he is apparently copying Cornill—seemingly without any independent investigation of the accuracy of that author's statement. Unfortunately he gives not the slightest hint that he is basing himself on the dictum of another writer.

Next the accuracy and trustworthiness of the critical work are greatly impaired by a cause that has already been touched upon—an overwhelming bias. As already explained, Dr. Driver believes that D—the main source of Deuteronomy—was dependent on "JE" and independent of "P" (including "H"). He appears to regard the argument from style as falling under two heads:—(1) the argument

from words and phrases, and (2) the argument from rhythm. He remarks<sup>10</sup> that the book “presents comparatively few exceptional words”, and he presents us with the first part of his stylistic argument in the shape of a list of “the most noticeable words or phrases characteristic of Deuteronomy”. This embraces some 70 numbered sections and covers nearly six pages of his introduction. The first 16 may in Dr. Driver’s opinion, “have been suggested to the author” by certain sections of “JE”. Now among these I find the following:<sup>11</sup>—“The *covenant*,<sup>12</sup> either with the patriarchs, or with Israel (expressing a fundamental theological idea of Deuteronomy).” Dr. Driver then gives the references in Deuteronomy and “JE”. But he does not mention that in “P” the word is also very frequent in covenant passages, occurring for example no less than three times in a single verse (Lev. xxvi. 42); that some of the most important covenants are narrated in “P” only, and that it is not less a fundamental theological idea in “P”—and for that matter in “JE”—than in “D”. It may be open to question whether collections of words have the probative value attributed to them by the higher critics; but if they are to be used at all the whole of the relevant facts should be fully and impartially stated.

What has been said about the inaccuracy of the critical work applies to the other branches of their case as much as to the argument from style. So do some of the other considerations that must be urged: but owing to the special character of their argument our illustrations of the other causes that are operative to render their labours nugatory will be drawn exclusively from this part of their work.

First, then, their selection of words frequently causes profound amazement. Take the following from an argument in the Oxford Hexateuch as to the first seven chapters of Leviticus: “Attention may also be called to the large group of cultus terms and formulæ, the constant repetition

<sup>10</sup> P. lxxvii.

<sup>11</sup> P. lxxix, No. 8.

<sup>12</sup> ברית

of which is characteristic of the legal style of P: thus, *Aaron's sons, atonement, without blemish (perfect), bring near (offer, present), burn, burn with fire, clean, guilt offering, heave offering, holy, kill, lay his hand on, meal offering, oblation, offering made by fire, sacrifice of peace offerings, etc.*<sup>13</sup> It will be noted that all the above are technical terms or terms that are peculiarly appropriate in regulations for sacrifice at the religious capital. This is emphasised if we take the words that might appear to an English reader to be general words and follow up the remarks made about them in the Oxford Hexateuch itself. Thus on the word "burn"<sup>14</sup> we find the following:<sup>15</sup>—"Ex. xxix. 13, Num. xviii. 17 (sacrificially) forty-four times", and of "kill"<sup>16</sup> we read: "Ex. xii. 6 and onwards, forty-two times, ritually".<sup>17</sup> The argument therefore amounts to saying that in a technical passage technical terms are used. To give it any force at all it would be necessary to prove either that "P" would have used these terms in narrative, speeches, civil laws, etc., if he had composed the whole Pentateuch, or else that "D" or "JE" would not have used them in technical sacrificial regulations. It need scarcely be said that no attempt is or can be made to prove anything of the sort.<sup>18</sup>

A second defect in the critical work is due to the inability of its authors to appreciate the subtle motives that influence great writers. Civilians have a division of 'things' that recurs to the mind—fungible things and non-fungible things. Fungible things are those *quae pondere, numero, mensurave*

<sup>13</sup> Vol. II, p. 144.

<sup>14</sup> קְרָב

<sup>15</sup> Vol. I., p. 210.

<sup>16</sup> מַחֲשָׁב

<sup>17</sup> Vol. I., p. 214. In this latter case we are invited to "contrast J Ex. xxxiv. 25, Num. xi. 22, R<sup>18</sup> Num. xiv. 16, E Gen. xxii. 10, xxxvii. 31", but without being told what inferences, if any, we are to draw from the contrast. Are we meant to infer that in the proposed slaughter of Isaac (Gen. xxii) or in the prohibition to "kill" (R. V. offer) "the blood of my sacrifice" (Ex. xxxiv.) the word is not used "ritually"?

<sup>18</sup> Instances from Deuteronomy will be found in the appendix to this paper.

*constant*—things that are weighed, counted, or measured,—such as money, wine, oil, corn, bronze, silver, gold. Non-fungible things are all others. For the critics words are mere fungible things. For great artists they are non-fungible. That is the secret of many phenomena that puzzle modern commentators. Eye and ear—especially ear—are needed to appreciate the choice of words; and a sense of form and an apprehension of subtle shades of meaning of which no signs are to be found in the critical work. Some examples of some words and phrases from Deuteronomy, the use of which appears to me to have been dictated by considerations of euphony, will be found in the appendix. Confining ourselves to mere single words or expressions it is impossible to give instances that would be intelligible to readers who are not Hebraists, but if we go beyond these it is easy to produce a most convincing example. There can be few English readers who have not admired the sublime opening of the book of Genesis. Here is the usual critical version:—"These are the generations of the heaven and the earth when they were created. In the beginning, etc.". The explanation given by the Oxford Hexateuch should prove illuminating. "It has long been recognized that the Book of Genesis is primarily based upon a document containing a series of sections introduced by the formula 'These are the generations of . . . ' . . . The *toledhoth* (i. e. 'generations of' H. M. W.) formula of Gen. ii. 4a is not appropriate to the narrative which follows it in ii. 4bff., for this says nothing about the creation of the heavens or the earth, but deals with the formation of the first man after they were made. On the other hand its form and substance are both congruous with the account of the creation of the universe in i. 1-ii. 3. In other sections, however, the formula always precedes the matter which it designates. It is probable, therefore, that it originally stood before i. 1, and was transposed by the editor who combined the two documents, to serve as the link of combination."<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Vol. II., p. 1.

So not only words, but sections and sentences are to the critics fungible things—things *quae pondere numero mensurave constant*. If I borrow a sovereign, I am under an obligation to pay back a sovereign—any sovereign—not necessarily the actual coin I borrow. All are legal tender. And similarly with the book of Genesis. If I do not begin with one sentence, I must begin with another. All are legal tender, and literary considerations—using the word “literary” in its best sense—do not enter into the question. But as all sovereigns conform to a certain type, so must all the sections of “P” in Genesis. There is no difference between the minting of coins and the minting of sections of Genesis.

But what if literature is not within the jurisdiction of the foot-rule? How if a commentator on a great author must be endowed with some appreciation of literary beauty, if he is to perform his task successfully?

The next cause that falls to be noticed is the lack of judgment and the inability to weigh evidence that characterise the application of the critical tests. For the sake of brevity the first instance will be taken from Genesis, since in that book it is easy to find examples limited to a single verse. In a genealogy we read “And Lamech lived an hundred eighty and two years, and begat a son” (Gen. v. 28). The whole of this down to “begat” is given by the Oxford Hexateuch to “P”, but “a son” is assigned to “J”—an author who with truly prophetic foresight took the unusual step of composing the end of the sentence some centuries before “P” wrote the beginning. The reason given throws much light on the analysis. The preceding items in this genealogy all conform to the type “And A lived  $x$  years and begat B.” Accordingly we read in the note: “The uniformity of P’s style leads us to expect here the name of Noah. The compiler, however, wishing apparently to utilize J’s explanation of it, has inserted it at this point, having no doubt found it in the list which traced Noah’s descent through Seth iv. 25f. That pedigree has apparently been

rejected by the editor in favour of the more highly systematized scheme of P, etc.”.<sup>20</sup> In other words “P” could not have written “a son” in vs. 28 because he has not done so in other verses, and we can feel the genius of fungible things—things *quae pondere, numero, mensurave constant*—hovering over us. It would be interesting to know what course was open to “P” if he too desired to give an explanation of Noah’s name. Are the premises in any way commensurate to the conclusion? Would it not be easier to suppose that “P” could vary his language when occasion demanded than to postulate this extraordinary machinery of lists and compilers?

Another curious instance may be taken from Dr. Driver’s statement that Deut. xi. 4 follows Ex. xiv. 27 JE.<sup>21</sup> He is speaking of a number of incidents of which the passage of the Red Sea is one, and he writes “in the case of some which are narrated in P as well, the terms of the allusion in Deuteronomy are such as to show that the writer followed JE and not P.” Here are the two passages in parallel columns:—

## Ex. xiv.

27. (P) And Moses stretched forth his hand over the sea, (JE) and the sea returned to its strength when the morning appeared; and the Egyptians fled against it; and the LORD overthrew the Egyptians in the midst of the sea; 28 (P) and the waters returned, and covered the chariots, and the horsemen, even all the host of Pharaoh that went in after them into the sea.

## Deut. xi. 4.

And what he did unto the host of Egypt, unto their horses, and to their chariots; how he made the water of the Red Sea to overflow them as they pursued after you, and how the LORD hath destroyed them unto this day.

Is there any evidence which would justify the statement that Deuteronomy is here based on “JE” to the exclusion

<sup>20</sup> Vol. II., p. 8.

<sup>21</sup> *Deuteronomy*, pp. xv, xvi.

of "P"? Or indeed is there here any evidence which would justify any inference at all?<sup>22</sup>

Two other sources of error remain to be dealt with, but as they are more appropriate to the argument from rhythm I proceed at once to dispose of the list of words. For this purpose it is necessary to look at Deuteronomy itself and see what it professes to be.

The most superficial reader of the book must be aware that it consists mainly of three great speeches. He will not therefore be greatly surprised to find that the language is coloured by this fact, and that appropriate phrases and rhythm are used, or that some of the terms employed appear to be popular rather than technical.

At the conclusion of the central and longest speech we are told that "these are the words of the covenant which the LORD commanded Moses to make with the children of Israel".<sup>23</sup> It requires no great grasp to enable us to understand that language appropriate to a covenant is likely to be used.

The covenant embodied a code of laws. It is natural that we should find in it expressions that were proper for a law-giver to use. Nay more, the task of the law-giver was conditioned by the circumstances of the time. The people were just entering a land in which idolatrous high-places abounded, and there was grave danger that they would offer at these sacrifices which for religious and national reasons ought to be brought only to the House of the Lord. We may therefore expect to find emphasis laid on the law of the religious capital, and this again must affect

<sup>22</sup> Strangely enough, Dr. Driver has a footnote on the next page (xvii) in which he says: "In xi. 4, 5 *host* (לִבְנָה), *horses* and *chariots*, and *pursued after them*, are points of contact with P's narrative of the passage of the Red Sea in Ex. xiv." He then collects some other "points of contact" and adds "it may be questioned whether these expressions are not too isolated, and too little distinctive, to establish dependence upon P." But, what expressions establish the dependence of Deut. xi. 4 on JE? Where is the evidence that supports his view.

<sup>23</sup> Deut. xxviii. 69 (xxix. 1).

the language. In other ways, too, the historical situation will colour the orator's phrases. What wonder if he should make frequent reference in glowing terms to the approaching entry into the land?

We have yet another piece of information about the book which must be taken into account. The book contains a code of law addressed to the people in the form of a speech. But it was not only on the occasion of its first delivery that this speech was to go before the people. On the contrary, it was to be read to them once in every seven years. Having regard to this, and also to the object of Moses, the nature of the people and the circumstances of the time, we cannot wonder if he lays stress on the duty of being faithful to God, inculcating obedience to His precepts at every opportunity, holding out inducements to those who obey Him, uttering warnings as to the result of infidelity and putting before the people the national evils of impiety.

These few and simple remarks dispose of the great bulk of Dr. Driver's numbered paragraphs. I have classified the particulars in the appendix, to which those who care for the details may turn. Of course I do not claim that all the items in this classification will commend themselves to everybody. In many cases two or more reasons have combined to make the use of a particular phrase natural. The influences that determine a great stylist's choice of language are both numerous and varied, and it would be absurd for anybody dogmatically to assign reasons for the phraseology employed by a speaker three thousand years ago, or to pretend that he can hear with the ears of an Israelite of the Mosaic age. Thus I expect that there will be many divergences of opinion both as to the phrases I have selected, and those I have omitted, and also as to the reasons assigned. But I think that when all deductions have been made, it will appear that the great bulk of Dr. Driver's selected phrases can be accounted for by a few simple considerations. Assuming that Moses did at the end of his career make speeches, one of which embodied *inter alia* a number of laws

in the form of the terms of a covenant, that the subject-matter of those laws was similar to the contents of the Deuteronomic code, and that the historical circumstances were such as the Bible represents them to have been, there is nothing in these lists to warrant any deductions as to authorship. If any critic doubt this, let me suggest to him a very simple test. Let him re-write some other portion of the Pentateuch, say chapter 1 of Genesis, as he thinks the Deuteronomist would or should have written it, with the "Hear, O Israels" and the "good lands", the "statutes and judgments" and the exhortations not to forget which are gravely put forward in evidence. Or, conversely, let him re-write some portion of Deuteronomy as he thinks P or JE would have written it. Far be it from me to affirm of any higher critic that in this way he would convince himself: but if he would only publish his results, he would speedily find that ridicule still has power to kill.

But it is on yet other considerations that I rely finally to clinch the matter, and these may best be advanced in connection with Dr. Driver's argument from rhythm.

"Of course a tabulated list of idioms cannot adequately characterize the style of an author; there is an effect produced by the manner in which phrases are combined, and by the structure and rhythm of sentences, which defies tabulation, or even description, and which can only be properly appreciated by repeated perusal of the work in question. Those who have by this course familiarized themselves with the style of the Deuteronomic discourses, will be conscious how greatly it differs from that of any other part of the Pentateuch,—even the parenetic sections of JE, which show a tendency to approach it, not exhibiting the *complete* Deuteronomic rhythm or expression."<sup>24</sup>

And here at last we are on bed-rock. In this instance Dr. Driver is right in his facts. Is he right in the interpretation he puts upon them or even in the method of his study? It is to this that the two last charges in my indictment of the critical argument from language—other than the unique dictum of Dr. Briggs—are directed.

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<sup>24</sup> *Deuteronomy*, p. lxxxv.

The ideal commentary on Deuteronomy would devote a section of the introduction to considering the place of Moses among the great orators of the world and to estimating his oratory as literature. Corresponding to this there would be notes dealing with details of style from the standpoint of the orator's art and in the light of the comparative material. But the ideal is not yet realised and probably no Biblical student has any conception of what we miss. After all, the speeches of Demosthenes and Cicero and Burke are also characterised by a very marked rhythm. When I look at attempts such as those of Sievers to scan certain portions of the Bible (*e. g.* Jeremiah i.) that would be regarded as prose in any other language, I cannot help feeling that a knowledge of the existence of prose rhythm would probably revolutionise the attempts of modern writers to discover metres in the Bible.<sup>25</sup> In the case of some authors a good deal of work has been done of recent years, and while I must not be taken as suggesting that everything that is true of other prose rhythms may be applied to Hebrew speeches, I cannot but see how a knowledge of other fields of literature would modify the conclusions of Biblical students. We should no longer be presented with the familiar lists of words, nor should we be invited to believe that *asyndeta* add a measured dignity to style,<sup>26</sup> but on the other hand we should have our attention drawn to numberless literary beauties to which commentators have hitherto been blind, and we should rise from a study of the Book with a truer knowledge of its place among the literatures of the world and a juster appreciation of its manifold greatness.

<sup>25</sup> I may be allowed to quote a sentence from the preface to the second edition of Blass' *Attische Beredsamkeit*, Vol. III., Pt. I.: "Man muss nicht mit dem maître de Philosophie bei Molière hartnäckig sagen: *tout ce qui n'est point prose est vers, et tout ce qui n'est point vers, est prose*, sondern es ist den Attikern des 4. Jahrhunderts ein mittelding zwischen beiden zuzugestehen wenn man den Thatsachen gerecht werden will." Any Hebraist who will carefully examine such a passage as Deut. xxviii. 38-41—its rhythm, its antitheses, the order of the words—will see for himself that there are grounds for supposing that a similar remark would apply to Mosaic oratory.

<sup>26</sup> Driver, *Deuteronomy*, p. lxxxvii, note.

And that leads me to my last point. The critical case rests on the assumption that differences of style prove differences of authorship. What has the comparative method to teach us as to this premiss? Does it confirm its soundness? The answer—which sweeps away the foundations of the critical argument—is in the negative. There is a passage in Norden's *Kunstprosa*—not to be translated for fear of losing the flavour of the original—in which the author asks what influence the individuality of the writer had on his style in the ancient world, or, in other words, how far Buffon's *le style est l'homme même* holds good for that period. Norden concludes that style was an acquired art, that individuality was subordinated in a far higher degree than to-day, and that one and the same writer could write in different styles according to the task in hand.<sup>27</sup> The case

<sup>27</sup> Bevor ich zum einzelnen übergehe, habe ich noch kurz eine Vorfrage zu berühren: welchen Einfluss hatte im Altertum die Individualität des Schriftstellers auf seinen Stil oder, mit andern Worten, wie weit gilt auch für jene Zeit Buffons Ausspruch *le style est l'homme même*? Zwar hatte auch das Altertum ein Sprichwort: *οἶος ὁ τρόπος, τοιοῦτος καὶ ὁ λόγος*, aber wir dürfen nicht verkennen, dass der Satz in der Praxis nicht so grosse Bedeutung hatte wie bei uns. Der Stil war damals eine erlernte Kunst, deren Regeln im allgemeinen keiner seiner Individualität zuliebe übertreten durfte, wie ja überhaupt das Altertum in viel höherem Masse als die moderne Zeit vom Individuum die Unterordnung seiner Eigenart unter die Autorität der von hervorragenden Kunstrichtern sanktionierten Tradition, die Zurückdrängung des Genialischen, verlangt hat. Daraus ergiebt sich zweierlei. Erstens: die Individuen treten zurück hinter allgemeinen Richtungen der Zeit, deren Repräsentanten sie sind. Zweitens: ein und derselbe Schriftsteller konnte nebeneinander in ganz verschiedenen Stilarten schreiben, indem er bald diese, bald jene *ἰδέα* verwendete, je nachdem sie ihm für das vorliegende Werk zweckentsprechend schien. Wir Moderne haben durch Verkennen dieser Thatsache vielfach geirrt, aber die Zeiten sind vorbei, wo man auf dies Argument hin dem Platon den Menexenos, dem Xenophon den Agesilaos, dem Tacitus den Dialogus, dem Appuleius die Schrift *De Mundo* und so vielen Autoren so vieles aberkannte, oder wo man sich darüber wunderte, dass der Aristoteles der pragmatischen Schriften in seinen Dialogen so dämonisch zu schreiben verstand. Selbst die so beliebten Schlüsse von der Stilverchiedenheit zweier Werke eines und desselben Autors auf eine verschiedene Auffassungszeit, sind selten zwingend und oft durch That-sachen anderer Art zu widerlegen. Der Stil war im Altertum nicht der

of Moses is to some extent different from that of any classical writer. He could have had stylistic models only within very narrow limits. A few traditions, a few songs and poems, a few "dooms" pronounced by the elders, would have constituted the sum total of the Hebrew literature that he found. Nevertheless I see no difficulty in supposing that when occasion demanded he was capable of creating a style suitable for the matter in hand. After all, the purposes of the various portions of the Pentateuchal legislation are palpably diverse. While the judgments are written in a form suitable for memorising (which may have conformed to what was usual in the traditional "dooms" pronounced by the courts of elders)—it is obvious that no speech could have been composed in the same style. Here, then, necessity must have been the mother of invention. And in dealing with the third style—that of the great body of "priestly" legislation—it must be remembered that the purpose was again different. Here we are not dealing either with a speech or with dooms to be committed to memory, but with complicated and technical rules to be transmitted by a specially trained class who would teach the people.<sup>28</sup> It is possible to point to modern instances of similar versatility. Let the Indian Penal Code which was drafted by Macaulay be contrasted with the speeches and ballads of the same writer and similar divergences of vocabulary and rhythm will at once become apparent. If it be urged that Macaulay came after a period of long literary development, I answer (1) that it is impossible to lay down narrow rules which no genius can transcend, and (2) that no man, however gifted, could have written "dooms" and speeches in the same vocabulary and rhythm and made a success of both. A man of genius who found himself confronted with such very different tasks could not avoid creating the means of executing them. In a word, I conceive that in each case the

Mensch selbst, sondern ein Gewand, das er nach Belieben wechseln konnte. (E. Norden, *Die Antike Kunstprosa* 1898 I pp. 11-12.)

<sup>28</sup> Deut. xxiv. 8; Lev. xiv. 54-7.

style was merely a tool forged by Moses for the accomplishment of his purpose.

We must now come back to Dr. Briggs, who claims that the language used did not exist until centuries after the death of Moses. After what has been said of the inaccuracy of the critical work it is not necessary to take this claim too seriously.<sup>29</sup> If and when Dr. Briggs chooses to specify the facts on which he relies there will be time enough to answer his argument, but a mere vague reference to his Lexicon is no sufficient clue to the evidence. Nevertheless it is not so difficult to answer Dr. Briggs as might appear, because it happens that I have myself had to examine the uses of a few of the words to which Dr. Briggs has devoted special attention. On the occasions on which I use his Lexicon (which is generally when I want information about some technical term) I am usually amazed at the backward state of lexicographical studies. The very first things that strike me about a word are usually points that have never been noticed at all by our lexicographers. In fact here, as elsewhere, I am separated from the higher critics by differences of training, of temperament, and of scholarly ideals. I propose to take a single example of Dr. Briggs's work and in discussing it I shall endeavor so far as may be to emphasise the distinctions between the historicoo-legal methods and those employed by Dr. Briggs. To this end I shall marshal a number of facts and arguments that are quite out

<sup>29</sup> Here is a sample from Dr. Briggs himself:

"A careful study of the term תֹּרְהָה, as applied to law, makes it evident that it was the earlier usage of all the documents of the Hexateuch except P to regard תֹּרְהָה as the Law in general, as embracing a complex of words, statutes, judgments, commands, and that the use of תְּוֹרָות, תְּוֹרָה for particular laws is post-Deuteronomic. Such laws are to be found only in P (See *New Hebrew Lexicon*, p. 435)" [*Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, new ed. 1897, p. 255]. But on p. 436 of the Lexicon Dr. Briggs writes of this word: "law (prop. direction): viz: of *special laws*, singular of *Feast of Massoth* Ex. xiii. 9 (J), *sabbath* xvi. 4 (J); of direction given by priests in particular case Deut. xvii. 11." It might be added that the language of Deut. xxiv. 8 (see Driver *ad loc.*) would in itself be sufficient to render Dr. Briggs's theory extremely improbable.

of proportion to the intrinsic importance of the statements investigated.

"The earliest type of Hebrew law is the **דבר** Word, not so much a particular word as a word-group—a saying, discourse, utterance, sentence."<sup>30</sup>

This statement occurs in an appendix on Types of Hebrew Law added to "*The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*" in the 1897 edition as the result of the work done for the new Lexicon. We are then informed that the "word" is spoken by God either directly as in the Decalogue or "immediately [Dr. Briggs probably means immediately, H. M. W.] through Moses and the prophets who succeeded him. Accordingly **דבר** becomes the term for the message of the prophets, and later for the sentences of the Hebrew wise men. . . . " "These Words are in the second person singular of the verb, and with the negative, and are brief terse sentences without reasons, without specifications, and without penalty. All such additions to the Words are redactional."

I proceed to outline the methods of attacking these statements:—I. We may turn to the history and see what it has to teach us. The book of Genesis, for example, is full of law. To take a few general instances: we find traces of a law that in certain cases a slave might inherit from his master to the exclusion of that master's collateral relations;<sup>31</sup> we have law regulating conveyances of land,<sup>32</sup> law of theft,<sup>33</sup> law of murder, birthright, marriage, slavery, etc. In some cases this was customary law that may not have been formulated. In others—e. g. murder and theft—it was impossible to escape formulating it. If it be asked what evidence Dr. Briggs has that such laws were known as "words" and conformed to some particular "type" or

<sup>30</sup> *Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, new ed. 1897, p. 242.

<sup>31</sup> Gen. xv. 2-4 cf. Prov. xvii. 2, xxx. 23, and for a parallel among the Wanimamwesi; see Kohler in *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft*, xv., p. 43.

<sup>32</sup> Gen. xxiii.

<sup>33</sup> Gen. xxxi. 32 xliv cf. Post, *Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz*, II., pp. 427-8, 442.

were sentences spoken by God, the inevitable answer is not merely that he has no such evidence, but that it has never even occurred to him to consider the matter. Yet if it were true that the earliest type of Hebrew law was the "Word", it would be possible to show that the earliest laws were "Words".

2. Even if we had no history to help us, we should know from the universal experience of mankind and the nature of society that the Hebrews had law as soon as a society existed. "It is an old saying, *ubi societas ibi just est*: where there is a society there is law. And perhaps no better account can be given of what is commonly understood by law than that it is a body of rules expressing the claims which, in a given society, are held to be enforceable and are more or less regularly observed. When a claim is urged but is not held to be enforceable, it is commonly called a moral claim as distinguished from a legal one. On the other hand, where no claims have become legal ones, there cannot be a society in any true sense. . . . So the maxim *ubi societas ibi jus est* correctly puts before us society and law as mutually dependent. They must have been inseparable as facts from the earliest time at which there was any intercourse between men, probably before there was any clear consciousness of the notions corresponding to the facts, and they are still inseparable in all departments of intercourse between men. Without society no law, without law no society."<sup>34</sup> In other words law is the necessary cement of every social fabric. Here again Dr. Briggs has never stopped to consider whether any society could exist for a single week on his "Words", or what the state of affairs was before these "Words" were given or forged. Yet the whole body of the Pentateuchal legislation presupposes the existence of a body of well-settled law dealing with the every-day occurrences of life. For example there is no rule providing for the descent of chattels or live stock on the death of the owner. Yet we cannot infer that no owner of

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<sup>34</sup> Westlake, *Chapters on the Principles of International Law*, pp. 2-3.

moveable property ever died. The ordinary rules must have been settled long before the days of Moses, and were left practically untouched by the Mosaic legislation.<sup>35</sup>

3. The "words" to which Dr. Briggs refers are not laws at all. Take "thou shalt not steal". The question at once arises what penalty is to be inflicted on a thief. In Genesis and Exodus we find the following in different cases; death, slavery, manifold restitution. How could any court administer Dr. Briggs' "Words" unless there were but one penalty which was inflicted in all cases of whatever nature? Not only so; yet another argument is available. Some of his "words" deal with matters that from the nature of the case cannot possibly fall within the jurisdiction of any human tribunal. "Thou shalt not covet" is an instance. Covetousness is a purely mental affection and it must be obvious that no man can be conscious of the mental condition of another, unless and until that other gives expression to it by some overt act. "Thou shalt not covet" may be enforced by God or by a man's own conscience, but by no other power on earth.

4. There is no sufficient reason for saying that **רְנֵר** meant any type of Hebrew law at all, or indeed could be used as signifying "law", except in so far as all laws consist of words. When I investigated its usage, I was unable to satisfy myself that this was the case. On the other hand I found that in some of the passages on which Dr. Briggs would probably rely it had a technical covenant meaning, expressing terms on which God and Israel entered into a covenant.<sup>36</sup> The fact that these terms were also Divine commands has helped to mislead our lexicographer.

5. There is no evidence whatever for most of the state-

<sup>35</sup> Deut. xxi. 15 *seqq* deals with some disposition in the owner's lifetime—thus not covering cases of strict intestacy—and presupposes law permitting such dispositions. The portion given by Jacob to Joseph and not to Reuben is an interesting case that would fall within the letter—though perhaps not the spirit—of this law. That and other passages in Genesis prove a power of disposition analogous to a testamentary power.

<sup>36</sup> *Studies in Biblical Law*, p. 64.

ments made by Dr. Briggs which are nevertheless put forward with the utmost confidence. Dr. Orr has recently dwelt on the extraordinary dogmatism of the critics.<sup>37</sup> Here it is only necessary to point to the entire absence of evidence for the following assertions, all of which are made or implied in the sentences quoted:—(1) All Hebrew “Laws” once conformed to a single “type”. (2) The name of that type was “Word”. (3) The “Word” was in the second person singular, etc. (4) All additions that do not conform to this dictum are redactional. (5) All early Hebrew laws were spoken by God directly or immediately (? meditately). (6) This is the origin of the term “Word” as applied to the message of the prophets or the sentences of Hebrew wise men.

It would be easy to deal with all the other relevant statements in Dr. Briggs’ appendix on Types of Hebrew Law in similar fashion. But it is obviously unnecessary. Sufficient light has been thrown on his methods to make clear what value should be attached to such unsupported statements as to the evidence of language.

#### APPENDIX.

The following table includes the bulk of the words and phrases relied on by Dr. Driver, and shows how a few simple and obvious considerations account for them:

I. (a) Words and phrases natural to speeches as opposed to narrative:—Nos. 15, “LORD thy (our, your) God” (the emphasis on the relationship expressed being most natural in a speech); 16, the LORD the God of thy (our, your, their) fathers; 50, “the priests, the Levites” [to bulk of the populace]; 59, “which thine eyes have seen”; 60, “thy (your) eyes are those that have seen”; 66, “Hear, O Israel”.

(b) Words and phrases that were probably chosen wholly or in part on account of the oratorical rhythm or euphony. [It is impossible for any modern writer to feel sure of this, but on p. lxxxvii Dr. Driver himself recognizes this as the ground for the selection of alternative forms of words]:—Nos. 19, אֵיכָה (a form of the Hebrew word for “how?”); 27, “The stranger, the fatherless and the widow” (the use of these words was of course necessitated by the sense, but probably the *phrase* commended itself by its rhythm); 30, “Thy corn, and thy new wine, and thine oil” (a similar remark applies); 41, “continually”

<sup>37</sup> Orr, *The Problem of the Old Testament*, pp. 507-8.

(Hebrew, "all the days"); 55, "the work of the hands"; 58, **בֵּין**, "midst"; 64, "that to which thou puttest thine (ye put your) hand"; 69, **מִן־הַנֵּר**, "out of the midst of the fire" [compare No. 58].

II. Covenant words and phrases:—Nos. 7a, "a people of special possession"; 8, "covenant"; 13, "to swear" (references to the oaths contained in former covenants); and some of the words or phrases in 37, "statutes and judgments and testimonies, etc". [*Studies in Biblical Law*, pp. 52, 59-64.]

III. (a) Law-book words and phrases:—the other words and phrases in No. 37, *e. g.* "judgment"; 9, "which I am commanding thee this day"; 57, "therefore I command thee" (this might almost equally well be put under [e]); 44, "thou (he) canst not" (= it shall not be lawful for thee to).

(b) Words and phrases connected with laws as to the religious capital:—Nos. 20, "to eat before the **LORD**" (*i. e.* at the temple); 63, "to make His Name dwell there" cf. 23.

(c) Laws for national purity:—No. 24, "so thou shalt exterminate the evil from thy midst".

(d) The duty of intense fidelity to God:—Nos. 1 (a) "to love" God; 2, "other gods" (not to go after, etc.); 11, "take heed to thyself (yourselves), lest"; 14, "to hearken to His voice"; 28, "to cleave to" God (Deut. always in a group with words like "to hearken to His voice"); 31, "to walk in the **LORD's** ways"; 45, the duty of fearing God inculcated; 48, "to do that which is right in the eyes of the **LORD**"; 49, "to do that which is evil in the eyes of the **LORD**"; 51, "with all thy (your) heart and with all thy (your) soul"; 53, "to turn neither to the right hand not to the left" used metaphorically; 62, the caution "not to forget"; 68, (a) "to observe to do", (b) "to observe and do."

(e) Exhortations and inducements to obedience:—Nos. 3, "to be long"; or "to prolong", of days (the Deuteronomic promise upon obedience); 25, "in order that the **LORD** may bless thee"; 36, "and it be sin in thee"; 42, "that it may be well for thee"; 67, "And . . . shall hear and fear" (of the deterrent effects of punishment).

(f) Historical reminiscences (often containing an appeal to obedience):—Nos. 5, "house of bondage"; 12, "A mighty hand and a stretched out arm"; 33, "And remember that thou wast a bondman in the land of Egypt".

IV. References to the acquisition of Canaan:—Nos. 4, "which the **LORD** thy (our, etc.) God is giving thee (us, etc.)", attached mostly to "the land", sometimes to "the ground", "the gates", "the cities", etc.; 6, "thy (your) gates"; 10, "to cause (others) to possess, *i. e.* to dispossess (the **LORD**, the Canaanites before Israel)"; 22, "the land whither thou goest in to possess it", "the land whither thou passest (ye pass) over (Jordan) to possess it"; 38, "The good land", of Canaan; 46, "to possess" (as in Nos. 4 and 22).

V. Miscellaneous:—There are also some phrases in this list that do not fall under any of the above headings and yet are obviously in place in Deuteronomy, such as Nos. 1 (b), God's love of Israel and 23, God's

choice of Israel (both topics on which it would be natural for Moses to dilate in speeches of this nature); 47, "all Israel"; 32, "who shall be in those days" (almost inevitable in a book designed to mould the future); 34, "thine eye shall not pity him" (intended to work on public opinion); 35, "be (ye) courageous and strong" (Dr. Driver says "the expression may seem to be an ordinary one; but it occurs besides only in 1 Ch. xxii. 13, xxviii. 20, 2 Ch. xxxii. 7," but his own references to Deuteronomy are xxxi. 6, 7, 23 and iii. 28—all in connection with Joshua's appointment. What could be more natural than the use of such a phrase by Moses in such a connection, and only in that connection? He also refers to five passages in Joshua which he regards as Deuteronomic. Of these no fewer than four deal with Joshua); 39, "which thou (ye) knowest (*or knewest*) not"; 29, "As the LORD hath spoken."

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## SHEOL AND PIT IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.

The Babylonians seem to have had a conception of the place of the dead as definite as a popular belief, the elements of which the imagination alone supplied, could well be. The prison mentioned in the "Descent of Ishtar" may indicate that the moral element was not wanting in this conception. In Egypt a belief in a future life ethically conditioned was very early current, and the children of Israel must have come into frequent contact with the Egyptians. In the Old Testament, however, no trace of a moral differentiation of the inhabitants of Sheol seemed discernible, and this appeared most strange not only in view of the Babylonian and Egyptian doctrines, but also, and more especially, in view of the Apocryphal and New Testament eschatologies, which found no point of connection in this respect with the earlier Hebrew literature, at least not with that portion of it which is extant. Recently the theory has been advanced that Pit in the Old Testament is a pit in Sheol, and not Sheol as a pit.\* If this view is supported by the facts, then we have the distinction in the Old Testament between the abode of the righteous dead and the wicked dead which has so far been sought in vain; then this distinction becomes important for later Jewish theology; then what has always been thought to be at most latent in the Old Testament will be found to lie on its surface. Does a close examination of the passages involved corroborate this view? Do they admit of such a distinction between Sheol and Pit?

It is difficult to find a satisfactory method of procedure for testing this opinion, because the lack of definiteness in the conceptions, due to the poetical and highly imaginative character of the language used, baffles the investigator at every turn. The meaning of Pit must be determined from the following passages: Job xvii. 14; xxxiii. 18, 22, 24, 28, 30; Ps. xvi. 10; xxviii. 1; xxx. 4; xl ix. 10; lv. 24; lxxxviii. 5; cxlii. 7; Prov. i. 12; xxviii. 17 (?); Is. xiv. 15; xxxviii. 17, 18; Ez.

\* Dr. Briggs advocates this view in his "Psalms" and in the Articles בָּרֶךְ, שָׁאָל, שְׁחָתָה and אַבְהָדָן in Brown's Gesenius. The matter is not argued, but assumed as probable. A development in the use of the terms Sheol and Pit is said to be traceable in the Old Testament.

xxvi. 20; xxviii. 8; xxxi. 14, 16; xxxii. 18, 24, 25, 29, 30; Jn. ii. 7. In no passage is a description of Pit to be found. It is said to have loins, *i. e.*, recesses (Is. xiv. 15); those who go to it go down, and they are the men of old times (Ez. xxvi. 20). It is called a Pit of pit (Ps. lv. 24) and a pit of nothingness (Is. xxxviii. 17), but this is a heaping up of obscurities. Two words are used for Pit (בָּרָךְ and בָּרָךְ), and it is not at all certain that the second of these means pit in all cases of its occurrence. It is very possible that there are two words בָּרָךְ, derived respectively from בָּרָךְ and בָּרָךְ, and that it cannot be determined which derivation must be accepted in a given passage. The Septuagint and the Peshitto both favor the derivation from בָּרָךְ in all cases. The term Abaddon must be included here. Once it is found in its root meaning as an abstract noun from אָבֹד, destroy (Esth. ix. 5; cf. viii. 6); it is also used as a proper noun in parallelism with Sheol (Job xxvi. 6; Prov. xv. 11; xxvii. 20), with death (Job xxviii. 22), and alone (?) (Job xxxi. 12). A definite moral conception can no more be read into this word than into the Silence (רְמָה) of Ps. xciv. 17 and Ps. cxv. 17.

These meagre data can hardly serve as the basis of an induction; but, as far as they go, they show no necessity for regarding Sheol and Pit as anything but synonymous. In regard to Abaddon there is not even a thread from which a theory may be hung. But while no necessity is shown for distinguishing between Sheol, Pit, and Abaddon, there is also very little to indicate that these are but different names for the same thing. The verb יָמַר is a standing term for descent into Sheol and Pit; while Sheol has bars, Pit has recesses; lowest Sheol is paralleled by lowest Pit (Deut. xxxii. 22; Ps. lxxxvi. 13; cf. Lam. iii. 53, 55; Jer. xxxviii. 9). If anything is indicated by these facts, it would be that the terms are synonymous. Pit is also used by certain individuals with reference to themselves in a connection and under circumstances that hardly admit of their having regarded it as the place of the wicked dead. Job, who protests so vehemently against the charge of unrighteousness preferred against him by his friends, would hardly have spoken of Pit as his father even in a figure, if Pit for him had had an evil connotation (cf. Ps. lxxxviii). It is easy to begin with the fact that the same writer uses both terms and on the presumption that he uses them discriminately to evolve distinctions which are unwarranted, but why then identify the two

Pits (בָּרַךְ) and Abaddon to contrast them with Sheol? As far as the data are concerned, all four may have been distinct conceptions. Why not find here the four apartments of Gehenna mentioned in the Ethiopic Enoch (Chap. 22)? There is almost nothing in the Old Testament that militates against the supposition of a development in the conception of the other world, but on the other hand there is absolutely nothing that makes such a supposition necessary. The examination of the terms separately and their comparison together admits of no more positive conclusion than that they are vague, poetical generalizations, based seemingly on the actualities of death and the grave, and used sometimes in parallelism with these, sometimes together, but always in contrast with life. As to their inter-relation—whether synonymous, antonymous, or overlapping—nothing can be deduced.

To leave the question in such a condition is very unsatisfactory, and therefore as a last resource the passages in which Sheol and Pit are used in close proximity may be more carefully examined. Clearly nothing can be done with parallelisms, unless these extend beyond the clauses in which Pit and Sheol occur. Where the words are merely connected by *and*, there is no basis of comparison. Thus Ps. xxx. 4; xvi. 10; Job xxvi. 6; xxviii. 22; Prov. i. 12; xxvii. 20; xv. 11 need not delay us.

Is. xiv. 15. "Yet thou shalt be brought down to Sheol, to the recesses of Pit".—These words can be understood in either one of two ways. (1) Thou shalt be brought down to Sheol, *i. e.*, to the recesses of Pit. (2) Thou shalt be brought down to Sheol, and even lower, to the recesses of Pit. It may be that the grammatical structure favors the identity of extent of the two phrases; but it may also seem that they are climacteric, and that the latter implies a deeper degradation than the former. If exact conceptions underlie the terms, and if Isaiah used them with accuracy, we should expect the verse to read, thou shalt go down to Pit, to the recesses of Sheol, *i. e.*, if these underlying conceptions were as suggested. This accumulation of *ifs* shows the precariousness of basing any conclusion on this passage.

Psalm lxxxviii. is a petition for deliverance from imminent death, or from an anguish similar to that of death. The writer endeavors to find as many expressions as possible to describe his actual or figurative condition. Sheol, Pit, and

Abaddon are used within the range of eight verses, and their parallelism with other expressions may help to determine whether they are used discriminately. Reduced to a bald literalness, the lines show that Sheol, Pit, dead, slain, grave, Pit, dark places, deeps, corpse (underlying thought of vs. 8), dead, shades, grave, and Abaddon are all descriptive of one and the same condition, *death*. All are thus antonyms of life, but they need not therefore be synonyms of each other. There is no evidence of clear-cut conceptions here.

In Psalm iv. we have on the one hand a prayer that Jehovah will bring the wicked down to Sheol alive (16), and on the other hand that Jehovah will bring the wicked down to pit of Pit (24). Pit of Pit must mean pit *par excellence*, the Pit (cf., however, the question raised as to the meaning of *supra*). It will be noticed that the wicked are the subjects in both cases. If in vs. 24 a pit in Sheol is meant, then the former petition becomes rather tame. The only allowable inference is that Pit and Sheol are in a general way synonymous, for here again the words are both antonyms of life. The point of view is that of the termination of this life, and to the exact relation of Pit and Sheol there is no clue. It may be argued, as Dr. Briggs seemingly would argue, that Sheol is both the designation of the underworld as a whole and the correlative of Pit,

the place of the wicked. <sup>General</sup> Sheol { Sheol. <sup>Name</sup> { Pit. The second meaning of the word may be said to have supplanted the first in the course of time. This, however, is pure theorizing. Some such conception must help us to understand the Sheol of the Old Testament as undifferentiated, but we are not justified in reading it into passages such as this, and in seeking this differentiation in a contrast between Sheol and Pit.

Is. xxxviii. 17b, 18a. "But thou hast in love to my soul delivered it from the pit of nothingness; . . . for Sheol cannot praise thee, death cannot celebrate thee; they that go down into Pit cannot hope for thy truth".—This personification of Pit and Sheol is confusing. The addition of the abstraction (nothingness) is still more confusing. Sheol, Pit, and grave may all as conceptions offer a striking contrast to life, and yet be of widely different meaning. It may be inferred, however, that the character of Hezekiah forbade his conceiving of him-

self as descending into the place of the wicked and that therefore both Pit and Sheol are non-moral.

Jon. ii. 2, 7. "Out of the belly of Shoel cried I." "Yet hast thou brought up my life from Pit."—Pit and Sheol are metaphors. This figurative use of figures would hardly warrant the conclusion that Pit is the belly of Sheol.

Job xvii. 13, 14. "If I hope, Sheol is my house; if I have spread my couch in the darkness; if I have said to Pit, thou art my father; to the worm, my mother, and my sister; where then is my hope?"—Job is absolutely hopeless. He protests vehemently against the reasoning of his friends, who by still holding out the hope of prosperity to him are changing night into day, for his death is imminent. If he waits, if he still cherishes hope, it must be a hope coupled with the thought of Sheol as his house, of darkness as his resting-place, of Pit and the worm as his intimates; for of his nearness to all this he is fully persuaded. Did anyone say that under such circumstances he had hope, then soon he and that kind of a hope would descent into, and rest in the dust. The imminence of death is the underlying thought of the passage, and here again no deeper meaning can be found for either Sheol or Pit than that which a sharp contrast with life affords. The character of the speaker here also all but forbids that Pit as a conception have moral content different from that of Sheol.

Ez. xxxi. 13-18. "Upon his ruin all the birds of the heavens shall dwell, and all the beasts of the field shall be upon his branches; to the end that none of all the trees by the waters exalt themselves in their stature, neither set their top among the thick boughs, nor that their mighty ones stand up in their height, even all that drink water: for they are all delivered unto death, to the nether parts of the earth, in the midst of the children of men, with them that go down to Pit. Thus saith the Lord Jehovah: In the day when he went down to Sheol I caused a mourning: I covered the deep for him, and I restrained the rivers thereof; and the great waters were stayed; and I caused Lebanon to mourn for him, and all the trees of the field fainted for him. I made the nations to shake at the sound of his fall, when I cast him down to Sheol with them that descend into Pit; and all the trees of Eden, the choice and best of Lebanon, all that drink water, were comforted in the nether parts of the earth. They also went down into Sheol with him

unto them that are slain by the sword; yea, they that were his arm, that dwelt under his shadow in the midst of the nations. To whom art thou thus like in glory and in greatness among the trees of Eden? Yet shalt thou be brought down with the trees of Eden unto the nether parts of the earth: thou shalt lie in the midst of the uncircumcised, with them that are slain by the sword. This is Pharaoh and all his multitude, saith the Lord Jehovah."—This passage is highly figurative. Under the symbol of trees exalting themselves Assyria and her allies are held up as warnings to Egypt. These *trees* are said to be "delivered unto death, to the nether parts of the earth, in the midst of the children of men, with them that go down to Pit". The last two phrases indicate that the figure of trees is retained, and that the trees have gone down into the same place into which men go. They are inserted to prevent the reader from dropping the figure as he would be inclined to do. If this is the true explanation of these phrases, then *in the midst of the children of men* and *with those that go down into Pit* are correlative expressions; and *children of men* and *those that go down to Pit* are equivalents. This passage is strikingly similar to Ez. xxvi. 20, where Tyre as a city is threatened with descent "with them that go down into Pit, to the people of old times". Here also the two phrases are correlatives. *Children of men* and *men of old times* must be general terms equivalent to *mankind*, and therefore "those that go down into Pit" must also be a comprehensive expression for all mankind that has died. Thus the conclusion is unescapable that *all* go down into Pit and that the conception is non-moral. The remainder of the passage confirms this interpretation, and Sheol is substituted for Pit. Assyria, still under the symbol of a tree, descends into Sheol; while Jehovah to cause a mourning for him withholds water from all the trees of the field, *i. e.*, his allies, so that they faint. It seems clear that Sheol and Pit are here synonymous. While the figure of trees is in part retained for Assyria's allies—"all the trees of Eden, the choice and best of Lebanon"—it is abandoned in the *nations* of verse 16, who presumably are these same allies. In the last part of this verse the figure is, however, resumed. To indicate that his allies went down into Sheol with the Assyrian they as trees drinking water are said to be comforted in the nether parts of the earth. Here Sheol is located exactly where Pit was located before. They, the

allies, as trees went down with him unto them that are slain by the sword. Again the dropping of the figure of trees descending is guarded against, although the term now used is less comprehensive than the former. While *those that are slain by the sword* is not descriptive of all mankind, it is certainly non-moral. The figure now changes, and the allies are called the arm of the Assyrian, only however to be again designated as trees. Finally Egypt and Pharaoh are threatened with the fate of Assyria's allies, and that too under the symbol of a tree. If this is the meaning of the passage, then we are sure that Pit is a non-moral conception; and if it is non-moral all reason for differentiating it from Sheol is gone. The localization of both in the *nether parts of the earth* and the parallelism of this phrase with *death* offer a very strong presumption, if not a positive proof, that they are identical.

Ez. xxxii. 18f. is bewilderingly figurative, and the attempt to coördinate the elements of the description is almost hopeless. This passage, however, is in complete agreement with the interpretation given of the preceding chapter as far as the distribution of the words Sheol and Pit is concerned; but Ezekiel cannot be expected to confine himself to exact statement. He transfers the graves of Asshur and her company to the uttermost parts of Pit (23).

Psalm xlix. was written to encourage the poor and afflicted in the thought that all alike, high and low, rich and poor, must die. The writer all but exults in the idea that death is the great leveller. A treatment of the righteous different from that of the wicked may be hinted at in vs. 16, but this does not lead to a differentiation of Sheol (xv. 15, 16) and Pit such as one would expect, if the latter were a place *in Sheol* where the wicked are confined. In vs. 10 *seeing Pit* is contrasted with *living always*. Death shepherds the flock that is appointed for Sheol, and their beauty is for it to consume (15). Redemption from Sheol is a taking by God. The point of view in this psalm is the termination of the present life, and it seems impossible to read a deeper meaning into Pit or Sheol than death or grave.

Our last resource has not then been altogether a delusion. Although no absolutely certain results have been gained, it has become clear that there is no necessity for differentiating Sheol and Pit on a moral basis. There are even a few indications that

such a differentiation is not permissible, and possibly a hint or two that the words must be synonymous. If Ezekiel, who is proverbially obscure, can throw light on such a hazy question, it may be said with assurance that Sheol and Pit are identical. We may conclude then that the evidence which can be gleaned from the Old Testament itself is, as far as it goes, opposed to a moral distinction between Pit and Sheol. If this distinction was latent in the words, it does not appear in the Old Testament.

The question may be approached in still another way; and since our results are rather disappointing, it seems worth while to exhaust all the possibilities for determining the relation of these two conceptions. A distinction between them may not lie on the surface of the Old Testament and their identity may even seem very likely, but Post-Biblical Judaism may still have found such a distinction and made it important for its eschatological speculation. Dr. Briggs asserts that this is the case, when he makes the statement that this distinction was of importance to the later Jewish theology. If the distinction was important, it is reasonable to expect that it will be reflected in the literary remains of Post-Biblical Judaism. On the authority of the rabbis Pit in the Old Testament might be said to be a Pit in Sheol and not Sheol as a Pit, if they so regarded it.

The Versions first demand investigation, and their value as witnesses will be inversely proportional to their accuracy and faithfulness as translations. The Syriac agrees with the Hebrew in every passage concerned, and it translates **תֹּהֶשׁ** everywhere by *h<sup>o</sup> bholo, destruction*. The Septuagint translates Sheol by (*θάνατος*) *death* in Prov. xxiii. 14, elsewhere invariably by Hades with or without the article. **כָּוֹר** is translated by *λάκκος* or *βόθρος*, except where the text is corrupt. In Is. xiv. 15 *sides of Pit* is interpreted as *foundations of the earth*. **תֹּהֶשׁ** is five times rendered by *death*, and elsewhere by words containing the idea of corruption or destruction. The Vulgate, which may here be included for the sake of completeness, translates Sheol by *Inferus, Inferi, or Infernus*; **כָּוֹר** by *lacus*; **תֹּהֶשׁ** by words such as *corruptio, interitus, puteus, internecio*. In their renderings of Sheol and Pit these three Versions commend themselves as reliable translations. They seem to demand that **תֹּהֶשׁ** be derived from **תֹּהַת**. They certainly do not indicate that

Sheol and Pit were differentiated ethically by the translators, and that the distinction was important for their theology.

With the Targums it is somewhat different. As is to be expected from their character as interpretations rather than translations, there is a great variety of renderings. Sheol is forty times transliterated as שְׁאֹל or שְׁזָל; three times it is once each by מְרוּאָה, קְטוּל, בֵּית נְהָנָם, בֵּית מְרוּאָה, תְּהֻקָּא, מְוֹתָא, קְטוּל, בֵּין נְהָנָם, בֵּית קְבוּרָה, מְחֻפָּלָא, translated by בֵּית קְבוּרָה; twice by בֵּית קְבוּרָה; twice by בֵּית קְבוּרָה, and קְטוּל; and קְטוּל. In Ps. xviii. 6 it is paraphrased by *a cohort besieges me with wickedness*; and in Ps. lxxxviii. 3 it is translated by pit itself (נִבְעָן). The Talmud translations of all contain the root נָבַב. In eleven passages is added בֵּית אַבְּדָנָא is added by way of explanation, and once בֵּית אַסְכָּנָי is rendered twice each by חַבְרָא and חַבְרָא; once each by עַמִּיקָא, קְבוּרָה, חַבְרָא, and קְרוּרָא לְרַשְׁעָנָא. Only three times is it translated by the root שָׁוֹת. In Ps. xl ix. 10 it is rendered by בֵּין נְהָנָם. No clearer evidence than this could be desired that these were not fixed conceptions to the Talmudists. Sheol is translated by Pit. Both Sheol and Pit are called Gehenna's house or judgment. Sheol is the *camp of the wicked*, and Pit is *bitterness to the wicked*. Pit, when not followed by an appositional phrase, often has the article, which seems to indicate that it was not even regarded as a proper name. The Talmuds also derive שְׁחָתָה from שְׁחָאָה in a number of cases. It is absolutely safe to conclude that the Talmudists made no moral distinction between Pit and Sheol, and almost as safe to maintain that to them the words were synonymous, so that their occurrence side by side in the Old Testament was of no importance for their theology.

Our clearest knowledge of Jewish eschatology comes from the Ethiopic Enoch. As far as a rapid reading in translation shows, Sheol occurs in this work only five times (li. 1, lvi. 8, cii. 5, 11, ciii. 7). Chap. cii. 5 shows that the righteous descend into Sheol. Pit is not mentioned in the book. The unimportance of a distinction between Pit and Sheol to the writer or writers is evident.

Hades is of frequent occurrence in the book of Ecclesiasticus (vid. ix. 12, xiv. 12, xvii. 27, xxviii. 21, xli. 4, xlvi. 5, li. 5, 6). In ix. 9 the phrase *with thy spirit slide into destruction* occurs. Presumably the original of destruction was שְׁחָתָה. In xxi. 10 *pit of Hades* occurs, for which the original—if destruction renders שְׁחָתָה—must have been בָּור שְׁאֹל. This may then be an

identification of the two, for בָּיֹר as a proper name could not be a construct. All this, however, is mere conjecture; but that a distinction between Pit and Sheol was unimportant to the son of Sirach is clear.

Peter affirms in Acts that David saw corruption. He quotes the Septuagint of Psalm xvi. He either did not know of the Old Testament usage of Sheol and Pit, or else he identifies them; for if Pit for him had an evil connotation, he could not say that David saw it. At any rate a possible moral distinction between Pit and Sheol was so unimportant that he ignored it, or so little known that he was ignorant of it.

This examination of what seemed to be the best sources has not been altogether fruitless in that it has shown that the usage of Pit and Sheol side by side in the Old Testament was not important to the later Jewish theology. This, however, is absolutely demonstrated by the fact that when ethics did penetrate into the eschatological speculations of Judaism with the resulting differentiation of the underworld into an abode of the righteous and a place of punishment, a nexus for the latter was sought in Gehenna and not in Pit, while the righteous went to Paradise or the Garden of Eden. Sheol became one of the seven names of Gehenna according to Erubim 19a. How can this be, if Dr. Briggs' view of the relation of Pit and Sheol is the true one, and if, as he says, the distinction between them was important?

A theory in regard to Pit, Sheol, and Abaddon which ignores the meagre data we have, need fear neither snares nor pitfalls, for it soars high in the atmosphere of speculation, and never touches the solid earth of facts. We must conclude then that a moral differentiation of Pit and Sheol was not important to later Jewish theology, that as far as its testimony goes the Old Testament does not distinguish Pit and Sheol on a moral basis. With the elimination of a possible moral element all reason for discriminating between the conceptions disappears, and nothing remains but to regard them as in a general way synonymous. Pit and Sheol are vague abstractions used metaphorically for death and the grave in exalted style. The vision of the Old Testament writers was circumscribed by death; and they never allowed their imaginations to leap the chasm of the grave. Merely to name that which lay beyond the termination of this life seems to have satisfied them. Where the righteous and

wicked are named in connection with Sheol and Pit, these but mark the end of earthly existence. The entrance of the wicked into Sheol is prayed for, or held up as a warning to them (Ps. lv. 16; ix. 18), because all their earthly enjoyments will be ended by it. Sheol is dreaded by the righteous, because it ends, or at least interrupts, all active communion with God (Is. xxxviii. 18). Is. xiv. and Ez. xxxii. seemingly lead us into Sheol by enumerating some of its inhabitants; yet the veil that hides it only trembles, and no hand is extended to thrust it aside. The literature of the Hebrew does not show that he explored the beyond, in as far as it concerned himself as an individual.

*Princeton.*

S. ZANDSTRA.

## REVIEWS RECENT LITERATURE

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### PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHILD AND IN THE RACE. Methods and Processes. By JAMES MARK BALDWIN, M.A., Ph.D., Hon.D.Sc. (Oxon.), LL.D. (Glasgow, etc.), Professor of Philosophy and Psychology in the Johns Hopkins University; Author of *Handbook of Psychology*, etc.; Co-editor of *The Psychological Review*. With Seventeen Figures and Ten Tables. Third Edition. Revised (Seventh Printing). New York: The Macmillan Company. 1906. 8vo.; pp. xviii, 477. \$2.25 net.

SOCIAL AND ETHICAL INTERPRETATIONS IN MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. A Study in Social Psychology. By the same. Work Crowned with Gold Medal of the Royal Academy of Denmark. Fourth Edition. Published by the same. 1906. 8vo.; pp. xxvi, 606. \$2.60 net.

These two books are companion volumes, if, indeed, they are not parts of one whole. The first was written with the promise of the second and the second was written upon the premise of the first. In the earlier work, the author intimated that it would be followed by another under the same general heading of "Mental Development". However, for reasons which he states in the preface to the first edition of the later volume, the unity of treatment was abandoned and yet he declares that "this volume is a continuation of the studies in genetic psychology begun in my *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*" (Vol. II, p. vii).\* The whole essay—a *magnum opus* indeed—is simply an inductive study of the natural history of the human mind. The point of view is persistently genetic. This is the distinctive characteristic of the "new psychology". It scorns the *a priori*. It takes up its line of work at the farthest possible remove from the eminent domain of metaphysics. It is nothing if not inductive. It knows no gospel but that of observed, ascertained, accredited fact. It must be empirical or it has no standing in court. The new psychology is a chamber in the splendid palace of science, not a cell in the dark dungeon of philosophy. This conception, great and illuminating as it is, is a comparatively recent arrival. "Now that this genetic conception has arrived, it is astonishing that it did not arrive sooner, and it is astonishing that the "new" psychology has made so little use of it" (I: 3). Borrowing from

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\*In this notice the two volumes will be referred to in the order stated at the beginning as I and II.

the terminology of the biologist, the development of the individual mind is called its *ontogenesis* and the mind history of the race, its *phylogenesis*. The one contemplates the individual and the other the race, using the term rather in its universal than in its ethnic signification. Speaking generally, the scope of the earlier volume is confined to the former study, while the later volume is occupied with the larger outlook of race development.

It is happily true that the columns of this REVIEW are not a proper place for an extended critique of this splendid work: otherwise, the pen of an expert must needs be summoned to the task. Such an expert, the present writer feels it unnecessary to say that he makes no pretensions to be. And yet upon the clumsy thought of the untutored ordinary mind, such a prodigious study as this cannot fail to make a deep and distinct impression. Certainly the genetic method is the favorite method of the present time. Evolution is the word of the hour, although Professor Baldwin has little to say about evolution and quietly reminds us that development, which is the term he prevailingly employs, "is a process of involution as well as of evolution" (I: 3). Our author is no mere academician; he turned his own home into a studio and his own nursery, with his own children, into his psychological laboratory. It is hard to estimate how much these observations were affected and therefore vitiated by the unavoidable circumstance that the observer was also the father. The experiment of the Columbia professor who had his children isolated from his home and from ordinary social surroundings was regarded as misleading from the very fact that their isolation rendered them morbid and exceptional. But is not the other peril as real if not so great? That Professor Baldwin's little girls H. and E. were his own daughters, whose psychological development and mental unfolding were subjected to his own personal, albeit strictly scientific, scrutiny is a factor in the result the force and effect of which it is simply impossible for him to measure or to estimate. And this fact is suggestive of the difficulties to be overcome in arriving at general psychological laws by means of inductive research. The needle is affected by the inevitable but indefinable factors present in the person of the observer. How safe is it to generalize from observations made by Prof. Baldwin in the growth of his own children (heredity) in his own quondam Princeton home (environment) and to apply that generalization to all children, even granting the impossible condition that such a trained observer as Prof. Baldwin could make the observations? In reply to a criticism by Professor Tufts, he frankly admits that his own children developed "reflective bashfulness" earlier than many and he parries the suggestion that his children are hardly fair samples of all children in this good-natured way, "I may especially thank Professor Tufts for the subtle compliment implied in the words: 'But I am convinced that few children develop in such a favorable moral atmosphere as that of the children observed by the author!'-that is, if he does not spoil it by saying he did not know the children observed by me were my own" (II: 590). This general criticism upon the empirical method is hardly a valid objection to that method, but it is

worthy of consideration as throwing doubt upon the trustworthiness of generalizations drawn from the study of specific conditions.

It is impossible even in barest outline to indicate the contents of these two volumes. The direction of functional development and differentiation, beginning with the object and passing on to the project, then to the subject and finally reaching the eject, is amply illustrated and exceedingly interesting. The psychology of suggestion and the rationale of dynamogenesis open up wide fields of inquiry which observed results will be a long time in answering. The conflict and poise between the habitual self (the conservative) and the accommodating self (the aggressive) begin to lead up to ethical elements. But this advance must wait for the later treatise. The soul is essentially a *socius*, not so much a social unit as a social outcome, and it cannot be studied or understood simply ontogenetically: the ontogenesis has its place and its possibility in the larger schedule of the race.

Professor Baldwin does not end the first volume without saying a word which well meets the thought of some who have followed him thus far. Of course, mere description explains nothing. The author has touched upon the distinction between description and explanation (I: 3), and yet it seems to us that the genetic viewpoint must hold itself to describing the development which it observes. It is not the only way of expressing the truth, which he chooses when he says that the results of his method are not metaphysical explanations but empirical generalizations (II: 591). "The further philosophical questions as to the nature of mind, its worth and its dignity, remain under adjudication. We have learned too much in modern philosophy to argue from the natural history of a thing to its ultimate constitution and meaning—and we commend this consideration to the biologists" (I: 466). It is plain that the author's interest in his work grows as he proceeds to consider its social interpretations. Society is to be viewed psychologically: human history is human psychology writ large: the understanding of the ontogenesis of the soul waits for its phylogenetic valuation. The social unit must be reckoned with before we can get a clear and correct view of the individual unit. Accordingly, the second volume begins with this announcement: "It is my aim, in the present essay, to inquire to what extent the principles of the development of the individual mind apply also to the evolution of society" (II: 1). The method is still genetic, or, more particularly, it is psychogenetic. The theory of recapitulation is presupposed. But for the purposes of this essay this theory has only an anthropological application and not a broadly biological one. That is to say, it is enough to assume that the human individual traverses and capitalizes the stages which the human race has come through and not the longer road that has been covered by all the forms of the animal world. Professor Baldwin finds that the racial and the individual developments have been along the very same line. Recalling the habitual and the accommodating self of the individual, we find them in the race, now become reflective and intelligent and advancing upon its course of social development, again figuring as private selfish intent on the one hand and the public social intent on the

other. The social attitudes of the child are first inductive, then spontaneous, then reflective; and here too is described the path of the race. In every case, the organic and the inductive serve as a scaffolding for the higher intelligent and volitional. The author argues strongly and convincingly for the social origin of the moral sense and carries his argument on to the genesis and nature of the religious sentiment in which he finds two cardinal elements, namely, the feeling of dependence and the sense of mystery. All this is exceedingly rich in its implications and suggestiveness and we believe that no student of the psychological aspects of religious experience can afford to ignore such a discussion as this. Professor Baldwin would have no patience with such views as those of Benjamin Kidd: for he tells us, "that the religious is an out-growth and constant index of the ethical sanction; that its social value is mainly on the side of its conservative influence; and that the ethical is the most important as well as the most 'rational' of all the springs of human action, whether public or private" (II: 451). With this, of course, it must be remembered that he regards the ethical which is "rational", and out of which the religious grows, as having its roots in the spontaneous, which roots itself in the instinctive, which in turn roots itself in the natural. This may suggest idealism in philosophy; but an empirical psychologist, intent upon his clinic of mental moods and tenses, is oblivious to metaphysical implications or inferences.

One of the finest insights of the work is in the distinction between the biological and the psychological in the genetic interpretation of society. Professor Baldwin has it in for the school of writers mostly evolutionistic and fitly represented by Mr. Spencer, which regards society as a huge sort of biological organism or which would interpret social phenomena in terms of physiology. "To force these things into biological moulds is simply to deform them" (II: 549). He italicizes his judgment that "the progress of society is, in its method, in its direction, and in its impelling motives, analogous to the growth of consciousness rather than to that of the biological organism" (II: 548). It is needless to point out that for a philosophical rationale of human history this is a distinct advance upon the old physiological valuation of society, and for this we are distinctly grateful. Our author, always psychologist and never metaphysician, comes up dangerously near to the border line when he says: "The true analogy, then, is not that which likens society to a physiological organism, but rather that which likens it to a psychological organization. And the sort of psychological organization to which it is analogous is that which is found in the individual in his *ideal thinking*" (II: 571, italics his). Not the least of the reassuring implications of this generalization is in its implied distinction between psychology and physiology—a distinction which a certain class of writers persistently ignore or deny, and yet a distinction which Professor Baldwin does not think it necessary even to argue for. In the synthetic philosophy, for example, psychology spells physiology and physiology spells biology, so that psychology is biology under another name, and yet here at the conclusion of an inductive study of individual and racial consciousness we are told, as clearly as English can tell us,

that the proper terms in which to interpret human society are psychological, *and not biological*. It is of the nature of this work to deal largely in processes and sparingly in results. We incline to believe that this is a handicap which the genetic method will find much difficulty in throwing off. The phenomena of the soul, so sensitive to circumstance, so determinable by antecedent, so fugitive at the approach of the observer, so facile in the tricks of self-transformation, so responsive to undiscoverable causes, so infinite in the aspects and attitudes which it may effect, and so mysterious in its exercise of its unique prerogative of free initiative, furnish a fascinating and boundless field for the imaginations of the empiricist, but the undetermined and indeterminable factors are so many and so great that in taking the step from the fact observed to the law of which it is the index or the proof, we believe that it requires the dogmatism of the credulous to affirm the law to be either fixed or final. Professor Baldwin does well to remark that while one case may be decisive in overthrowing a theory, it is very seldom that conditions are so clear that we can establish a theory. However, we do not mean to condemn or to discourage the scientific study of the phenomena of consciousness. What if there is a vast *terra incognita* which it can never explore? Is there not a wide and enchanting tract that lies within its reach? What if it shall fail to accomplish all that its enthusiastic friends hope? Is it not glory and gain enough if it accomplish something not yet done and, if, in its very failure to do more, it has made substantial contributions to the fund of human knowledge by tracing its limits and demonstrating the factors which fix those limits? We have again and again in reading these pages asked ourselves whether Professor Baldwin is justified in employing the word "genetic" as applicable to his method. Then he is studying the *origin* of mind in the individual and in the race. Perhaps there is a sense in which this is so. In studying the infant's movements he is studying the first manifestations of its consciousness. Science cannot do more or less. Is the genetic method properly engaged in studying the earliest perceptible manifestations of mind, or the source whence it comes and the way of its coming? If this latter is the proper problem of genetic psychology, then it may argue that its task is so great that it is no task at all and that therefore it is justified in betaking itself to the next best thing, the only other thing that is possible. But we have been impressed with the thought that Professor Baldwin's great and remarkable work has been rather along the natural-history method, whether or not that is properly called also the genetic method. He has little to say about creation or evolution. It is fair to say that nothing in his method is incompatible with our unquestioning acceptance of supernatural origins and supernatural agencies. He studies what is and asks the question how it came to be. It seems to us that the weakness of the method is in the fact that it is purely descriptive. It burdens itself with data but it cannot be sure of their value. It must be content to do service for others; its very method is its own limitation. Nevertheless, this work, which has justly made its author famous among scholars the world over, cannot be too warmly commended.

The psychological interpretation of religion is a favorite idea of the present time. Free rein is given to the fallacious conception that religion is the subject of which theology is the science. This is to degrade theology to the low level of the mere natural history of man. Thus, indeed, theology, too, may be made only to spell psychology, which is biology, which is chemistry, which is mechanics, which is mere matter. What is needed is the true conception of theology, which has for its theme God, and of psychology, which has for its theme man. This book does good service in bringing its great learning and breadth of vision to bear in showing, even though it is but between the lines and without formal announcement, that psychology has for its distinct field and noble theme the consciousness of the human soul, and that in this it is once and forever to be distinguished from all disciplines which merge man in the great world in which he finds his home or the study of man in the study of the muscles and movements of biological organisms and in the actions and reactions of mechanical forces.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

ESSAY ON THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION. By TH. RIBOT. Translated from the French by ALBERT H. N. BARON, Fellow in Clark University. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1906. 8vo.; pp. xix, 370.

This is an interesting study of a very interesting subject by one of the masters of modern psychology. If there be any who regard psychology as one of the "spooky sciences", they must regard that department of psychology which deals with the imagination as the spookiest of all. It is a merit of this essay that it rigidly specializes its theme, which is the "Constructive Imagination". We observe that the term used in the title of the book is less accurate, judged from the real nature of this faculty, than that employed in the text itself. The imagination is constructive, not creative. The essay is in three parts: The Analysis of the Imagination, The Development of the Imagination, and The Principal Types of the Imagination. The author conceives that what the will is to the sphere of action, the imagination is to that of intellectual order. It creates and furnishes the images which serve as the symbols of thought. Analogy is the product of imagination, involving both personification and transformation, and the meaning of the process is *Ex analogia hominis*. All minds are imaginative, the low degree of some imaginations being due to lack of either material or resourcefulness.

The author's discussion of myths is very instructive. He holds, of course, that the history of the race is that of the individual in the large, and therefore that the myth-making era of history finds its best illustration in the myth-making years of childhood. The real mark of a myth is in this *analogia hominis*. It is a humanization of nature according to processes peculiar to the imagination. "According to the definition that seems to me best adapted for psychology, the myth is 'the psychological objectification of man in all the phenomena that he can

perceive' (Vignoli, *Mito e Scienza*, p. 27). It is a humanization of nature according to processes peculiar to the imagination" (p. 121). Animism is a faith born of the imagination. Everything either above or below man is conceived as man. Civilization is the slow process of climbing down from the heights of fancy to the *terra firma* of hard fact. Ritualism is a decadent and rationalized mythology". Vico's three successive stages of mankind are recalled, viz., the Divine or Theocratic, the Heroic or Fabulous and the Human or Historic. The great-man-theory of history, championed by Carlyle, Nietzsche *et al.*, and opposed by such evolutionary writers as Spencer, Taine and others, is proof that we have not yet advanced out of the second into the third.

The last part of the essay is full of anecdotes and incidents that show what strange freaks the imagination, following its own methods and obeying its own laws, may play. The various types of the imagination are the same in the main and the differences are due to the way in which it is put, the circumstances by which it is surrounded and the other faculties possessed by the person himself. There is less actual difference than we are inclined to suppose between the scientific imagination, the mechanical, the commercial and the Utopian. The inventor is a poet working not simply in thoughts and words, but in thoughts and things. The imagination is never exercised without the feelings being involved. To Mendelssohn words were vague and ambiguous, while music was definite and full of meaning.

The translator's work, we should say, is well done; only he has left himself open to criticism that it is not quite done—completely. Some technical terms are pardonable, such as formication, asthenic and habephrenia, but we submit that there is no good reason for sending the reader of fair intelligence to the dictionary to learn what certain words mean whose significance could easily be put into clear and sufficiently accurate English equivalents; *e. g.*, Misoneism, Crepuscular, fulgurations, psychomy and hypnagogic hallucinations.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

DER KAMPF UM DIE SITTLICHE WELT. Von D. WILH. SCHMIDT, Professor an der Universität Breslau—Gütersloh. C. Bertelsmann. 1906. Pp. 334.

Lest the prospective purchaser should be disappointed in this work through a misapprehension of its character, it is well to point out that it is not a systematic treatise on morality, but a collection of popular essays. The meaning of the title is made clearer by the table of contents, which shows that the book consists of an Introduction and ten Chapters, entitled respectively Freedom of the Will, Conscience, Shakespeare the Poet of Conscience, Spencer and the Ethical Movement, The Buddhistic and the Christian Ethic, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Tolstoi, Lombroso, Man's Will and Destiny. Six of the ten chapters thus treat of the moral world as viewed by as many different influential writers. These chapters are mainly expository and contain nothing new. They

give a good popular presentation of the ethical views of Spencer, Tolstoi, etc., and should prove interesting and instructive in proportion to the reader's lack of first-hand knowledge of these authors. This perhaps in part explains the fact that the chapter on Lombroso, which contains some good criticism of that author's "statistical method", seems to me the best in the book. Prof. Schmidt's own view of the moral world is presented more directly in the chapters on Freedom, on Conscience, and on Man's Will and Destiny; though even here the impatient reader will be somewhat disconcerted by the frequent quotations, much as he may welcome the numerous references to other works as a guide to farther study. In fact there is little or no sustained argument, but much moral earnestness and copious citation from almost everything that could possibly be included in a work of little more than three hundred pages, from the Code of Hammurabi to Avenarius.

While an author who has read all the philosophical and literary works quoted by Prof. Schmidt deserves to be treated with respect, he does not contribute anything that calls for an extended notice. The gist of his position may be stated as follows: The moral world is the world of Will. The attitude we take towards all ethical questions will depend upon whether and in what sense we recognize the Will of man as the independent cause of his actions. Since we are morally accountable for our own acts, we must judge of their rightness for ourselves. This power of moral judgment is Conscience. Conscience is not a new discovery, it is as old as mankind. Moreover, Conscience is not empty of content; it judges according to a known standard of right. It is unconditionally binding, its laws are absolute and universally recognized, and yet it can err. Progress is explained by the fact that Conscience lays down laws or contains the principles of moral conduct, but error may be made in the application of innate moral principles. All this is definite enough and represents the familiar intuitionist position, minus the attempt to tell us what are the universally recognized moral ideas which constitute the 'always-present indwelling norm'. Though the advocates of 'innate practical principles' differ among themselves as to the number and identity of these principles, they at least ordinarily seek to give a list of them. And though, if they were universally recognized, it might be regarded as a work of supererogation to name them; since so many people seem to be in doubt about them, an author whose aim is practical and who knows what they are, ought not to keep this knowledge to himself. It should be superfluous to point out that the belief in an innate capacity to develop moral principles or to make them explicit in consciousness with growing experience, does not necessarily involve the belief in a whole brood of moral ideas existing full-fledged from the beginning of human life. The bare statement (p. 72) that Des Cartes and Leibnitz maintained, and Locke opposed, the existence of innate ideas, is superficial and misleading.

Prof. Schmidt's treatment of Free Will and Destiny is even more unsatisfactory than his treatment of Conscience, because less definite. 'What befalls us depends upon ourselves. We feel ourselves responsible for our destiny, and responsibility implies freedom.' But what is free-

dom? Freedom means, in the first place, the absence of determination by foreign or external causes; it means that we are the causes of our own volitional actions. But does freedom mean anything more than this? Does Prof. Schmidt teach the liberty of indifference and power of contrary choice, or simply the freedom of self-determination, the freedom to act in accordance with one's character? Evidently the latter: "Wie wir werden, so handen wir". "Our actions are not motiveless, they follow the momentarily strongest motive". But A's strongest motive may not be the strongest motive for B. If A and B each following the strongest motive, nevertheless act differently, this is because their natures are different. As we are, so we act. I do not see how it really adds anything to this, or helps to solve any difficulty, to say that it is equally true that: "wie wir handen, so werden wir". This is true, but irrelevant. Our acts determine our future character; but if our present character determines these acts, we are just where we started from. The acts which determine the character are themselves pre-determined by the character of the individual. We are still within the circle of self-motived conduct, of conduct determined by the nature of the self which chooses this or that—and Dr. Schmidt holds that such a view is incompatible with Freedom (p. 45).

Nor, again, do I see how the antithesis between "what we are by Nature and what we are with and through our Wills" explains how, in accordance with the author's view of freedom and responsibility, man is the architect of his own fate. Our destiny is determined not by external circumstances and gifts of fortune, but by what we make of them and of ourselves (p. 303). We show ourselves moral beings only through our Wills—that is true—but my Will is myself, willing. What, then, am I, this self that wills and in willing follows the strongest motive? A Kantian would say that my "empirical" self—the self of desires, inclinations, affections, motives—is a part of Nature, and as such is just as much determined as any object in the physical universe. Whether my 'self' is not also in some way above Nature (as the Kantian would also hold) is a fair metaphysical inquiry involving a great deal to be said in regard to both Nature and the self. But Dr. Schmidt does not enter into this inquiry. Nor would he have bettered his position in regard to Freedom and Destiny even if he had worked out an argument after the analogy of the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal self whose volitions are causally determined by the motives of the agent and the noumenal self which is free; since, quite apart from the question of the relation of man to Nature, he holds that the freedom of self-determination (which he does not escape) is not the kind of freedom which is compatible with responsibility for our Destiny.

All the arguments are in favor of determinism. Against these arguments may be set the immediate affirmation of consciousness that at any given moment we have the power of contrary choice. This consciousness may indeed be illusory: but if it be held not to be illusory, one might conceivably hold that the arguments in favor of determinism are not strong enough to offset the immediate affirmation of consciousness.

This, however, is not Prof. Schmidt's position. He first accepts psychological determinism and then seeks to escape it by adding a qualifying statement which does nothing to blunt its edge.

*Princeton.*

GEORGE S. PATTON.

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## APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF. By JAMES BISSETT PRATT, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy in Williams College. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1907. 8vo.; pp. xii, 327.

"The aim of this book is to discover the form and basis of religious belief rather than its content." Its method is the modern and fashionable one of psychology, not the antiquated one of metaphysics. It presents the phenomena of the different varieties of religious belief; it shows us how it works; it tells us what effect it has on us: but it rigidly excludes the question whether there is any reality back of it. In gathering the phenomena of religion our author has recourse to anthropology and to the history of religion; and that he may be altogether up to date, he makes large use of the "questionnaire". He addresses five hundred and fifty persons. To each one he sends ten searching and almost inquisitorial questions with regard to their deepest religious experiences, and from the answers of the eighty-three who replied he undertakes to show "the nature and the strength of the belief in God as it exists to-day in the Protestant communities of the eastern part of our country".

Our author classifies "the elements of psychic life" into "the definite, describable, communicable elements of consciousness", which may themselves be resolved into "ideation and sensory experience"; and into "the indefinite, the indescribable, the peculiarly private mass of subjective experiences which, by their nature, are not susceptible of communication", within which division we may again distinguish between "feeling and what is known as the phenomena of the background". Religious belief, as all belief, is of three kinds: "primitive credulity", which accepts whatever is presented and because it is presented; "intellectual belief", which is consciously based on reasoning; and "emotional belief", which "draws its strength from the field of vital feeling", and whose argument is, 'We feel that it *must* be real, therefore, it is real'. These three kinds of belief are illustrated in the typical forms of religion: in the animism of primitive people, in which primitive credulity plays the most important part; in the religious belief of India, in which intellectual belief is prominent, but, that it may satisfy the demands of human nature, has to turn to the religion of feeling; and religious belief in Israel, in which, while we find all three forms, it is the religion of feeling, of the consciousness of the immediate inspiration of Yahweh, which is most characteristic and most influential. These three phases of belief appear also in the development of Christianity. Authority,

even in its lower form of primitive credulity, was the great basis of faith in the earlier part of the Middle Ages. Intellectual belief became prominent "in the middle of the thirteenth century at the court of the Emperor Frederic II in southern Italy and three centuries later at the Reformation. The religion of feeling manifests itself, of course, in Mysticism. The same three forms of belief are seen in the development of the individual. Primitive credulity is supreme in early childhood; rationalism, in adolescence; the religion of feeling, in maturity. This last does not rest on the authority of the Bible. That has long been shattered. Neither does it depend on the theistic proofs, nor on the arguments of systematic theology; and as to the latter, in the words of Dr. Osler, "the battle of Armageddon has been fought and lost". The idea even of God, while valuable to many, is not indispensable to religion. The essence of this is that it is an "immediate experience of a vast reservoir of life beyond us, which is like ours and with which our life may make connections". Whether religion is really to last we cannot tell; but if it is to last, it will be because this "one dogma", if we may so call it, "will be seen in its true light as the one doctrine of the real Religion of Humanity, because it is founded on the very life of the race". In a word, religious belief will stand or fall with the religion of feeling. "Personal inner experience, the unreasoned (though by no means unreasonable) religious attitude toward the universe, is the only source from which religion in these days of naturalism and agnosticism, of indifference and hostility, can draw its life".

The first impression which this discussion is likely to make on the thoughtful reader is that the author has succeeded admirably in confining himself to the role of the psychologist. He has ruled out theology and metaphysics completely. Much as he has told us of the mode and source of religious activity, he has told us nothing as to whether it gets anywhere or rests on anything. The reviewer has tried his best, but he cannot discover whether the author does or does not himself believe in God. He congratulates him on his success. This success, however, robs psychological analysis of all save academic value. If religion be the response of the human soul to the ever living and ever blessed God, "our Father which is in heaven"; especially if it be the answer of a heart which God has regenerated and of which his Spirit has become the animating principle, to information directly communicated by him in the human and earthly life of his own Son and in 'men who spake from him being moved by the Holy Spirit',—then the psychology of religion becomes of absorbing interest. We cannot know too much of what happens when God and man meet together in living and personal communion. But if religious experience and activity do not mean this, especially if God means something altogether different from this conception of him, then it is quite otherwise. In a word, the value of facts depends on their meaning. The most wonderful machinery in the world would lose its interest for us, if we might not inquire what it signified and what it was for. Now these are just the questions which the psychologist will not ask. His aim is to study the process, but not the meaning. This, however, is not all. His method

should deprive his investigations of even academic value. For it may be presumed that this is not without regard for truth. It appreciates facts, even if it assumes indifference to their meaning. But the two are intimately related. If the meaning grows out of the fact, the fact can be fully apprehended only in the light of its meaning. One who sees in a man's turning over the ground in his field simply what he sees in a pig's turning over the mire in his sty does not see all even of the fact. He fails even as a scientific observer. It is no defense, therefore, for the psychologist to say that when he confines himself to his own method he does not exclude the metaphysician. The point is that to work his own method rightly, he must call in the metaphysician.

Again, the pragmatic sanction for religion will not satisfy man permanently. It might be sufficient for an individual here and there, but it could not be for the race. If men are to continue to believe in God, or even in a vast reservoir of life beyond us, they must know that there is a God, or that there is such a reservoir. That is to say, a want indicates nothing of itself as to truth or fact. Sleep seems to be the supreme need of the man who is freezing. His whole nature, so far as his feeling goes, demands it. Yet sleep is the one thing that he must fight against, if he would live. In a word, it is not all feeling, not even what feels as if it were instinctive, that is trustworthy. Hence, while religious experience is indispensable to true religion, as our author rightly insists, what he does not see is that it is just as indispensable that this experience should be true, this feeling right, and that this can be determined only by the reason which he would deprecate. In the long run the pragmatic sanction must fall back on metaphysics.

Finally, we cannot see how, from our author's standpoint, there can be any question as to whether religion will "last". Of course, it cannot continue. Its reasoned foundations having been overthrown, it cannot abide even as an experience and feeling. The heart cannot speak when the head has been silenced. We are surprised that psychologists should so often forget so fundamental and outstanding a fact as that human nature is not made in segments, but is an indivisible unity. It is not true that rational religion ceases with adolescence and is then replaced by the religion of feeling. What is true is that with advancing years we appreciate the truths which we accepted in youth and feel more and more the preciousness of the Saviour in whom we have from the first believed. But this does not imply any change of base. The heart does not take the place of the head. It both confirms it and depends upon it, and when it confirms it best it depends upon it most. High thinking and deep feeling go together; and while we may have the former and not the latter, we cannot have the latter and not the former. If, therefore, as our author claims, religion belongs to "the indefinite, the indescribable, the peculiarly private mass of subjective experiences which, by their nature, are not susceptible of communication", if it is mainly a matter of "feeling and of the background", then, man, being what he is, is bound to outgrow it; and for ourselves, we do not think that he can do so too quickly.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE. By HENRY W. CLARK, Author of *Meanings and Methods of the Spiritual Life*, *The Christ from Without and Within*, etc., etc. With an Appreciation by Marcus Dods, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 8vo., pp. 243. \$1.25 net.

This book is a near approach to the remarkable. Dr. Dods' commendation of it seemed extravagant and accordingly served rather to deepen than to remove the presumptive bias against it. The recent output of books in the line of the psychological interpretation of religious experience has been so abundant that, what with Coe, Starbuck, Davenport, James and the rest, the reader has a suggestion of weariness when another is proposed. But this book certainly has extraordinary merit. It is an original interpretation of the personal religious life. It holds itself rigidly to its specific theme. It is strictly a monograph, in delightfully lucid English, with the clear expression which is the best proof of the clear conception. And there is no evidence of straining after novelty. The author's conception is self-consistent and, except perhaps to the technical critic, in entire conformity to the teachings of Scripture. It neither builds upon nor avoids Holy Writ as a source of authority in the treatment of its subject.

A brief resumè of the argument of the book would be something of this sort: Religion may be regarded either as a science or as an art. Science discovers; art creates. In this book, religion is to be viewed as an art—the art of "character production". The need of religion is universal because universal in the sense that somehow life has missed the way. Ideals have been left behind. Reflection makes it clear that life consists in right relations—the response of what is within us to what is without, or *vice versa*: it is not very important which way it is said, for both come to the same thing, namely, the harmony between the two. This harmony is broken and it is a just criticism upon religion that it too often falls short of the work of moral reconstruction. Conversion is the response of moral qualities in man to moral qualities in God. This trite religious term has been degraded to superficial or spurious connotations, such as the substitution of the attitude of attention for that of inattention to spiritual things, insurance against penalties, and availing oneself of God's help in a struggle in which we had previously been contending singlehanded.

These are partially, if not wholly, false, for conversion is nothing less than the reconstructing of our moral being. The fatherhood of God, rightly understood and experienced, secures this conversion. This fatherhood of God is much talked of and much misunderstood to-day, but what Christ intended to be the Christian conception of it was this: "that God is prepared at any moment to be the inspiration and the source of the life which moves and throbs in the spirit of man" (p. 78). It is not a past fact or relation of origination, but it is a continuous process. It is not realized except when man responds to the ever-pressing active solicitation of the Divine. God's love is always urging

men to let it pass into fatherhood, but this it does and can do only with those who consent. The love of God is the potential fatherhood of God.

Repentance is a recognition that the withholding of self from God in the past has been an injury to God; it is concerned rather with what it has done in the past than with what it may gain in the future. Here we detect a subjective theory of repentance infinitely higher and healthier than Dr. Dawson's doctrine of forgetting. In bringing about this moral reconstruction, which is conversion, the office of Christ is needful and obvious. He came not so much to reveal God as to communicate God. He is not so much the light-bearer as the life-giver. The chapter on this subject is very fresh, rich and suggestive. The author puts his thought in such a light that the Incarnation is made to seem the most natural thing to be expected. Of course, it is unique in its purpose and in its nature, and therefore we must not expect to find analogous or adequate evidences elsewhere.

Here, too, is easily seen the function of faith. Some truth is such as when believed affects the intellect only; other truth affects intellect and conduct; other truth affects intellect, conduct and character. Religion is of the last sort and it involves and influences the whole personality. Sanctification is the status set up in conversion and indefinitely sustained, and the perils of lapse and loss of the new life are a motive for constant and assiduous endeavor in spiritual self-culture.

The book is modest in its pretensions, reverent in tone and almost entirely destitute of the personal equation of the author; and it gives every evidence of devout and sincere evangelical intention. Its style raises the presumption that it was written, not for the theologian, but for the average thoughtful man who takes the twentieth century layman's view of religion generally. The theologian can find flaws that the man for whom the book was written might never dream of. The book does not say everything; indeed, it leaves unsaid some things we believe that it would have been the better for saying: but if it had tried to say everything that is true it would certainly have failed, and it would pretty certainly have said less clearly and effectively what it does say. It is a better book than Professor Drummond's *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, because it is more modest, less involved in the dubious hypotheses of science and less anxious to be epoch-making. We frankly confess we like the book. It is not a persuasive book to put into the hands of a man to induce him Christward. It is rather an essay in the way of explanation of the Christian experience upon grounds that are reasonable in themselves and are analogous to things with which we are familiar on all sides. If it is silent concerning the Atonement, the *ordo salutis*, the differentiae of sin, and the full work of the Holy Spirit in salvation, we may well believe that this silence was designed by the author in order to enable him all the more clearly to impress upon the minds of the theologically untutored some central and fundamental truths which the conventional nomenclature of the schools might have only covered up or confused.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

THE CREED OF A LAYMAN, *Apologia Pro Fide Mea*. By FREDERIC HARRISON. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1907. 8vo.; pp. vi, 395.

We have in this volume a series of seventeen papers expository of Positivism by probably the most eminent living disciple of Auguste Comte. These papers have been prepared during the last thirty-one years. Some of them are reprints of magazine articles. Others are addresses that were delivered in connection with the celebration of the so-called Positivist sacraments, such as the Presentation of Infants, Initiation, Destination, Marriage, Burial. Probably the most important of these papers is that which gives name to the whole collection, *The Creed of a Layman*. In this the author expounds and vindicates formally and at length the Positivist belief. He calls attention to its excellencies, and many of these we, too, would emphasize. Such is its comprehensiveness. It combines "belief, discipline and worship". "It asserts its power over the Intellectual World, the Moral World, and the Practical World". It repudiates utterly the psychology which makes it possible for a man to accept with his heart a religion which he denies with his head. Again, it strikes hard at much of modern philosophy in insisting on a real object of worship. "Let who will and can love God and Christ, looking for a celestial crown; let them serve these. But let no one pretend to love or to serve the Infinite, or Evolution, or the idea of Good. It is a farce." So, too, it takes a firm stand against pragmatism. The question is not whether beliefs will work, but are "they true? are they real, or are they artificial?" And yet while we find much in the presuppositions of their creed with which we are in sympathy, the creed itself is the dreariest and the most impossible with which we are acquainted. No God but collective humanity; no hereafter but an immortality of influence and, if we have been great, of remembrance,—how can any bring themselves to accept so dismal a faith? how can any find it reasonable to bow down to an aggregation whose members are most of them dead? We venture to predict that Mr. Harrison's clear and frank presentation of positivism will do more to exalt the glorious gospel of the living God than will many of the apologies for it. The strongest argument for life is to bring on a corpse.

Of almost equal interest and importance with a "Layman's Creed" is the first paper, "*Apologia pro Fide Mea*". In this we read how the writer came to be a positivist. He carries us along with him in his descent "through all the typical phases of religious thought, from effusive Ritualism to Broad Church, to Latitudinarianism, Unitarianism, Theism, and finally to the Faith in Humanity". We cannot agree with him in his judgment that his environment was most unfavorable to his change of faith. To us nothing could more dispose one to it than the ritualism in which he was trained, and the ecclesiastical dishonesty in the atmosphere of which as a young man he lived. Had he been reared

in a Calvinistic home where the emphasis was on devotion rather than ritual, and had he associated with those who, while they professed much, sincerely believed more, we venture to say that he would not have succumbed so readily, if at all, to the influence of Comte. Even positivism is more rational and better than hypocrisy.

One lesson above all others is taught by Mr. Harrison's experience. There is no stopping place in unbelief. As Henry B. Smith said: "One thing is certain—that Infidel Science will rout everything except thorough-going Christian Orthodoxy. All the flabby theories, and the mollescent formations, and the intermediate purgatories of speculation will go by the board. The fight will be between a stiff, thorough-going Orthodoxy, and a stiff, thorough-going Infidelity. It will be, *e. g.*, Augustine or Comte, Athanasius or Hegel, Luther or Schopenhauer, J. S. Mill or John Calvin. Arianism gets the fire from both sides: so does Arminianism: so does Universalism."

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

CHRISTIANITY IN THE MODERN WORLD. By the REV. D. S. CAIRNS, M.A.  
New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. Pp. xv, 314.

"A preface, being the entrance of a book, should invite by its beauty." So said D'Israeli, and there is no disputing the remark. And while mere beauty is not to be sought for in the preface of a book with a theological subject, we naturally view first the preface as the "porch" of the author's literary edifice. In the preface of this stimulating and useful work the author refers to the "crisis" to which Christianity has come in the experiences of present-day scholarship and in "the common life of the church"; and he indicates that it is his purpose to show that the movement and uncertainty in current religious thought and feeling instead of being a "down grade" tendency is "a slow coming to life of a new and nobler world". From this statement we are prepared to find a vigorous optimistic tone to the book, and on our perusal of it we are not disappointed. Moreover, it is long since we have read a book of this class in which we have found so slight an element with which we have been compelled to disagree.

The heart of the discussion concerns the person, mission and work of Jesus Christ. Chapter II has for its title "Jesus and the Fatherhood of God". In chapter III "Jesus and the New Life" is treated. "Jesus and the Kingdom of God—Apocalypse and Ethics" forms the subject of Chapter IV. These three chapters include nearly two hundred pages, or about two-thirds of the entire volume. The last two chapters deal respectively with "The Kingdom of God and Science", and "Christianity in the Modern World". The book as a whole, then, resolves itself into a discussion of the question as to what the world of to-day is to think and do concerning Jesus who is called the Christ. Evidently the author regards the deity of Christ and the uniqueness and necessity of His redemptive mission as forming the great issue of our time as of former

periods between Christianity and unbelief. He is plainly not of those who regard Christianity minus the Incarnation and the Atonement as they have been understood by the Christian consciousness of the ages as worthy the name of Christianity. He defends these great fundamentals of Christian theology—as, for instance, against such teachers as Professor Seely and Dr. Martineau,—with fairness and dispassionate-ness, but also with vigor and power and, we may add, with an un-hackneyed form of expression.

Mr. Cairns' criticism of "Ecco Homo", in chapter II, is very fine; and his analysis and discussion of the rationalism of the Unitarian system as summed up in the phrase of Emerson concerning "the noxious exaggeration of the person of Christ", is very brilliant and, to our mind, thoroughly convincing. Very striking is the sketch presented of the successive steps in the shifting positions of Martineau in the vain attempt of that great thinker to adjust his preconceived notion of the non-deity of Jesus to the claims of the supremely just and sane Founder of our religion concerning Himself. There is no logical resistance to be offered against the drift of his argument here. Either the wisdom and authoritativeness of the Great Teacher—which Martineau's heart forbade him to surrender—must give way at the most vital point, or the Church must retain its historical "Christolatry" which it has learned directly and unmistakably from the lips of its Founder Himself. Here the words of the author may well be quoted: "It is clear, I think, that we have here the true roots of the 'noxious exaggeration' with which, it is asserted, the Church has always thought of Jesus. He is, Himself, I believe, directly responsible for the peculiar cast of Christian life and thought. Christianity reproduces Him here as certainly as Islam repro-  
duces Mohammed, and, on the bare Humanitarian view, the Christolatry of the Christian Church must be traced to the overweening self-estimate of its Founder, as surely as the polygamy and tyranny of Islam must be traced to the sins of its Prophet" (p. 121). And noble is the author's language in the summary of his argument in this chapter. He says: "I have endeavored to show, in the above argument, that we cannot adequately account for the Personality of Jesus Christ so long as we are content to explain Him by analogy with other great founders of world religion[s], and that we can only approximate to the truth about Him when we associate with that the further analogy of such a great cosmic change as the first appearance in the world of Self-con-  
scious Mind. The Apostolic writers go even beyond this. They compare the appearing of Jesus to the creation of the world itself, and the rise of Christian life to a continuance of the creative fiat of God" (pp. 159, 160). We know of nothing that better indicates the essential gulf between real Christianity and its emasculated form as, for example, it presented itself to the minds of Emerson and Martineau.

We are, of course, unable in this brief review to give more than a scant and imperfect indication of the scope, method and spirit of this excellent book. We have read it through twice, and we recommend our readers to procure it and, in this particular, to follow our example.

*Cranford, N. J.*

GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

## EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

LA QUESTION BIBLIQUE AU XX<sup>e</sup> SIÈCLE, par ALBERT HOUTIN. Paris: E. Nourry. 1906. 8vo.; pp. xi, 294.

The Abbé Houtin has constituted himself the historian of recent Biblical criticism in France; the historian, and something more than the historian, of it,—the eager apologist of it, and that in its most extreme form. His *La Question Biblique chez les Catholiques de France au xix<sup>e</sup> Siècle*, published in 1902 and almost immediately (before the end of that year) again in a second edition, contained a thoroughly well-informed and a very well executed account of the history of Biblical criticism among the Catholics of France during the nineteenth century; and was so written as to constitute a sharp arraignment of the Catholics of France for their attitude toward this criticism and a strong plea for entire freedom for it from all ecclesiastical interference. It was published just at the moment when the controversy which was raging about the Abbé Loisy was at its height—the second edition was exactly contemporaneous with the publication of *L'Evangile et l'Eglise* and the *Etudes Evangéliques*—and it tended greatly to influence the situation. Naturally, it was included in the condemnation of the Abbé Loisy's volumes, pronounced by the Holy Congregation of the Index at the opening of December 1903. Here is the account which M. Houtin gives of his own book:

"The two works of M. Loisy appeared at a critical moment. For many Catholic theologians the author incarnated the Biblical question. They thought that if he was suppressed, all the difficulties of the Church would pass away. His personality had recently become still more irritating, through the publication of a book which had thrown it strongly into relief. This was *La Question Biblique chez les Catholiques de France au xix<sup>e</sup> Siècle*. This work showed that M. Loisy stood really on the lower rungs of the Biblical controversy; that many of the ideas for which he had been persecuted had already become part of ordinary teaching; that those who attacked him had been able to work out only a puerile apologetic, tainted with charlatan processes, insolent falsehoods, shameless assertions, impudent recantations. Such a picture could not fail to arouse protestations. Some were willing to pardon the author for recognizing the greatness of the rôle M. Loisy was playing; but they could not forgive him for exposing the weakness of the official apologetics of M. Vigouroux. . . . That the author had been respectful to the Church of Rome was superabundantly proved by its conclusion, which was full of confidence for the future and expressed the conviction that Catholicism would surmount the objections of criticism. When those whom the book particularly irritated announced that it was to be put on the Index, they were not credited. It was thought that the book was open to no other condemnation than an episcopal one for infraction of the rules of the *imprimatur*" (pp. 74-76).

The ingenuous reader will, of course, understand that the tone of this extract is part of the artifice of M. Houtin's controversial method—as of M. Loisy's, and that of a large number of their fellow-writers. But that aside. What it concerns us now to note is that M. Houtin has followed up this former work with a sequel, in which he undertakes to continue the story of "the Biblical Question" through the

opening years of the twentieth century. The title-page of the new volume no longer bears the qualifying words, "among the Catholics of France". M. Houtin apparently wishes to sweep with his eye now a wider circle and to enter the conflict going on in a broader field. Nevertheless, his book is essentially a continuation of the former one, and its real significance lies in its minute tracing of the progress of the Loisy controversy in France through the opening years of the twentieth century. What it has to say of the broader field is little in amount, not specially important, not so thoroughly digested or indeed so well understood, and seems to be introduced chiefly as a controversial device, colored, perhaps, with the hope that thus the book may be given place and influence in the world-conflict itself, and become perhaps a factor in the determination of "the Biblical Question" not merely in France, but throughout the world.

For a proper estimate of the volume, then, it is necessary to look at it from two separate points of view. It is a detailed history of the later stages of the Loisy controversy, with an introduction designed to enable the reader to put himself at the proper angle for understanding it and an appendix designed to suggest the ultimate issue. It is also a brief for radical Biblical criticism and a demand for freedom of criticism in the churches. It is in the former of these aspects that the value of the book to the public lies: it is in the latter, apparently, that its value to the author lies. His endeavor seems to be to make use of the Loisy case in order to put in a plea for "freedom of criticism"; and the criticism for freedom for which he enters his plea is a criticism of the most radical order—a criticism which denies that there is any adequate historical evidence for even such capital facts as the resurrection of Christ or such fundamental doctrines as His deity.

The extremity of the criticism for which M. Houtin would make place in the churches and the guileful art by which he sustains his appeal for it, are illustrated on every page. Take a single incidental instance of both, which fairly illustrates the manner of the whole. In describing the controversy raised by the recently issued Declaration of certain of the Anglican clergy in favor of liberty of criticism, he remarks, after his ordinary fashion, on "the naïvety and ignorance displayed by the orthodox in the discussion"—and then adduces as shining examples of this "naïvety and ignorance" the following: "One of the orthodox alleges as proof of the dogma of the Trinity, the interpolated verse of Mat. 28<sup>19</sup>, 'Baptize them in the name of the Father, of the Son and of the Holy Spirit' (*Standard*, 18th May). A correspondent having declared that he does not believe that Christ ever affirmed his deity, an orthodox critic cites to him nine texts of the Fourth Gospel (*Ibid* 20 May)." To this advocate of "freedom of criticism", therefore, the spuriousness of Mt. 28<sup>18</sup>, and the historical untrustworthiness of John's Gospel are such assured results of criticism that only "ignorance" can explain appeal to them! The criticism he advocates is a criticism in effect which makes a clean sweep of all the historical foundations of the Christian system and bids men build with totally other materials—and, of course, totally different results. It is a criticism of which men like

Mr. F. C. Conybeare are the coryphaeuses, while men like "the aged Professor Sanday" are mere "apologists" whose "feeble responses give the measure of a criticism which pretends to defend points which it commences by placing outside the reach of a free examination" (p. 238).

Already from these references it will be seen that the opponents of the extreme criticism which M. Houtin has undertaken to command to us do not fare very well at his hands. The sharpness of his personal polemic is, to speak the truth, a distinct blot upon his book. He even permits himself to devote well-nigh a whole chapter to pillorying the Papal professors of Exegesis at Rome, in a humorous account of their courses of instruction. For example:

"In his introductory lecture, Father Hetzenhauer distinguished between active and passive exegesis. Active exegesis, says he, is the act of explaining, passive exegesis is the result of active exegesis. Instead of a Bible, he took a prayer-book for the text of his course. A good Catholic does not read the Bible; he reads the Scriptures as the Church places it under his eyes, in select passages distributed in the holy Liturgy, that is to say, in the Missal and the Breviary if he is a priest, and in his prayer-book if he is a layman. Here is orthodoxy! Father Hetzenhauer opens now his Liturgy and commences at the commencement, that is to say at the Gospels for the first Sabbaths of Advent. He cites the Greek, the Hebrew, and even—apropos of the stars which are to fall to the earth at the end of the world—he draws upon astronomy. Soon comes the Gospel for the Wednesday of the December fast,—the Annunciation. The Capuchin of course believes all that is in the sacred text on the subject. But that is not enough for him. What a pity it is that we do not find more of the details which our piety would like to know! Happily the scholastic method permits us to supply the lacunae. . . . (p. 205).

We raise no question whatever as to the exactitude, nor yet as to the perspective, of M. Houtin's report of Father Hetzenhauer's or Father Delattre's lectures. We raise no question even of the accuracy of his account of the descent of, say, Monsieur Batiffol from the aspirations of his ingenuous youth when he was companion with M. Loisy under the roof of the Abbé Duchesne, to the pliant servant of authority in the name of which he now assaults M. Loisy: though we had conceived better of Monsieur Batiffol from his published writings than M. Houtin seems to have done from a closer acquaintance. It may be that all the opponents of M. Loisy and the policy he represents—in France and elsewhere—are at once stupid and cunning. This is a question of fact and we have not at hand the documents to enable us to control M. Houtin's assertions and insinuations. But the manner in which he puts them forward does not incline us to take them, uncriticised, at the foot of the letter; and the tone which they give his book may communicate to it a certain piquancy for the desultory reading of an idle hour, but cannot add weight to it as a solid plea for the freedom of criticism in the Church. Suppose it be true that all the opponents of the "Loisyites" are animated by personal ends or are innocent of historical sense. How does that fact prove to us that "the Loisyites" are safe historical guides? Especially when we see them so lacking in historical sense as to miss the historical note in John's Gospel, to be unable to discover a historical basis for the greatest events which have occurred

in history—the Incarnation and Resurrection of Jesus Christ,—and to be incapable of discerning the purely *a priori* character of the radical criticism of the day. We hold no brief for the integrity of the historical conscience of the Roman hierarchy in France, or at Rome. But we should feel we had journeyed from the frying pan into the fire if, revolting from them, we should cast ourselves under the domination of the historical judgments of Auguste Sabatier, Eugène Ménégoz, Jean and Albert Réville. There is more than one way of being grossly unhistorical, even though we shield ourselves under the sacred name of history.

M. Houtin wishes it to be understood, to be sure, that the criticism he pleads for is purely historical. He repels with vigor the insinuation that it is governed by *a priori* presuppositions, particularly that it is determined by prejudice against the supernatural. It does not enter upon its work, he affirms over and over again, with the maxim in its hands that miracles are impossible. It simply asks with calm brow whether the evidence for the supernatural events recorded in the Gospels is satisfactory to the historical sense. And it finds it is not. We are sorry to differ with M. Houtin on a matter so fundamental to the estimate we shall form of the value of the criticism he defends. But we have no choice—our reading of the critical literature of the day convinces us beyond the possibility of hesitation, that the primary principle of the reigning criticism is precisely the impossibility or the incredibility of the directly supernatural. Many modern critics—and those not of the least esteem—openly avow it. Others, while not avowing it, and even while disavowing it, yet obviously act upon it throughout their work. Sometimes we meet side by side with the most explicit rejection of the principle that miracles are impossible, the most naïve betrayals that nevertheless the whole thought of the writer is dominated by this maxim. We read, for example, in Professor Schmiedel's famous article "Gospels" in the *Encyclopedie Biblica* (the type of criticism in which M. Houtin approves) the most emphatic statement that "it would clearly be wrong . . . to start from any such postulate or maxim as that miracles are impossible" (p. 1876); and we turn the page and read that the statement of Luke 23 "that the sun's light failed at the crucifixion is incredible, because forsooth an eclipse of the sun "is possible only at the period of the new moon and cannot happen on the 15th or 14th of a month" (p. 1878). That is to say, unless it is a purely natural event occurring naturally—it is "impossible". Mr. Alfred W. Benn similarly told us a few years ago (*The New World*, Sept. 1895)—quite in the spirit of M. Houtin,—that disbelief in the supernatural among modern historical investigators is *a posteriori* and would give way to the testimony of eye-witnesses (p. 439),—and then incidentally dropped the remark that "if the evidence of eye-witnesses could convert the rationalists to a belief in miracles, incredulity on their part would long ago have ceased to trouble the apologist" (p. 440). It is possible, to be sure, that men may deceive themselves (as well as others) on this point, and fancy that they do not deny the possibility of miracles but only find the evidence actually adduced insufficient. Does it ever

occur to them to ask themselves what kind and degree of evidence would suffice to convince them of a truly miraculous occurrence? Say of the Virgin Birth, or of the Resurrection of Christ? Asking themselves such a question and holding themselves to a precise answer, they will be apt to discover shortly that no conceivable evidence would suffice to convince them of such occurrences; and so the real state of their minds would reveal itself to themselves. When one is unreasonably exacting as to evidence it is because he is unwilling to credit the thing evidenced. In point of fact, the whole of modern criticism is founded on chariness as to the supernatural: and its demand for "historical" interpretation and for "natural" sequences of events is but another way of asserting this fundamental characteristic. For "historical" interpretation means on its lips just the explanation of every event out of the forces intrinsic in the historical development; and a "natural" sequence means a sequence explicable out of the natural causes at work and is just a synonym, as used by it, for "naturalistic" sequence. And a criticism which sets itself to explain everything that occurs out of the "historical" situation and to draw out the process of events in a "natural" order cannot stop until everything "supernatural" is eliminated from history. Anti-supernaturalism is accordingly the very principle of the presently prevalent criticism: and as supernaturalism is the very principle of Christianity, this criticism and Christianity can live together in harmony just as little as can fire and water. The Abbé Loisy, the Abbé Houtin—they may intend otherwise: they may fancy otherwise: but what they are doing—and every reader of this book will perceive that this is what they are doing—is, not striving to make a place in the Roman Communion for sober and sane history (which would no doubt be the destruction of the Roman system), but to implant within it a leaven which, if it ever becomes active in it, cannot stop working until it drives out every vestige of Christianity itself. The cause of the Roman curia in this battle is sadly confused with the cause of Christianity itself.

As the larger part of the contents of M. Houtin's book concerns the work of M. Loisy, it may be of interest to give in closing the summary estimate he passes on that writer:

"On the whole, the work of M. Loisy in the Latin countries is that which Robertson Smith accomplished in Great Britain. Like Smith he has maintained the rights of Biblical criticism against the pretensions, not less intolerant than false, of traditional dogmatism. Brought up in the strictest orthodoxy, in a manner of thinking vitiated by the strongest prejudices, he formed himself gradually by impartial search after truth. Observing how science menaced the Church, he wished, while continuing to work in an objective way, to supply means of defense for the religious society of which he was a priest. In the face of such an evolution, the impartial mind is compelled to think that if he has not succeeded it is because success is impossible.

In his scientific work, the Abbé Loisy has reached the same results as the 'rationalists'. On points of detail his conclusions are even more radical and destructive than theirs. In his theological work he has pretty nearly fallen in with the religious systems elaborated by Protestant scholars to justify the old Christianity of their youth (notably the systems of Auguste Bouvier, Auguste Sabatier and Edmond Stapfer . . .).

This is no doubt because there is scarcely more than one way open to theology, as there certainly is only one way open to reason.

But for the modern mind the problem is to discover whether there is any way to conciliate the labors of reason with the pretensions, even when pruned, of the religions called revealed. Freed from dogmatic interests, or subtleties, the modern mind, in the presence of the dissolution of the legends of the Gospels wrought by criticism, scarcely understands how Harnack, as theologian, can speak with so much enthusiasm of Christ, of whom, as historian, he tells us we know so little. Or rather we understand only too well, and fear to share this enthusiasm, lest we fall into a prejudice,—if we recall the terms in which the same historian speaks of Luther. 'To the name of Luther', says he, 'no German remains indifferent. Luther is an incomparable name for all—whether we seek to combat him or to praise and exalt him. Each party among us has its Luther, and thinks it has the true one. More than half of our nation reveres Luther, and nevertheless they are profoundly divided in the manner in which Luther is conceived.'

Christ also is venerated by Catholics, Protestants, Greek and Russian Orthodox. Each believes it has the true Christ, and yet they differ profoundly in the way they understand His person and work. But the day is dawning when these differences will cease; when ancestral legends will be sacrificed to the truth; when no one will desire to celebrate Christ any more than Luther according to confessional traditions, but will seek to know Him according to rigorously historical method.

M. Loisy speaks neither of Luther nor of Christ with Harnack's enthusiasm. True Catholic, what he seeks before all to defend and to honor is the Roman Church. Working out the numerous evolutions through which it passed before it framed for itself an absolutely compact body of doctrine at the Council of Trent,—hoping that it will suffer numerous transformations more to adapt itself to the future—he has made of the incessant variation of dogma its essential character, its distinctive mark, and, so to say, the proof of its divinity. His manner of pleading his cause supplies one of the most curious and one of the most skilful apologetics ever written; but those who take history without binding it to a thesis, are not able to follow him in this theological commentary, and faithful Catholics do not follow him because the Church condemns him, though avoiding staking its infallibility upon this condemnation, at least for the present.

Discredited, from the dogmatic point of view, in the eyes of his co-religionists, sacrificing, himself, the apologetic system for which he had dreamed he might obtain the acceptance of the hierarchy, M. Loisy remains purely and simply a critic. The Protestant liberals are in error in thinking that they recognize in him a brother. If he has worked out a theodicy resembling theirs in many respects, his system has nevertheless proved for him only provisional. He subordinated its value to the acceptance of it by the Church. From the moment when he abandoned it, he ceased to be a theologian and became nothing but a historian; and it must be admitted that, in the vigor of his criticism there have been very few historians who have delivered such heavy blows upon the old dogmatics, very few historians who have unraveled so minutely the web of the Gospel narratives. His historical works remain; while the nonsuccess of his apologetics is, for the public, only a new illustration of the impossibility more and more flagrant which forbids theologians to elaborate a theory of religion which shall be at once orthodox and scientific" (pp. 150-153).

In this passage, we have, we take it, a very fair portrait of M. Loisy: and there may be read between the lines of it, also, we take it, a very fair portrait of M. Houtin.

AGRAPH. Aussercanonische Schriftfragmente gesammelt und untersucht und in zweiter völlig neu bearbeiteter durch alttestamentliche Agrapha vermehrter Auflage herausgegeben von Alfred Resch, mit fünf Registern. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1906. Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, etc., herausgegeben von Oscar v. Gebhardt und Adolf Harnack. Neue Folge XV. Band 3|4 Heft. Pp. xvi, 426.

The first edition of Resch's *Agrapha*, which appeared in 1889 as V. Band 4 Heft of the *Texte und Untersuchungen* edited by v. Gebhardt and Harnack, was reviewed in *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, Vol. II, 1891, pp. 332f. The second edition has been entirely worked over, reorganized and enlarged by the addition of new material and of five useful indexes. The author's point of view and purpose are known from the earlier edition and these have not been changed. The chief value of the new edition consists in the new material, gathered mainly from discoveries in the field of early Christian literature which have been made since the appearance of the first edition. Another interesting feature is the beginnings of a collection of Old Testament Agrapha. The present edition has the advantage also of building upon and referring to the author's writings which have appeared since the first edition. Resch still seeks to explain the predominantly Synoptical character and the Pauline affinity of the Agrapha by his theory of a written source known to Paul and to the authors of the Synoptic Gospels. The learning and the labor revealed in this edition deserve the fullest recognition. The author has made it an indispensable storehouse of information, the more valuable by reason of the fulness with which the data are given especially in the reproduction of the context in the patristic passages cited. The discussion at times, however, seems repetitious and even in its reorganized form the work shows traces of the "aggregate" character of the first edition. On page 8, line 2 from the bottom, read, nicht; on page 16, line 24, read, Lock; on page 353, line 28, read, 30.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

OUTLINE STUDIES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT: *Philippians to Hebrews*.

By WILLIAM G. MOOREHEAD, Professor in Xenia Theological Seminary. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Pp. 249. Price, \$1.20 net.

Dr. Moorehead is well known as an enthusiastic student and teacher of the Bible who combines scholarly equipment of a high order with evangelical warmth and earnestness. Dr. Moorehead's specialty is the whole Bible. His *Outline Studies in the Books of the Old Testament* is widely used by Bible teachers and he has brought out two volumes of Studies in the Gospels and Acts. The present book, as rich in insight and inspiration as any that have preceded it, covers the epistles from *Philippians* to *Hebrews*, and holds a place midway between a commentary and a more formal "introduction". The treatment of historical details is fresh and pertinent, and the analyses, comments on leading

passages and discussion of fundamental truths are helpful in opening up the spiritual treasures of the epistles. It is the work of a ripe Biblical scholar and Christian.

*Lincoln University, Pa.*

WILLIAM HALLOCK JOHNSON.

THE SECOND EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY. By the RIGHT REVEREND HANDLEY C. G. MOULE, D.D., Bishop of Durham. The Religious Tract Society. London. Cloth; 192 pages. Price 2 shillings.

It would be impossible to speak in too high commendation of this most helpful "Devotional Commentary". The honored and illustrious author has long been known to the Christian world as a scholarly and devout expositor of Scripture, and in this particular volume he exhibits in peculiar measure the distinguishing features of his admirable method, his lucid style and his devotional spirit. The purpose of the writer was to "take up the Epistle . . . in quest of divine messages for heart and life". It is needless to say that in this quest the distinguished commentator has been most successful. Every page is full of practical instruction and of helpful spiritual suggestion. In accomplishing his aim, Dr. Moule gives to the reader even more help than his simple purpose would suggest. First of all, might be mentioned the complete *translation* of the Epistle which is given to us. At the head of each of the brief studies is given the Authorized Version of the verses to be discussed; but there also follows an original rendering of these verses, in a version marked by peculiar accuracy, vividness, force and suggestiveness. Then, too, while literary criticism is quite aside from the purpose of the author, we are afforded the positive conclusions of the most careful critical study; and in the course of the commentary we find convincing proofs of the genuineness and authenticity of the Epistle, while its historic setting is vividly depicted. The aim of the studies is eminently practical and not exegetical, and yet the meaning of each verse of the inspired writer is set forth in clear light, and its teaching is enforced by helpful illustration. The real design of the work, as has already been suggested, is practical and experimental. This is indicated by the title of the volume: "Short Devotional Studies on the Dying Letter of St. Paul". There are in all forty-eight of these brief studies; not one is lacking in interest and value. There is no unnecessary phrase, no dealing in platitudes and commonplaces; no mysticism, no extravagances: but every sentence gives light and help. It is a delight to read a work of such exact scholarship and deep spiritual insight, which sets forth great truths in language so simple, and in a compass so brief.

As one completes the reading of this last epistle: "The Dying Letter of St. Paul", the mind naturally turns toward the unrecorded scene of martyrdom to which the great apostle points by his words of farewell. It is therefore with interest that we read the poem with which Dr. Moule closes, "The Martyrdom of St. Paul". Nearly the whole of this poem is a striking commentary on the words of the last chapter of the Epistle, which speaks of Paul's imprisonment, and of his first appearance before the emperor, in which he stands alone; but the concluding

lines suggest the scene of Paul's "departure", "Without the gate, upon the Ostian road".

The study of this brief volume cannot fail to give to any reader a new conception of the meaning and power of Paul's Second Epistle to Timothy, and it must result in fulfilling the author's desire to promote in others, "Personal attention to the very words of Scripture, in a spirit of obedience and prayer".

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE EPISTLES OF ST. PETER. By the REV. J. H. JOWETT, M.A. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1906. Crown octavo, cloth; pp. 345. Price, \$1.25 net.

This volume is the farthest possible remove from a critical and exegetical commentary. It is rather a series of popular and informal essays on various themes suggested by successive phrases and verses of the Petrine Epistles. A critical commentary would have given us more clear and definite statements of doctrine, yet in its more minute investigation, and in its less connected discussions, it would have appealed to a smaller circle of readers. This is not a volume to satisfy specialists, but is well adapted to interest, to instruct and to edify the general Christian public.

In spite of his popular method, and animated literary style, the writer fails to give us a broad and comprehensive view of the Epistles as literary units, with an historical setting and atmosphere of life. After completing the volumes we feel that we have been listening to brief and serious sermons on isolated texts, rather than that we have been brought into vital contact with two living letters which are pulsating with the emotions of the great Apostle. However, the writer is always true to his aim, and is guided by his practical motive. Whatever the simple principles of spiritual life may be, which he selects for his discussion, he sets them forth with clearness, illustrates them with vividness, and applies them with vigor and fervor. The volume cannot fail to prove highly valuable for the spiritual and practical end in view. It forms one of a series which will ultimately cover the entire New Testament. This series will be known as *The Practical Commentary on the New Testament*, and will be under the able editorship of the Rev. Robertson Nicoll, D.D., LL.D. Other volumes of the series now ready are *Colossians and Thessalonians* and *Ephesians*, by Dr. Joseph Parker, and *Revelation*, by C. Anderson Scott.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

VAN DE DINGEN DIE HAAST GESCHIEDEN MOETEN. "De Openbaring des Heeren aan Johannes." Voor de gemeente uitgelegd door Dr. S. Greydanus. Geref. Pred. te Rozenburg Met Titelplaat. Doesburg. J. C. Van Schenck Brill. 1906. Aflevering 1 en 2.

Works on Eschatology, either of a dogmatic or of an exegetical nature, are very scarce. Our time is not inclined to listen to men who speak to us of the future. When Constantine reigns, the millenium is

far off. In times when the Church is an *ecclesia pressa*, people are willing to lend their ears to heralds of the future.

Dr. Greydanus, in making Eschatology his theme, confines himself to an exposition of the apocalypse. It is not his aim to add a learned exegetical treatise to those already existing; his desire is to interpret the revelation, given to John, for the people. There is a place for such a book. In a time when heavenly mindedness is branded as otherworldliness, it seems to be necessary that the Church of God should listen to what the Spirit has to say about the things which must shortly come to pass.

Judging from the two parts which are before me, I think that Dr. Greydanus is the right man for the task he has undertaken.

*Holland, Mich.*

NICHOLAS M. STEFFENS.

BIBLISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT IN VERBINDUNG mit der Redaktion der "Biblischen Studien herausgegeben von DR. JOH. GÖTTSBERGER, Professor an der Universität München und DR. JOS. SICKENBERGER, Professor an der Universität Würzburg. Vierter Jahrgang. Freiburg im Breisgau. 1906. Herdersche Verlagsbuchhandlung. B. Herder: St. Louis, Mo. Price for four numbers, \$3.50.

This periodical, published by Roman-Catholic scholars, in the numbers lying before us throughout maintains the high standard, both as to learning and conservatism, it set for itself in the first three years of its existence. Especially exegesis and introduction are well represented by a series of valuable articles. What we miss are contributions dealing not so much with the externals of Biblical science as with the great historical and doctrinal problems now under debate. The comparative neglect of this is especially noticeable in the instalments of the year under review. There is not a single article dealing with a biblioco-theological question. The bibliographical notices at the close of each number continue to prove a most interesting and instructive feature of this publication.

*Princeton.*

GEERHARDUS VOS.

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## HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

DIE ÄLTESTE REDAKTION DER AUGSBURGER KONFESSION MIT MELANCHTHON'S EINLE'TUNG, zum erstenmal herausgegeben und geschichtlich gewürdigt von D. THEODOR KOLDE, o. Prof. der Kirchengeschichte in Erlangen. Gütersloh: Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. 1906. 8vo., pp. iv. 115. 2 M., geb. 2 M. 80 Pf.

This brochure makes a considerable contribution to our knowledge of the origin of the Augsburg Confession of 1530. Having had his attention directed to a manuscript recently discovered by Dr. Karl Schornbaum in one of the Nuremberg archives, Prof. Kolde soon convinced himself that the document formed a most important link in the

history of the genesis of this Lutheran creed. With the minute knowledge of one of the foremost specialists in this department of study, the author convincingly shows that this manuscript thus suddenly brought to light is nothing other than the oldest of all known redactions of the *Confessio Augustana*.

Even the circumstances attending the origin of this document can be satisfactorily reproduced. From a letter written by the Nuremberg delegates of the diet of Augsburg and preserved in the *Corpus Reformatorum* it had been known that on the 31st of May, 1530, these men had come into possession of certain "articles" composed in Latin, though lacking the preface and conclusion, and that they intended to have these "articles" copied and forwarded to the Nuremberg Council. On the 3rd of June, though the conclusion and a number of the articles had not yet been perfected, a copy of the rest of the work was sent. The Council next day had the document submitted to learned ecclesiastics, and on the 15th (or 17th) of June the Council informed the delegates that it had ordered "an intelligible German translation" to be made from the Latin original. There can be little doubt, moreover, about Kolde's conjecture that the translator was the well-known Nuremberg councilor H. J. Baumgartner. This German translation—the erasures and emendations of the manuscript, carefully preserved in the notes of Dr. Kolde's edition, make it plain that we are dealing with a translation of a Latin original—is therefore undoubtedly a translation of the "Latin advice" sent home to Nuremberg by the delegates at Augsburg as early as the 3rd of June, together with Melanchthon's somewhat lengthy Preface. Of course the original Latin would be an even more welcome discovery, but meanwhile we must thank Professor Kolde for his careful edition of this German redaction and the illuminating remarks he makes about the historical situation at Augsburg in the summer of 1530.

In the first part of the pamphlet we have Baumgartner's text itself: the Preface (pp. 5-11), the 18 Articles of Faith (the 14th—no doubt it dealt with Ecclesiastical Orders—was inadvertently omitted by the translator, pp. 11-16), and the 7 Disputed Articles on abuses in the Church (pp. 16-31). The Preface clearly reveals Melanchthon's strong desire for mediation with Rome, and at the same time his utter lack of diplomacy in dealing with the situation. Prof. Kolde shows (pp. 47-75) that the individual articles of this German recension vary in many details from the received text of the Confession; that Luther's influence, however it may have been exerted—whether upon the basis of a Latin or a German recension or both—was exceedingly slight; and that, on the other hand, there is nothing un-Lutheran or decisively Melanchthonian in the finished Confession. It is interesting to note that this German recension conclusively proves that Arts. xx. and xxi. of the Creed as we have it were late additions, since they did not belong to this earliest redaction. Arts. iv. and v. were transposed; vii. and viii. were originally united as Art. vii. The greatest change is in Art. xvi. (xvii.), on Christ's Return to Judgment, the earlier sentences about the followers of Origen and the Anabaptists as teaching restorationism being omitted. The Thomistic conception of the resur-

rection body had, no doubt in an apologetic interest, been suggested in the earlier recension, only to be stricken out in the final text.

The second part of the pamphlet (pp. 76-106) discusses, with polemic reference to Brièger's interpretation of the facts, Melanchthon's negotiations with the imperial secretary Alphonso Valdés and the papal legate Lorenzo Campeggi. The argument is closely reasoned and the main points are conclusively established: (1) the negotiations of Melanchthon with the imperial secretaries were begun not by them but by him; (2) the reformer was acting in his private capacity as an ecclesiastical leader, and not in collusion with the electoral concilors of Saxony; and (3) he purposely delayed the completion of the *Confession* for a number of days from the 18th of June, because of his mistaken judgment that the apologetic manifesto might after all not be required at the diet; but he himself on the 21st of June resumed negotiations for the presentation of the evangelical cause at the diet upon the legal basis secured in the very summoning of that body. Prof. Kolde states fully and fairly the contentions of Brièger, and it is plain, so far as the initiation of some of the friendly relationships between Melanchthon and the Romanists is concerned, that Cochlaeus and Marius, for example, were quite as ready to come to terms as the Wittenberg professor was. But undoubtedly in all essential points the situation at Augsburg must have been very like unto that which is so skillfully reconstructed for us in this work.

In conclusion we have a number of *Beilagen*, five hitherto unpublished letters of the preacher Johannes Rurer, of Ansbach, to Andreas Althamer. The correspondence shows that as early as June 4th, 1530, Melanchthon, in a letter no longer extant, had appealed to Cardinal Albert of Mayence "quo operam det ne res ad arma ducatur". The author promises to publish from time to time other letters, found in the district archives at Bamberg, as an epistolary supplement to his monograph on Althamer (Erlangen, 1895), and these documents, it is not improbable, will have additional light to throw upon the main subject of the second part of this work.

*Philadelphia.*

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

HEINRICH BULLINGER DER NACHFOLGER ZWINGLIS. Von GUSTAV VON SCHULTHESS-RECHBERG. Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte—22. Jahrgang. Erstes Stück. Halle a. d. Salle: Kommissionsverlag von Max Niemeyer. Zürich: Kommissionsverlag von Zürcher u. Furrer. 1904. Pp. 104.

This booklet was Professor von Schulthess-Rechberg's contribution to the quartocentenary of Bullinger's birth, celebrated at Zurich, July 18, 1904. Since the publication of the *Diarium*, which was (all too briefly) noticed in THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW for April, 1906, Vol. IV, p. 275, the student of the Swiss Reformation is pleased to receive from the pen of a learned and facile writer this sane and condensed, yet comprehensive, account of Zwingli's successor. The references—85 in all—are placed at the close of the book, and are followed

by a list of 81 publications of the Society for the History of the Reformation. After a few introductory lines, containing a eulogistic quotation from Conrad Pellican, Bullinger's contemporary, the contents are arranged into five sections as follows: (1) The Beginnings (pp. 1-10). (2) Bullinger's religious viewpoint or way of thinking (pp. 11-31). (3) Bullinger's activity in Zürich (pp. 31-51). (4) Bullinger's relation to other evangelical churches (pp. 51-89). (5) Personal (pp. 90-98). From the relative space given to these subjects, it is evident that Professor von Schulthess-Rechberg's aim is to represent Bullinger as a thoroughly cosmopolitan character.

The first section begins with Bullinger's birth at Bremgarten, July 18, 1504, traces his career at Emmerich, Cologne, Kappel and Bremgarten, and the summons to the position of *Antistes* at Zürich (1531). Already at Emmerich, but particularly during the three years at Cologne, the young student betrays the marks of an untrammelled thinker; which in those days meant heresy. It was therefore the reflective method, or, more accurately, it was by way of historical investigation that Bullinger was led to evangelical truth (p. 5). It was the early historico-critical Bullinger that made the later evangelical Bullinger a possibility. The specific influences which wrought in this intellectual development are taken up in the second section of the book. These influences came from three distinct sources: the Church Fathers, Erasmus the Humanist, and the Reformers. Bullinger's debt to Erasmus is constantly emphasized; and although he held the supernatural as distinguished from the Erasmian ethical conception of Christianity (p. 17), in no way representing the latter's intellectualistic and aesthetic Christology (p. 18), and decidedly opposing him in the doctrines of the Supper and the freedom of the will, yet throughout his whole life Bullinger remained open to the influence of the great Humanist (p. 19). Among the reformers he is influenced by Luther, Melanchthon, Calvin and Zwingli. To Luther and Melanchthon he is indebted for the Pauline gospel of justification by faith alone (p. 19), but finds difficulty (was it Erasmus again?) in holding exclusively to the forensic idea (p. 21). In this connection he cannot reconcile free grace and free will, Divine providence and human responsibility, and by apparently sacrificing the latter to the former, he becomes an ultra-determinist. *Exit* Melanchthon; *enter* Calvin. And yet: "He remains separated from Calvin and his school by his refusal to include the fall of Adam in the Divine decree" (p. 22). The will is free in the sense that the Christian is empowered through Divine grace to do good, and the decree of reprobation is only significant as a mental boundary (*eines Grenzgedankens*, p. 23). This relieves Bullinger of being supralapsarian. Interesting is it to notice (p. 23) that Zwingli did not influence Bullinger in his theological incipiency, but only strengthened him later in his spiritual acquisition. The author cites Bullinger's doctrine of the Eucharist which, though Zwinglian, was not derived from Zwingli but from the ancient and mediaeval theology. On the other hand, he is indebted to Zwingli for his ecclesiastical and social activity and was a real follower of the great reformer. At the close of this section (pp.

28-31) we learn that Bullinger was not so original as traditional. The peculiarity of his theology is its ecclesiastical character. It is, however, none the less rational. "Er konnte nicht gläubig sein, ohne zu wissen, dass er orthodox sei" (p. 28). His thought is never abstract, but historical and therefore practical, which is the reigning feature of the *Decades* and the *Confessio Helvetia Pasterior*. He was, moreover, no systematic theologian in the sense of being able to reduce the totality of Christian thought to a solid system (p. 31).

Bullinger's installation over the Grossmünster at Zurich, December 9, 1531, naturally placed him before the public. Basel and Berne extend calls. His policy in Zurich is to follow his predecessor and promote tolerance. Unlike Zwingli, he is no statesman; he knew and was governed by no "weltpolitisches Programm". "What guided him, was the firm belief that obedience to Divine truth is the deciding factor in human destiny, the highest source of all material and spiritual welfare of a people, the faith of the prophets of Israel and of the Puritans" (p. 40). His preaching is expository, seldom polemic. His pastoral solicitude, his active participation in the school-life at Zurich, his relation to the youth of that city, his zeal for and success in effecting social harmony—are all clearly brought out. This brief and vivid picture of Bullinger at Zurich leaves the impression that into no better hands could the distracted city of Zurich and the fate of the Swiss Reformation have been left at the time of Zwingli's tragic death.

The fourth division, on Bullinger's relations with the other evangelical churches, is the most interesting and valuable. Here the doctrine and especially the character of the Zurich pastor are presented in the company of his illustrious contemporaries: Calvin, Farel, Luther, Zwingli, Melanchthon, Bucer, *et al.* The general outline is geographical, Switzerland being first considered. The evangelicals in Locarno, the Grisons, St. Gall, and Schaffhausen find ready sympathy in Zurich. Most noteworthy, however, is the foreign intercourse. Among the south German centers are Constance (Ambrosius Blarer), Ulm, Lindau, Memmingen, Augsburg, Mühlhausen and Hesse (Philip the Landgrave). Then follow the Lower Rhine and the Palatinate (the Elector Frederick III., Ursinus and Olevianus, and the occasion of the *Helvetica Posterior*). In Italy Bullinger's popularity grows: he has most intimate relations with Peter Martyr, but is annoyed by Occhino's skeptical tendency. He influences the church in Poland through áLasco. The Polish antitrinitarian heresy is a source of anxiety to him. It is in the portrayal of Bullinger's intercourse with England that our interest is especially centered. Bullinger is just the man for the English exiles. "One may speak of a sort of elective affinity between Bullinger's genius and the needs of the evangelical movement in England" (p. 74). His influence here at times goes beyond that of Calvin, and so popular are his writings that the book-sellers become wealthy through them (p. 74). Not even the antievangelical mania of Mary is able wholly to obliterate his influence. The archbishop of Canterbury (1586) requires each theological candidate to possess a Bible and a copy of the *Decades*, to read and excerpt daily a chapter from the former

and weekly a sermon from the latter (p. 76). "In how many an English village-pulpit, then, was the Zurich Grossmünster divine preached during the last years of the sixteenth century?" (pp. 76-77). In France Bullinger is overshadowed by Calvin, Farel and Beza, but follows the religious upheavals there. Thus did the Zurich theologian anxiously and prayerfully "encompass the whole of evangelical Christianity; a pastor of the common flock of Christ, a universal bishop of the heart, as Origen and Augustine had been in the ancient church" (p. 78).

This is not to deprecate the importance of other reformers who also possessed a universal character. Bullinger simply responded to a task laid upon him by his time. This suggests a final comparison with some of his contemporaries: Calvin, Bucer, Luther, Melanchthon. The mention of Luther recalls the Eucharistic controversy. Professor von Schulthess-Rechberg thinks that the fanatical Anabaptists drove Luther to emphasize the divinity of the external Word and the Sacrament (p. 81). The Zurich Chirstians, not being fanaites (*keine Schwarmgeister*), took the extreme opposite side. Bullinger, substantially Zwinglian or Calvinistic, likes to explain it thus: the believer always and everywhere (*immer und überall*) eats the body and drinks the blood of Christ, for that is nothing other than to believe (p. 80). He thoroughly appreciates the rugged intensity of Luther, but heartily resents his unreasonable slander and intolerant method. He (Bullinger) is the apostle of peace and labors for unity. "No blame attaches to him for the separation within the Reformation" (p. 85). He argues for tolerance in unessentials if in the main thing there be unity. But this (let us note) is a question of relative values, with obviously a rationally interpreted Bible as the standard. Bullinger is represented as holding, that the Lutheran and Zwinglian churches are essentially one; that "the sacramental controversy concerns a subsidiary point" (*einen Nebenpunkt*); and that he (Bullinger) never doubts that the Lutheran doctrine of a bodily presence is false and the Swiss symbolical view is true (pp. 85-86). Compared with Melanchthon, their positions were both similar and different. Both lives were complex, but the latter lacked the concentration of the former, and allowed compromises in which essentials were surrendered without corresponding returns (p. 87). With Bucer's unionistic motive Bullinger was in full sympathy, but did not like his method. The internal cleavage of the Bern, the weakening of the Basel church, and the decline of the Swiss Reformation in South Germany are laid at Bucer's door (p. 89). This section concludes with Bullinger's service in the union of the churches. Mutual recognition of the real unity and mutual tolerance of the real differences, and this end attained rather through the press than by colloquies, is the method proposed. It is a "republican" way (p. 89).

The closing section brings the reader to the very heart of Bullinger. Here he is viewed in his sermons and commentaries, in his historical and poetical labors, in his recently (1904) published *Diary*, and in the circle of his family and friends. The writer has not concealed (how could he?) his personal admiration for the subject of his sketch. He had said (p. 72): "Calvin was the teacher, Bullinger the father of the

Reformed Churches". The latter half of this statement forms the text of this account. Bullinger was by nature a pastor, and he is so presented in these pages. "There was no practical proof of his untiringly active nature which he would not have adapted to the religious and moral aims of his calling" (p. 90). His character leaves the impression of resoluteness, steadfastness, firmness. The blows of Luther and the sarcasm of Calvin were beneath him (p. 96). "Bullinger's greatness lies in the moral realm. He stands in his day as a power of earnestness, of truth, of love, and as an example of the most loyal devotion to an ideal task. He is one of the noblest characters of his century. The Swiss people honor him as one of their best men" (p. 97).

As we lay aside this study two impressions abide: the cosmopolitan character of the man and his almost anachronous zeal for union and tolerance. Surely, in the latter possession, Bullinger was somewhat in advance of his age. We could have wished for a more thorough treatment of Bullinger's position on the Supper question as related to Calvin and Zwingli than is given on page 80; or of his Federalism and Predestinarianism than we glean from pages 15 and 23. But we remind ourselves that this is, perhaps, asking too much in view of the evidently comprehensive aim of the booklet. It is not so much a theologian that Professor von Schulthess-Rechberg has given us, as a man of affairs; a man who does not even claim to be abreast with the theological literature of his day (p. 93), but whose sympathetic brotherliness is ever open to the needs of his fellow-men (pp. 96-97). To the student of Bullinger who does not care to wade through the *Lives* by Pestalozzi and Christoffel, this admirable summary will come as a most welcome substitute.

Langhorne, Pa.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

REMINISCENCES OF BISHOPS AND ARCHBISHOPS. By HENRY CODMAN POTTER, Bishop of New York. Illustrated. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1906. 8vo.; pp. vii. 225.

In a thoroughly informal manner, making no attempt to employ the critical spirit or the graver materials of serious biography, but contenting himself with the modest aim of furnishing "some of those sidelights by means of which individuality in human portraiture may be detected", Dr. Potter here gives us a series of charming sketches, in the form of reminiscences,—beautifully illuminated miniatures we may call them—of a number of distinguished American bishops and English primates. The list includes Bishops Smith of Kentucky, Whittingham of Maryland, Williams of Connecticut, Eastburn of Massachusetts, Clark of Rhode Island, Coxe of Western New York, Wilmer of Louisiana, Clarkson of Nebraska, Brooks of Massachusetts, Dudley of Kentucky, and Archbishops Tait, Benson, and Temple, of England; a group of ecclesiastics presenting a marked variety of interests, aims, and achievements, as well as of personal peculiarities. With a characteristic breadth of sympathy and an abundance of humorous incident and com-

ment, the author introduces us, in the racy manner of a glib cicerone in a picture gallery, to the distinctive features in the personalities and the accomplishments of these altogether worthy and thoroughly interesting prelates. The sketches are too broadly and freely drawn to permit their having much historical value, although in some cases, notably that of Bishop Brooks, the author expresses judgments which, because of the specially intimate relation that existed between these two men, will be scanned with more eager interest than many of the less studied utterances may merit. Many a reader will doubtless find the chief attraction of the book in the modestly restrained yet everywhere present autobiographical element. The really good stories so freely interspersed in these pages would suffice, apart from the more serious aims of the author, to secure a generous recognition of his attempt to say a fitting word of praise for a number of very dear friends.

Philadelphia.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

YOUNG MEN WHO OVERCAME. By ROBERT E. SPEER. Fleming H. Revell Company. 12mo., pp. 229. \$1.00 net.

This inspiring book is made up of brief "sketches of the lives of fifteen real men, men who loved the highest and who made duty the first thing in their lives". Most of them were college-bred men, five being graduates of Princeton, namely, Walter Lowrie, Theodorick B. Pryor, William Earl Dodge, Cortlandt Van Rensselaer Hodge, and Isaac Parker Cooler. No one can read the story of these fifteen virile and beautiful Christian characters without having a deeper sense of the sanctifying power of divine grace and a more ardent desire to attain a higher level in daily living. Like other works by Mr. Speer, this breathes the spirit of an intelligent, manly, sympathetic, optimistic, and inspiring Christian faith. It is a book which anybody may read with profit, but it is emphatically a good book for a young man to read and re-read.

Philadelphia.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Verzeichnis der von Adolf Hilgenfeld verfassten Schriften zusammengestellt von den Mitgliedern der neutestamentlichen Abtheilung des theologischen Seminars der Universität Jena v. S. S. 1902 durchgesehen, ergänzt und herausgegeben von Dr. Heinrich Hilgenfeld a. o. Prof. a. d. Universität. Leipzig Verlag von O. R. Reisland 1906.

This is a unique testimonial offered on a unique occasion to a man of eminent position and ability. On the 2d of June, 1903, Adolf Hilgenfeld, the well-known editor of the *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie* celebrated his eightieth birthday. The members of the Theological Seminar prepared a list of all his publications from the year 1846 up to date and offered it to the venerable theologian as a birthday remembrance. This list was republished in a supplemented form and offered by the son, Dr. Heinrich Hilgenfeld, likewise Professor in the same University of Jena, to his father on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the latter's promotion to the doctorate of philosophy at

the University of Halle, May 25, 1846. It is truly a remarkable list. Of all these sixty years there is not one in which articles and books, sometimes of lasting value and epoch-making importance, did not issue from his pen. The titles of them cover no less than 49 closely-printed pages. Dr. Hilgenfeld's first activity dates from the time when the old Tübingen School was at the acme of its prestige and influence. To some of its positions (e. g., the priority of Matthew to Mark) he remained faithful to the end. Even when eighty years old and more he used with unabated vigor to follow and criticize from his own standpoint all recent developments in New Testament science. His productivity until the very last was unparalleled, hardly an instalment of his *Zeitschrift* appearing without an extended article from his hand. The interest attaching to the present pamphlet is increased by the recent death of the man whom it honors. He survived his eightieth birthday more than three years and was so active till the very last that the list offered him on the sixtieth anniversary of his doctorate will undoubtedly require once more to be supplemented. The pamphlet contains a good engraving of Hilgenfeld. It is valuable as a piece of bibliography to every writer in the field of New Testament science.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

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## SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

THE AUTHORITY OF CHRIST. By DAVID W. FORREST, D.D., Edinburgh. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1906. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. Price \$2.00 net. 8vo.; pp. xvi, 437.

There is a story told of an impetuous and somewhat headstrong cavalry leader in our great Civil War which is brought back to our memory by Dr. Forrest's book. He had just ordered a daring charge, when he was interrupted by an aide-de-camp, riding furiously and bringing imperative orders from the general in command, to draw back. "Of course I obey my superior officer", he said, with no attempt to conceal his chagrin. "But", he at once added, his face clearing up, "Mr. Aide-de-camp, this is a very remarkable order, which I find it difficult to understand. And how do I know it has not suffered some 'sea-change' in its transmission through you? And, indeed, how do I know 'the old man' is quite himself this morning?" "Men", he said, turning to his forces, "charge!" The authority of Christ, says Dr. Forrest, is of course final. It has in all ages been acknowledged by the Christian Church to be final (p. 1, cf. pp. 101, 392). But it certainly is not always easy to ascertain precisely the bearing of either His commands or His example (pp. 160, 393); and in point of fact men have repeatedly and in great masses and through long periods gone astray in their appeal to His authority. Nor is it easy to be sure that some of the phrases transmitted to us "have not come to us coloured by later reflection" (p. 399): His disciples certainly misunderstood Him in some of His utterances and modified them to suit their own

convictions (pp. 312, 317, 319), and though "the question of subsequent modification or interpretation touches" different parts of His teaching with more or less force, it is legitimate on all occasions to raise it (p. 292). And in any event Jesus' own outlook was bounded by the horizon of a man of His own time, race and social and intellectual opportunities. The mysteries that press on us pressed similarly on Him. The mystery of suffering for example—"we have no reason to suppose" that the data required for its solution "lay within Christ's purview more than within ours" (p. 141). "The detailed course of the kingdom in the world" was "inscrutable" to Him as to us; because "the influences that determined it were infinitely complex", and above all the factor of the free human will comes in to modify all forecasts (p. 300, 312). It is not difficult for us to convict Him even of positive errors. No doubt He shared the current opinion which attributed the 110th Psalm to David, and the later chapters of Isaiah to Isaiah (p. 69). Nor did He err only in matters of Biblical criticism. "His teaching in many of its parts is coloured by temporary-Jewish influences" (p. 96): even the Parables, at least those "that portray the final judgment, "are affected" by suggestions from Jewish traditional belief" (p. 292). Thus we are carried through the whole sorites and—despite the occasional accidental dropping of such a phrase as "Christ teaches with authority" (p. 331)—the only conclusion that can be reached is that no such "authority" can justly be assigned to the teaching of Christ as has "in all ages been acknowledged by the Christian Church" (p. 1). As we read we are inevitably reminded of Nelson at St. Vincent, vociferously protesting his subjection to his admiral's authority, but taking great care to clap his glass to his blind eye, and, crying out 'I see no signal', to go his own way.

And here we must emphasize the phrase "his own way". For we must not suppose that Dr. Forrest puts aside the authority of Jesus in favor of that of the Scriptures. As he says himself, generalizing on an individual instance: "He who believes that Christ's thought had its limitations will not think that Peter's knowledge on such a matter was infallible" (p. 330, cf. p. 413). "Is it at all likely", he demands, "that the Apostle was commissioned to reveal an eschatological truth which was concealed from the Lord Himself, or which He deliberately refrained from proclaiming?" We do not pause here to point out that according to John's representation (Jn. xvi. 12-13) precisely this might seem very likely; or to point out that according to Dr. Forrest's own principles there seems no good reason why the later writer, after mature reflection and the teaching of experience, might not have known better than Jesus. What we are concerned to point out here is that so far from falling back from Christ's authority upon that of the Holy Ghost speaking through the apostles, it is one of Dr. Forrest's aims in setting aside the authority of Christ to escape also from the authority of Scripture. It is, in fact, just because Christ's authority authenticates the Scripture that Christ's authority is onerous to him. He sweeps the field clean and leaves himself logically without any "external authority" at all. And he succeeds very fairly in living practically up

to this logical result (pp. 372, 382, 421, cf. 2, 64, 68). There is, of course, an appeal here and there to Scriptural teaching as if there were some good reason why we should not outrun the "scriptural warrant" for this or that (p. 50). But this occasional slip is explicable usually from the influence of long habit and from a sense of the force of the appeal upon those addressed. There is exhibited no great tendency to defer to the detailed teaching of John or Paul or Peter: but rather a suggestion here and there of an underlying hesitancy in appealing to it. At one point, no doubt (p. 330), there seems to be a hint let fall that we may appeal from any one apostle to "the common primitive faith" as a better basis of confidence. What is not shared by all or a plurality of the Apostles we are told, "according to every sound canon of Biblical criticism", "can only rank as a *theologoumenon*" of the individual; and as not "forming part of the common primitive faith" fails, by implication, of normative authority (p. 338). The New Testament, however, is treated on the whole as but a product of the Church (p. 383) which can possess no higher authority than belongs to the Church—even though it comes from "the creative period of the Christian faith" (p. 421). We say truly, then, that Dr. Forrest strips himself of all "external authority", and stands forth as, in some sense, autonomous. Has he not the Spirit as truly as any of the Apostles? And does not the promise of guidance into all the truth belong to him as really as to them? And does there not lie behind him a much longer and a much wider experience than lay behind them—through which the Church has learned many things?

We have thought it best to begin thus by stating briefly the central and determining line of thought of Dr. Forrest's volume, that we may have before us at once the principles which have controlled his thought, and the issue to which he would conduct us. We may properly revert now, however, to the manner in which these principles and conclusions find utterance. Dr. Forrest takes for his subject "The Authority of Christ": and his end is to determine the sphere in which that authority,—shall we say is available or shall we say is extant?—and its "character"—or shall we say its mode of operation?—within that sphere. In one word, Dr. Forrest's purpose is to investigate the limits of Christ's authority both extensively and intensively. In what sphere is He authoritative? he asks; and then, How authoritative is He in that sphere? He cannot be said to proceed in his discussion in a right line: nor does the book give the impression of a unity. One gets the suggestion as he reads that it may have been composed piece-meal, at perhaps disconnected periods, and not in all its parts with the same precise end prominently in view and with the same definitions and presuppositions vividly in mind. Nevertheless the whole is bound together in some sort of unity by the fact that the whole treats in one way or another of the authority of Christ: and if at one time there seems an implicit recognition underlying the discussion of the plenary authority of our Lord's declarations and only a zeal to provide against their misapplication, while at another there seems a tendency to deny at least absolute authority to His declarations themselves, the reader still is able with

a little care, to find his way amid the resulting ambiguities. If we may be allowed a conjecture as to the composition of the book, we may perhaps suppose that it originated in a strong feeling on Dr. Forrest's part that "the authority of Christ" has been and is frequently much too lightly asserted; and has accordingly been invoked for a multitude of points of view and conceptions, usages and practices for which no colorable warrant can be found in the recorded teaching and example of Jesus. Here is, for example, a portentous sacredotal system like that of the Church of Rome. Or here is an impracticable scheme of conduct like that propounded by Tolstoy. Or here is a thoroughly indefensible withdrawal from public life and avoidance of the common duties in which our complicated modern social organization enmeshes us. Or here is an innumerable body of particular crochets more or less offensive to sane thought. And for all of them alike "the authority of Christ" is confidently appealed to. The case obviously calls for a serious examination of the basis on which "the authority of Christ" is claimed for these things, and Dr. Forrest has felt this obligation and has given us a series of excellent chapters in which the interpretation of Christ's precepts and the general bearing of His teaching is searchingly examined and illustrated. It is a dreary mass of crass and often evident misinterpretations and misapplications of Christ's words which he has to expose.

If Dr. Forrest had stopped at this point, although there would certainly remain points of detail which would invite criticism, he would have made us all his debtors. But unfortunately there are a number of instances in which the authority of Christ is invoked for matters not to Dr. Forrest's mind, with regard to which it cannot be denied that the recorded words or example of Jesus warrant the appeal. And Dr. Forrest has unhappily permitted himself to be misled on their account into an attempt to discredit the authority of Christ. He pleads that we must not raise the dilemma in men's minds "as to whether the acceptance of His authority is compatible with loyalty to truth" in any region of their investigation (p. 2): and he does not seem to perceive, or at least does not stay at this point sufficiently to consider, that if this principle is given universal validity it amounts to saving Christ's authority in name while discarding it in fact throughout the whole range of knowledge. Under its pressure, he seeks to escape the dilemma, first, by throwing doubt upon the exact transmission of our Lord's words and example; and next by invoking a theory of the Incarnation by which the authority of His teaching and example, even when fully before us, is reduced to the vanishing point. The book thus becomes a sustained attempt to throw off the authority of Christ altogether; and by this driftage of the argument its own unity is, as we have said, seriously marred. For what is the use of arguing at great length that the teaching and example of Christ have been misapplied by this or that class of reasoners or body of Christians, if we are not quite certain what the teaching and example of Christ are, and they have no authority at any rate? The assertion in the opening chapters of the book of a theory of the Incarnation which robs the

teaching and example of Christ of all authority, antiquates beforehand the argument of the later chapters that the teaching and example of Christ have often been grossly misinterpreted by those who have appealed to them. The argument of these later chapters proceeds on a major premise which has already been discredited, and can command our attention only if the assertion of the former chapters is rejected by us. The gravamen of the case the book seeks to make out certainly lies therefore in its opening chapters, in which Dr. Forrest attempts to expound the Incarnation as in its very nature voiding the authority of Christ; and that attempt must therefore claim our previous attention. We think this unfortunate, for the excellence of the volume lies in its later chapters, in which the proper use of Christ's authority is studied. But we have no choice. Both the logic of the case and Dr. Forrest's own arrangement of his matter demand of us to seek the *crux* of the volume in its opening chapters and its theory of the Incarnation.

This theory of the Incarnation is nothing other than that kenotic theory which, after enjoying a remarkable vogue in the middle of the last century, has in more recent years fallen very much out of credit, as continued discussion has thrown more and more into light its inherent weaknesses, or rather impossibilities—metaphysical, exegetical, theological and religious. Respectable in the hands of its first propounders as an attempt to do justice to Christological data neglected by the Lutheran construction in which they had been bred, it has lost the respect of men when it has become only a fig-leaf to hide the nakedness of those who, fallen from their first estate of trust in the God-man, yet shrink from standing forth in a bare naturalistic conception of the person of Jesus. It is thus, unfortunately, that it appears in Dr. Forrest's pages, as in those of most of its remaining advocates. Dr. Forrest declines to enter into the deep questions which such a theory necessarily brings with it. "It is quite foolish", he says, "to seek to disparage the idea of the Son's self-limitation by asking what became of His cosmical function during the incarnate period" (p. 95). And then he enumerates a number of the suggestions which have been made to meet this and similar difficulties raised by the kenotic assumption, with the general implication that any of them will do well enough, —although no one of them has yet been invented which does not fatally infringe upon either the Christian doctrine of the Trinity or our fundamental conception of God. With these things, however, Dr. Forrest does not concern himself. His concern is rather with the right of men to hold to be false, what the Son of Man recognized as true. Says he: "The frank recognition that such was the character of the Son's incarnate state is a prime necessity for Christian faith at the present time. For this age is preëminently one of historical research, bent upon discovering as far as possible the actual facts of the past. Now it has been demonstrated beyond dispute that there are sayings of our Lord which, taken literally, seem to conflict with established results of biblical investigation, and that His teaching in many of its parts is coloured by temporary Jewish influences. When Professor Pfleiderer, on grounds such as these, ridicules the notion that Christ

is a 'final definitive authority', the only right reply is: We do not claim that Christ's word is final in all spheres. . . . We can only gain for Christ His true place and essential significance by plainly recognizing, not only that the limitations are there, but that they are the inesparable accompaniments of a historical Incarnation" (pp. 96-7). Which, being interpreted in the brutal language of the streets, means just that we cannot in the face of modern research sustain the claim of Christ to "authority". Dr. Forrest would, indeed, distinguish and say, 'except in the sphere of faith and conduct' (p. 3)—or, as he puts it here: "we do claim that He has embodied in His person and in the principles He has expounded the final revelation of religious truth and practice, of 'what man is to believe concerning God, and what duties God requires of man'" (p. 97). The care with which this language is chosen should not, however, pass unobserved. Even in "the sphere of faith and conduct" Dr. Forrest is not prepared to claim absolute and indefectible authority for every utterance of Jesus. "His teaching in many of its parts is coloured by temporary Jewish influences", and we shall need to take these into account in applying it to our own times: and this "revelation" of religious truth and practice does not find its embodiment so much in spoken words enunciating final doctrine and promulgating final precepts, as in lives quickened by the Spirit He has sent and efflorescing under His influence into true thinking and high acting. There is, thus, at least a tendency in Dr. Forrest's discussion to reduce the authority of Christ to His immanent action on the conscience of the race, or of His church. "That He constantly confronts us with an obligation which presses down upon us from the Unseen" constitutes "what we call the authority of Christ" (p. 7). This seems to mean that Christ is the incarnate conscience of the race; and His authority consists in the coincidence of His demands on us with the demands of our religious and moral nature. "He quickens the impulses and resolves" of our moral and religious nature, and we respond to it in a higher outlook and upward aspiration,—

"Then a sense of law and beauty,  
A face turned from the clod—  
Some call it Evolution  
And others call it God."

Dr. Forrest calls it Christ: and sees here Christ's authority manifested. It is thus that Dr. Forrest adjusts his profound reverence for Jesus as the "final authority" of Christians and his inability to find in his recorded teaching a final authority for his thinking and acting. It is always painful to disturb such adjustments: and the more painful as it becomes evident that the adjustment is in the individual an expedient to retain as much as is possible to him of the higher truth. But what choice have we? In this sphere too the maxim will be found to have in all its absoluteness its inevitable application: "Ye cannot serve two masters".

Dr. Forrest's impulse to the adoption of the kenotic theory of the incarnation seems then to be rooted in mental perplexity in view of the conflict between some of Jesus' utterances or points of view and

some suggestions of recent research. This perplexity is voiced in such phrases as this: "If Christ is declared by us to guarantee the accuracy of what is scientifically disproved, or at least improbable in the last degree, we are much more likely to imperil His claim than to establish the disputed point" (p. 69). And certainly we may be permitted to suspect that the dogmatism with which the elements of the kenotic theory are asserted and the fundamental postulates of the Chalcedonian Christology are discarded, is a reflection of the terror with which the dilemma Dr. Forrest finds himself in inspires him,—the terror lest all trust in Christ be destroyed in wide circles by the conflict between His utterances and recent theory. But Dr. Forrest seeks support for his theory from Scripture. Why he should be exigent in this matter is not very apparent, in view of the weak hold which the authority of Scripture has upon him, particularly in its historical element, the only element on which he can depend for the dramatization of our Lord's life on earth, from which he derives his chief support in advocating the kenotic theory of His incarnation. But, permitting that to pass, Dr. Forrest has persuaded himself that the Scriptures give us both in their didactic teaching and in the portrait they draw of Jesus in the Gospels, a kenotized Christ; and he supports himself on this their supposed testimony. We cannot say, however, we have found anything very new or particularly strong in the exegetical argument with which he has favored us.

✓ To the great passage, Phil. ii. 6 sq., he consecrates two long passages (pp. 98 sq.-338 sq.)—one of them a formal discussion in the kenotic interests: and, of course, he says many things in both of them which command our attention and exhibit his own careful study of the passage. But in neither discussion can he be said to have advanced the matter in hand. The more formal discussion (pp. 98 sq.) even acquires a somewhat unpleasant flavor from the sustained effort made in it to rid it of its two most obvious theological implications—that of the unbroken persistence of the Son of God "in the form of God" after His incarnation, and that of the consequent coëxistence in the Incarnate Son of "two natures". It is quite certain that in the phrase *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ* *ὑπάρχων*, the participle embodies the conception of continuance and, therefore, declares not merely that Jesus was before His incarnation "in the form of God" but also that He retained that "form of God" after His incarnation. The sixth verse indeed, as its tense-forms unmistakably indicate, lays the basis in one broad negative statement for the entire positive statement given in verse seven, and there analyzed into two parts,—not less, then, for the "He humbled Himself" than for the "He emptied Himself". The unbroken continuance of our Lord "in the form of God" is therefore of the very essence of the assertion; and it is it which governs the choice of the language throughout the entire passage. It is this that accounts not only for the *λάβων* and the *γενόμενος* (in both instances), but also for the *ἐν ὅμοιωσατι* and the *σχήματι*, which have seemed to many "to point to an apparent rather than to a real Incarnation" only because the ruling idea of the passage, that Christ Jesus always continued to be—because He was by nature

and could not but be—"in the form of God", has been lost sight of. It was because He continued in His incarnation to be "in the form of God", that He is said, not to have come to be in "the form of a servant" but to have *taken* "the form of a servant": there was here no exchange of one "form" for another, but an addition of one "form" to another; as the ecclesiastical language has accurately phrased it, there was an "assumption". Accordingly He is said, not to have "become man", but to have "become in the likeness of men". The docetic inference had been excluded by the "He *took* the *form* of a servant": there is no illusion here, but a real assumption of the "form", that is, of the characterizing quality, of all that belongs to, the servant's nature. The transmutation notion is now excluded by the assertion that He did not, in assuming humanity, "become man" exactly, but only "became in the likeness of men": He remained much more than He seemed; though His humanity was a real humanity, really "assumed", and He lived in the sight of man within the limits of this humanity so as to appear only man, this was not all,—He remained "in the form of God" all the time as well, and therefore was only "in the likeness of men".

Whatever He did therefore as man,—within the limits of the humanity He had assumed—He did voluntarily, by an ever fresh act of voluntary self-abnegation. His dying, for instance,—that was not an inevitable sequence of His incarnation, but an additional act of voluntary self-devotion. He who is and remains "in the form of God" may properly at any and all times claim and exercise His right of "being on an equality with God" the deathless one, and not die: and this possibility and right is wholly unaffected by the fact that He has assumed into union with Himself, "the form of a servant", and thus has made it possible for Him to act here too "in the likeness of men". Accordingly we are told, in order that the example of our Lord in His self-abnegation may be exhibited in its full extent, that "being found in fashion as a man", "He humbled Himself"—it is a voluntary act of His own, not an inevitable consequence of His changed nature, no longer in His power to do or to prevent; and that He did this "by becoming"—it is a change to the unnecessary, not a submission to the inevitable, that is signalized by the term—"by becoming subject even unto death". Death, then at least—and all that led up to and accompanied and issued from death in His subjection to human conditions—was not the unavoidable and irresistible consequence of His incarnation, coming of itself as the necessary lot of the nature He had, not assumed, but become; but an additional act of humiliation voluntarily entered into in the prosecution of His mission by Him who, just because He remained "in the form of God", had no necessary part in death, but might well have held to His inherent right to be in this matter also, on "an equality with God". Not only is at least this much so imbedded in the passage that it cannot by any artifice of exegesis be driven out of it, but it constitutes the main and emphasized teaching of the passage, on which hangs its whole value to Paul in his exhortation to his readers

to look not to their own things but each also to the things of others, and thus to have the mind in them which was in Christ Jesus.

✓ The meaning of the passage to us, then, is precisely that, according to Paul, the Son of God did not lay aside His divine "existence form" in "becoming man", but, retaining in full possession all that characterizes God as God and makes Him that specific Being we call God (for that is the significance of "being in the form of God"), took to Himself also all that characterizes a servant as a servant and makes Him that specific being we call a servant; and having so done, willed to live out a servant's life in the world, subjecting Himself from moment to moment, by uncomelled and free acts of His unweakened will, to the conditions of the life which, for His own high ends, He willed to live, and manifesting Himself thus to man as "in the likeness of men", "in fashion as a man", though He was all the time Lord of all. This is, of course, the precise antipodes, the express and detailed contradiction, of the entire kenotic construction. It is the assertion of the dual nature of our Lord: for according to it the humanity of our Lord was something added to (*λαβών*) His divine nature, not something into which His divine nature was transmuted. And this includes of course the assertion that within the person of Christ there are two "minds"; though both matters are denied by Dr. Forrest with intense dogmatism. "No matter how real may be the affinity of divine and human nature, these two diverse methods or forms of operation can by no possibility coexist within the same conscious personality" (p. 89, cf. pp. 51, 91); "there was but one mind, that of the Word made flesh" (p. 58, cf. pp. 53, 90). It is also the assertion of the retention, in the Incarnate state, in possession and use, of the whole body of Divine attributes, which in their sum make up "the form of God"; although this too is not only denied but scoffed at by Dr. Forrest. He complains of those who occupy the same position here with Paul, that they "calmly transfer" "what is true of the Son in His timeless existence to Him in the period of His humiliation as if the continuity of His absolute attributes were self-evident" (p. 65, cf. pp. 51, 53, 59). It is further the assertion that the controlling factor in our Lord's whole earthly manifestation, as well as in His entire life-history, is His Divine nature, since it was He who was in the form of God who not only "emptied Himself" by taking the form of a servant, thus becoming in the likeness of men; but also, being found in fashion like a man, humbled Himself by becoming subject even unto death and that the death of the cross; although this too Dr. Forrest sharply denies (pp. 91-92).

But above all for our present purpose—for this is the hinge on which the whole kenotic controversy turns—it is the assertion that our Lord's life of humiliation on earth was a continuous act of voluntary self-abnegation, in which He by the strong control of His absolute will to live within the bounds of a human life, moment by moment denied Himself the exercise of His divine attributes and prerogatives in all that concerned His mission, because He had come to do a work and for the doing of it it behooved Him thus to do; and not the unavoidable natural development of a purely human life incapable as such of escaping the

changes and chances which are necessarily incident to humanity. By this assertion Paul sets aside at one stroke the whole kenotic contention, to which it is essential to hold that in our Lord's life of humiliation "there was not merely" (as Bishop O'Brien puts it in words adopted and utilized by Dr. Forrest, p. 93), "a voluntary suspension of the exercise" "of all His infinite attributes and powers", "but a voluntary renunciation of the capacity of exercising them, for a time". And not only Paul, we may add, but the whole Gospel narrative as well, to which Dr. Forrest would make his appeal, as if it dramatized Christ's life on earth as not only a purely human one but a helplessly human one. A very simple test will exhibit this. Let any simple reader of the Gospels be asked whether their narrative leaves upon his mind the impression that Jesus' life and acts were determined for Him by the necessary limits of a well-meaning but weak humanity; or were not rather the voluntarily chosen course of a life directed to an end for the securing of which He daily denied himself the exercise of powers beyond human forces? No simple reader of the Gospel will be easily persuaded that Jesus' life was what it was because He had for the time lost the capacity to act in superhuman powers: that it was, for example, lack of power rather than lack of will which withheld Jesus either from making the stones bread at the demand of the tempter (else where was the temptation?), or from coming down from the cross when challenged thereto by the scoffing multitude. But when we have assured ourselves that the limitations within which Jesus' life were cast were voluntary from day to day and act to act,—and not the necessary sequence of a change which had once for all befallen Him at His incarnation we have cut up the kenotic theory by the roots.

The advocate of the kenotic theory who, under the condemnation of the epistles, seeks comfort from the Gospels, certainly has a claim upon our pity. No one of the evangelists, assuredly, shares his conception. To one and all alike Jesus is God manifest in the flesh, and to each and all alike a divine manifestation is both a *manifestation* and a *manifestation of what is divine*. "Even the oldest Gospel", says that Bousset whom Dr. Forrest repeatedly quotes as if he were an "authority" in such matters,—on this occasion indeed speaking truly,—"even the oldest Gospel is written from the standpoint of faith; already for Mark Jesus is not only the Messiah of the Jewish people, but the miraculous eternal Son of God whose glory shone in the world. And it has been rightly emphasized that in this regard our three first Gospels are distinguished only in degree from the fourth". And again: "In the faith of the community, which is shared already by the oldest evangelist, Jesus is the miraculous Son of God in whom men believe, whom men set wholly by the side of God" (*Was wissen wir von Jesus*, pp. 54, 57). It would be hard if writers, writing for the express purpose of depicting a Divine Being manifesting His deity in His daily course, should have so missed their mark as to have presented us rather with a portrait in which only a human life is manifested. That they have not done so is obvious to every reader of their Gospels. And when Dr. Forrest attempts to make it appear that they have done so, he not only wilfully shuts his

eyes to one whole half of their representation, but sets himself in direct contradiction to their whole portraiture of Jesus. It is he, not they, who tells us that Jesus had "a bounded outlook", was "subject to all the influences of His immediate surroundings", and even in His "perfection" was not "absolute" but "conditioned" (pp. 11, 12). In their view Jesus' outlook had no limits, He was master of all circumstances, and His perfection was just the perfection of God. So far from Jesus' "perfection" being to them "conditioned, not absolute", "derived not creative", negative not positive ("His sinlessness means that He did not at any point of His progressive experience deflect from the specific ideal of service set before Him by God", p. 12) it was just the realization in a human life of the perfection which constitutes the ethical content of the idea of God (Mt. v. 48), asserted by Jesus as His own possession as the Son of God (cf. Volkmar Fritzsche, *Das Berufsbewusstsein Jesu*, pp. 31-32). According to the evangelists thus Jesus' perfection is the manifestation of the *τελείωσις* of God in flesh: a manifestation made under the conditions of human growth it is true, but a *manifestation*, and a manifestation precisely of the *τελείωσις* of the absolute God. Others needed daily to seek from God forgiveness of their unceasing sins: He, needing no forgiveness, is the dispenser of forgiveness to others, and even commits to others the right to remit sins. As self-evident as is the evil of all others (Mt. vii. 11), so self-evident is it that "doing the work of the Father" brings them into unison with Him (Mt. xii. 50): since whatever the Father has, in that does He share (Mt. xi. 28 sq.).

It surely is hopeless to appeal to evangelists seeking to present this conception of Jesus, in order to validate a theory that in the days of the flesh He was phenomenally mere man with no capacity left Him for Divine activities. Of course they represent Him as growing in wisdom, and as therefore at every stage of His growth lacking in complete knowledge and perfected wisdom: as subject to changing emotions,—and there might have been included, only there does not chance to be included, in this, the experience of the emotion of surprise; as making inquiries and learning by experience. All this belongs to another side of His complex personality—the human side, which the evangelists, though they do not dwell upon it so fully or make its validation so much the end of their writing, yet are as far from obscuring as His divine dignity and powers. If we begin with the dogmatic announcement: "There was but one mind in Christ", naturally —*cadit quaestio*. If there was but one mind in Christ, then certainly He could not have been at one and the same time the subject of knowledge and ignorance, He could not have been at once God and man. But then, the whole Gospel narrative becomes at once a mass of contradictions: contradictions which cannot be voided by resolutely shutting our eyes to one and that the main line of representation and focussing attention on the lower and less emphasized series. Thus we are brought, to say nothing more, into flagrant contradiction with the main purpose and general trend of the evangelical narrative. It is designed to set forth Jesus to us in His Divine majesty: to it He is the

manifestation of God in the flesh. To Dr. Forrest, He reveals nothing but human limitations in His life. "Confessedly, what we desire to discover is the revelation which God has been pleased to give us in Jesus Christ. We see that in certain instances Christ is represented as characterized by limitations. Of what value is it to say that while these existed for Him in one sense, they did not exist in another? The sphere in which they did *not* exist is, *ex hypothesi*, outside the range of the revelation" (pp. 55ff., p. 79). It is worth while to insist on this and similar passages. For they are not chance utterances but belong to the essence of the situation. What we have to interpret is a double series of parallel facts. The means of interpretation adopted is neglect of one whole series and exclusive validation of the other. The result is that all that is left to be said of Jesus in the days of His flesh is that He was subject to human limitations.

Let us not blink this shocking result. All that Christ was, in the days of His flesh, was, according to this conception, that limited nature whose outlook was bounded, which was accessible to temptation and was the subject of moral growth (p. 79). This was absolutely all there was to Him. Behind this there were no depths in that personality. The Scriptures tell us that God's outlook is boundless, that He is essentially perfect, that He is not tempted of evil. In what sense was this Jesus, then, who was nothing beyond and above the nature whose outlook was bounded, which suffered temptation and was the subject of moral growth—and who therefore was not in any recesses of His being perfect as God is perfect,—in what sense was this Being God? Dr. Forrest wishes to recognize Him as God. In order to recognize this Being as God, however, he must redefine Deity and in redefining it he must define it away. The ultimate difficulty of all theories of the class that he is defending is thus brought before us. Having set their hearts on a merely human Christ, and yet feeling unwilling to yield up frankly the Divine Christ of the Gospel revelation, they end by debasing the idea of God to the human level; so that in the end we lose not only our Divine Christ but God Himself. That simply is not God which is imperfect, and in process of perfecting by means of temptation. If this is all that Christ is, then Christ is not God; and Dr. Forrest continues to call Him such only by stress of old habit and by a willing delusion. Dr. Forrest seeks to make capital (pp. 94, 95) out of the consent of the humanitarian theorisers with the orthodox in their perception of the absurdity of the kenotic hypothesis. If it is any comfort to him to cry out against the upper and nether mill-stones grinding together, he ought not to be denied that small comfort. It ought, however, not to seem unnatural that every consistent thinker—whether his consistency is of belief or of unbelief—should think ill of a theory which inconsistently wishes to be both at once.

We cannot illustrate here in detail the straits into which Dr. Forrest is brought by his attempt to interpret the Christ of the Gospels as a mere limited human being in His phenomenal manifestation. It admits of no doubt, for instance, that the evangelists represent Him as sharer in the whole extent of the divine knowledge, differentiated from the

prophets (with whom Dr. Forrest confuses Him, p. 7, though He never calls Himself a mere prophet) just in this,—that to the prophets God reveals some items of knowledge, while His Son shares in all He knows (Mt. xi. 28 sq.). We have lately had occasion to point this out, however (see Hastings' *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*, art. "Fore-sight"), and will not here go over the ground again. Let us take the sole example we can allow ourselves, then, from another sphere—that of the Divine power which the Evangelists ascribe to Christ; but which Dr. Forrest in the interests of his theory denies to Him, insisting that He wrought His mighty works, like other instruments of God's will, only by means of the power of God graciously exerted, now and again, in His behalf. In the course of his argument he necessarily, however, comes across this phenomenon of the Scriptural representation: that Jesus in working a miracle says, "I will: be thou clean"; "I say unto thee, arise"; while His disciples say, "In the name of Jesus of Nazareth"; "Jesus Christ maketh thee whole". In face of this contrast Dr. Forrest knows nothing better to urge than this paradox: that "the emphasis which He puts on His own personality is an assertion, not of His independence of the Father, but of the entireness of His dependence upon Him"! By this he apparently hopes he will persuade us that the distinction here drawn only means that Christ was more dependent—more perfectly dependent, he would say—on an exterior power for the working of His miracles than His apostles even!

Surely no one will contend that the Son is "independent" of the Father; much less that the Mediator of the Covenant, in His covenanted work, acts "independently" of the Father. Here is only one of those "undistributed middles" which are as characteristic of Dr. Forrest's reasoning as the misplaced "only" is characteristic of his style: for the whole plausibility of his paradox here depends on the ambiguity of the use of the words "dependent" and "independent". The plain man will be slow to believe, however, that the contrast between the "I will" of Jesus and the "Jesus Christ maketh thee" of His disciples, is not a contrast between the relatively independent action of the Lord and the relatively dependent or instrumental action of the Apostles, in the matter of working miracles. It is nothing less than obvious, indeed, that the difference in the modes of statement means that the power by which the miracles of Jesus were wrought was in some high and true sense His own power, while that by which those of the Apostles were wrought was not in this high and true sense their own power. So far from it being possible to say that Jesus "was not the worker of His own miracles", we must go on to say that, according to this representation, He was the worker not only of His own but also of those of His disciples as well. The whole series,—His and theirs alike,—were His work. Is this a false testimony of the authors of the historical books of the New Testament? Jesus Christ on earth or in heaven—but whether on earth or in heaven, the same Jesus Christ incarnate—is the real source of the power by which the miracles, whether of His own or of His disciples' working, were wrought: and what is really significant of the record is that it takes pains by its "I will" and "Jesus Christ maketh thee whole",

to say this of all alike. There is no such distinction then in the minds of these writers as that which Dr. Forrest draws between the earthly and the exalted Christ, in respect to this question. Of course this is not to say that God the Father was not concerned in the working of these miracles, and that they were wrought "independently" of Him: that the Man Jesus was not conscious of resting on the Father's power, or of doing merely the Father's will: that in all His mediatorial work He did not act as the "Sent of the Father"—as His "delegate", if you will. These are deeper questions than can be touched upon in this notice: but it is surely already superabundantly evident that they are not to be lightly set aside, as if there were no profound problems here of the interrelations of the Persons of the Godhead,—by the shallow expedites at the disposal of a kenotic theory. Enough that here too, as at every other point, the kenotic theory runs precisely athwart the most emphatic deliverances of the Gospel narratives.

In the failure of the kenotic theory on which he bases his whole argument, the entire structure of Dr. Forrest's attempt to reduce the authority of our Lord in sphere and character alike, of course falls to the ground. It will scarcely do to say that God is authoritative only in the spheres of faith and conduct. It is, of course, open to Dr. Forrest to follow his Bousset and his companions, and assail the trustworthiness of the Gospel report of Christ's teaching and life. We have already seen that he exhibits a tendency here and there to find in the evangelic report the intrusion of the later reflection of the community. We cannot believe, however, that he is prepared to carry this to such lengths as, like Bousset, to disengage from the Christ of faith as presented in the evangelists a Christ of fact who was merely man, and perhaps something less than an average man; much less to such lengths, as, with Pfleiderer, to lose the real Christ altogether behind the veil of the Christ of faith. The retention of the Christ of the evangelists in any recognizable form, however, entails the retention of the Christ of authority—authority in His declarations as well as in the religious impression He made, and in His declarations in all spheres as well as in those of faith and conduct. Of this Christ, it is illegitimate to speak, as Dr. Forrest speaks of his kenotic Christ, as if He were liable to repeat in His teaching Jewish errors (p. 69), and not quite able to forecast the future in which His authority might be wrongly applied. There remains to us, of course, the whole duty of carefully weighing His words and example and of seeking to apply them only according to His will. Whatever value Dr. Forrest's book possesses to us will be found to lie in its earnest attempt to perform this work in several departments of thought and action. He has, of course, not been able in even this serious and careful discussion to place himself on a plane which is above criticism: but he has led us through a study of the relation of Christ's teaching to individual and corporate duty which is cast in a high note and cannot fail to interest every reader.

We must not neglect to say frankly before closing, nevertheless, that in the course of his discussion Dr. Forrest occasionally hints at theological positions which we cannot share and which on another occasion we

should like to traverse—such as, for example, his very defective doctrine of Providence in connection with an exaggerated doctrine of freedom (pp. 139, 140, 142, 143, 146), or his conception of the gift of the Spirit without distinction of His miraculous endowment of the Apostles and His indwelling in the people of God, or, indeed, his fundamental conception of Christianity as summed up in "the filial spirit" (pp. 153, 202). Nor would we neglect to say equally frankly that we deprecate the apparently confused way in which certain findings of modern criticism are here and there utilized, as if they stood apart item from item and did not form a part of a closed system of anti-supernaturalistic interpretation. But on none of these things can we dwell now. We shall only stay to say in a word that Dr. Forrest's second work does not seem to us to fulfil the promise of his first one: but exhibits him as embarking upon a line of thought from advancing in which his well-wishers will heartily pray he may be saved.

Princeton, August, 1906.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE GOSPEL IN THE GOSPELS. By WILLIAM PORCHER DU BOSE, M.A., S.T.D., Author of *The Soteriology of the New Testament*, *The Ecumenical Councils*; Professor of Exegesis in the University of the South. New York, London and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co. 1906. 12mo.; pp. xiv, 289.

Dr. Du Bose certainly does not write for "the general". Some of the difficulty we have experienced in following his thought in the present volume may undoubtedly be due to our not having yet given ourselves the pleasure of reading his earlier work, on *The Soteriology of the New Testament*: it is more than likely that much which has been expounded at length and with plainness in the earlier has been presupposed in the later treatise. Some of the apparent difficulty of his thought may be due to a mere trick of style, an inordinate love of antithesis and neatly contrasted phraseology, which betrays the author into many an obscurity, and not seldom into open paradox. Some of it, again, may be due to the scheme upon which the book is ordered, which involves the occupation in turn of three different and gradually rising standpoints, and obliges an effort to attain an inclusive mode of expression in which many different points of view may find room for themselves. It cannot be doubted, however, that much of it is inherent in Dr. Du Bose's conceptions, and belongs to the type of thought of which he is an exponent. This is a type of thought which is quite alien to the ordinary mental movement of plain men. "I would describe Christianity in its largest sense", says he, in the opening paragraph of his closing chapter (p. 274), "to be the fulfilment of God in the world through the fulfilment of the world in God. This assumes that the world is completed in man, in whom alone God is completed in the world. And so, God, the world, and man are at once completed in Jesus Christ." Language like this is, of course, perfectly familiar. But we frankly confess our inability to attach to it any clear meaning.

The task which Dr. Du Bose has proposed to himself is to expound the Gospel of Jesus Christ. But, in this volume, not that Gospel in its

final and complete expression. The complete construction of the Gospel, given by Paul, is reserved for a subsequent volume. Meanwhile there is undertaken here, as the title indicates, only the exposition of the Gospel as it lies in the Gospels. But where shall we find the Gospel in the Gospels? Is it confined to the purely "reportorial" element in them—the bare record of Jesus' acts and words which may be discovered in them? Or does it include the interpretation which the evangelists give of this record, with a view to what we call "the work" of our Lord? Or, perchance also, the interpretation they suggest also with regard to His Person? According as we take one or the other of these standpoints, Dr. Du Bose supposes, we shall find ourselves more or less exactly upon the plane of one of three varying stages or degrees of faith in Christ and Christianity represented in modern life. There are those who will see nothing in Jesus but the man and find in the man as much of the Gospel and of salvation as, they think, humanity can or ought to receive on this earth. There are others who see in Jesus something more than common humanity, and cherish Him as the One who has brought something more into our nature and life than was there before. There are still others who see in Him not less than God manifest in the flesh. Taking his cue from this correspondence of varying points of view with separable elements in the contents of the Gospels, Dr. Du Bose undertakes, first, to treat of the "Gospel of the common humanity", next of "the Gospel of the Work" and last of "the Gospel of the Person" of Jesus; and orders his matter accordingly. We have no criticism to make upon this distribution of the material in itself. It is quite conceivable that it might be made the vehicle of the richest exposition of the Gospel as contained in the Gospels, rising stage upon stage to its climax. It is plain also that it might be utilized as an organon for the critical examination of the deposit of the Gospel in the Gospels. There would be an obvious gain in discussing first with critical stringency the nature of the Gospel embodied in the merely "reportorial" element of the Synoptics; then the nature of the Gospel as suggested by the Synoptic evangelists through the medium of their entire presentation; and then the nature of the Gospel as set forth by John—comparing all these together and bringing to view their relations to one another. Thus a great apologetic might be accomplished, accurately keyed to the needs of the day. Neither of these methods has been used, however, by Dr. Du Bose. The strictly critico-exegetical method one would judge to be alien to his spirit. The dogmatico-expository method, while more congenial to him, is interfered with in the present instance not only by the artificial limits imposed upon the exposition at each stage by the requirement that it shall not transcend the point of view of the class of modern theorists whose standpoint is assumed for the moment, but also by the copious intrusion into the dogmatic result of Dr. Du Bose's own preconceived opinions. The reader is continually oppressed, therefore, with the double feeling that the material under discussion is not permitted to speak out fully its message, and that what it is permitted to say it is permitted to say only through Dr. Du Bose's forms of thought. He becomes more and more aware, in

other words, not only that he is not obtaining the Gospel which lies in the Gospels, but that he is obtaining only Dr. Du Bose's gospel. This is, no doubt, very interesting to him: but it is not authoritative; and he finds it just a little difficult.

Dr. Du Bose's gospel, which he here expounds on the basis of the Gospels, centers in a doctrine of purely subjective salvation which is rooted in a doctrine of atonement that finds its affiliations with that class of theories which have been called, perhaps not very illuminatingly, theories of "salvation by sample". In Jesus Christ humanity perfected itself in the sight of God: and in Jesus Christ every member of humanity may become perfect in the sight of God. Here, in a nutshell, lies the entirety of Dr. Du Bose's doctrine of salvation. The main elements which enter into it are the following: Jesus Christ "was not one man but humanity" (p. 216); in Him God "once for all and completely incarnated Himself in humanity" (217); He is therefore not one man but "universal man" (279)—and "the fact of such a universal humanity is the truth of religion" (230). Accordingly "whatever He was or did in the name or in behalf of humanity, humanity itself did and became in His person" (260). What He did and what humanity did in Him was "to put away sin". "In Jesus Christ, humanity has accomplished its salvation through a perfection of all those dispositions, and acts, and characters which effect and constitute salvation" (p. 172). Thus humanity in Him at-one-d itself with God "by the one possible act, and in the one possible way, of self-reconciliation and reunion"; "redeemed itself by putting away sin from it and taking to it the holiness of God" (261): and "arose from the death of sin into the life of holiness and God" (p. 296). "The Gospel" thus, "as such, begins with the objective fact of the taking or putting away of sin by Jesus Christ. It proceeds with the universal proclamation of the double remission in His name, a remission of present pardon through faith in Him, and a remission of real deliverance through final participation with Him. The difference between the two is only that of different stages of relation to the same thing, between the proleptic or anticipatory appropriation of faith and the progressive and final appropriation and fruition in fact" (p. 181). The proleptic or anticipatory appropriation corresponds to what has been called justification: the progressive and final to what has been called sanctification. "We cannot bring to God at once a sin completely put away and a oneness with Him restored, but we can bring Him an attitude towards our sin which means and will never be satisfied with less than its complete putting away; and we can bring an attitude towards holiness which means and can never stop short of the most perfect actual attainment of the most perfect holiness" (p. 178). And, "if we do in reality and in sincerity bring this, then God can treat what we really mean and intend as though it really were, and by treating them so or calling them so make them so" (p. 178). This is justification by faith—and the ground of it is the germ of hatred of sin and love of holiness perceived in us, taken for the fruitage of which it contains the promise (cf. 153). As this germ develops, as this promise passes into performance, our salvation is

perfected. "Attuned to Christ by the anticipatory spell of faith, hope, and love, we shall be by a natural process of assimilation, transformed into His likeness in act, character, and life, until, coming to see Him perfectly as He is we shall be wholly what He is" (p. 289). Thus, Christ, first, in our nature perfects humanity objectively: then, we, by God's grace, accepted, as meaning and intending to share in this perfection, into a right relation to Him, are by that acceptance enabled to go on into perfection: and, perfecting ourselves, are saved. The points to be emphasized are that the entirety of salvation is subjective,—there is nothing objective in it: and that the entirety of salvation is our own work, though it is our own work only under the grace of God. "Nothing that God can do merely for us, not even anything that God alone can do in us, can effect or constitute our salvation. Only that can be our salvation which we ourselves are, and are through our own doing and becoming" (p. 173). "Christ is our salvation only because He is the power of God in us to work out our own salvation. If instead of being that, He was instead of that to us, He would be not our salvation but its opposite" (pp. 80-81).

It is characteristic of all forms of the theory of "salvation by sample" (so-called), to lay great stress upon the Incarnation and the Incarnated Life, as bearing the brunt of the saving-work, and to develop a particular conception of the nature of the Incarnation, as a taking up into the Divine of humanity as it actually exists in the objects of salvation. If salvation consists essentially in a cleansing of humanity from sin in the person of the God-man, naturally the idea of the guilt of sin retires behind that of its pollution and power; and equally naturally the humanity taken up into the God-man is conceived as the humanity which is in need of the cleansing. Dr. Du Bose, of course, does not escape either of these tendencies. In obedience to the uniform Scriptural representation, he makes a manful effort to give a primary place in the work of Christ to His sufferings and death: "only the perfect cross could earn for humanity the perfect crown", he says (p. 124), with crispness and beauty. But, after all, it is not on the death of Christ that he looks as the hinge of the saving work: "the significance and value of the death", he says plainly, "must have lain chiefly if not wholly in the fact that it is only death that sets the perfect seal or places the final valuation upon life" (p. 120). He is inclined to complain, therefore, of the current forms of doctrine that they neglect the true saving work of Christ, that long life of conflict in which He put away sin and has shown us the way by Himself entering it and so opening it for all (p. 37). Of course the "active obedience" of Christ has been as little neglected in the theological construction of His saving work as His "passive obedience"; and Dr. Du Bose's complaint is indicatory only of his own too exclusive dwelling upon one aspect of the work of the Lord—His victory over all the temptations of life. Or, as Dr. Du Bose, in accordance with his general standpoint, would represent it, His "taking away or putting away or abolishing of sin". This "taking away, or putting away, or abolishing of sin was accomplished", he explains, "by an act on His part, and it was accomplished first in His own per-

son" (p. 154). "He Himself was sinless," he continues, "not by any mere fact of His own nature—differencing it from ours—but by an act of Himself in our nature, which we too were to enter into and make our own and so perform for ourselves in and with Him". If he put away the sin of the world, He did it "by primarily putting away sin from Himself" (p. 155). In Him humanity has thrown off its old self of deficiency and insufficiency, of weakness and sin and death" (p. 172, cf. p. 204). Dr. Du Bose's hamartiology is very obscure; but it is evident that he is inclined to follow the logic of his primal conception and to think of the flesh which the Son of God became at the incarnation, more or less explicitly, as the flesh which needed salvation.

To this type of thought, however, the sinlessness of Christ is as essential as it is essential that this sinlessness shall be conceived as a conquest of sinful tendencies in His flesh. It will not be without instruction, therefore, for us to observe how Dr. Du Bose deals with this great subject. He wishes from the outset "to guard ourselves from offense in every direction by agreeing upon the ancient formula: We do not say that our Lord as man could not have sinned if He willed, but God forbid that He should have willed" (p. 160). But the mere repetition of an ancient formula is no guarantee that its spirit is our own. In this case the question meant to be raised by the "ancient formula" is whether Jesus Christ, the Incarnate God, can be supposed to have willed to sin: and the answer meant to be suggested is that He, being what He was, was incapable of so willing. Dr. Du Bose is, however, thinking of Christ as a man, and is working under the influence of the conception that holiness and sin are the opposite results of varied reactions to the same cause or occasion, temptation; and that temptation involving the possibility of sinning is the very condition of holiness, so that—as he emphatically sums it up—"the possibility of the sin is the condition of the holiness" (p. 163 and *passim*). Of course then he is in no position to affirm the *non posse peccare* of our Lord, since that would be equivalent to saying that He could not become humanly holy, seeing that the *posse peccare* is the condition of holiness. The principle that governs the incarnated life of our Lord is accordingly unconditionally presented as that "He was born into and lived our life and was in every respect a man like us" (p. 163). Dr. Du Bose feels no impulse to limit this by adding the phrase "except sin", on account of his theory of human nature in its relation to sin: no, Christ was in every respect like us. "He was born in the flesh, because the flesh is our lowest and most earthly constituent and carries in it and with it all the possibilities, all the weaknesses and temptations and dangers, in a word all the probation of our earthly life" (p. 163). Christ in taking our flesh, took thus "all the possibilities" of our earthly life. "All these He met fairly and squarely as a man, and as a man was thoroughly proved by them and perfectly approved" (p. 163). We come now to the cardinal point: "Our Lord did not do that in our nature which no man within the limits of his own nature or by the exercise of only his own powers is capable of doing. He was not holy by nature, nor righteous by the law. . . . He was holy as a man, and in the

only way in which a man can be holy. He was holy by the conquest of sin" (pp. 163, 164). The "ambiguous middle" is obvious: say that our Lord's accomplishment was well within the powers of humanity as such: humanity as it exists is not humanity as such but humanity as sinful. When we say, therefore, that "the impossibilities of humanity were as much impossibilities for Him as for us", we need to ask whether it is the impossibilities of humanity as such or of sinful humanity that are in question. In point of fact, if our Lord did not do in our nature what that nature in its present condition of sinfulness is incapable of; then,—either we are yet in our sins, or we never needed a Saviour. The issue is brought to its height in the sentence, "He was not holy by nature, nor righteous by the law". In that case He was not Divine in nature, nor did He work out a perfect righteousness for us. What Dr. Du Bose intends by this remarkable assertion is to assimilate the Incarnate Son to us, who must acquire holiness and that through the grace of God and not by the law. But that is because we are by nature sinners, and therefore incapable of acquiring holiness by the law. The very grace of Christ consists in His undertaking what was impossible to us, and accomplishing it instead of and for us. Of course He did not accomplish it apart from God: nor was His human nature ever independent of Him in whom all live and move and have their being. Accordingly what Dr. Du Bose has further to say of His looking to God as His Help and Stay in all the prosecution of His work has its full validity. Because He was not, like us, unholy by nature, but holy,—as the angel announced Him at His conception,—He was able to work out a righteousness by the law; and in the process of working out this righteousness,—that "active obedience" He has offered for us,—of course He hungered and thirsted after it in each of its progressive stages infinitely more than any other human being ever did or ever shall. It is not improper, perhaps, even to speak of this ever growing righteousness, in the elements of it at every stage of its development, as not yet "fulfilled", as not yet "His own". But if the meaning be that He was approved by God for a righteousness not His own in the same sense that we are approved on the ground of a righteousness not our own—this is to subvert the entire Gospel. Christ's righteousness was not like ours a righteousness graciously imputed to Him on (the occasion of) faith, but precisely a righteousness of works—by the law. And therein His differs from ours by a whole diameter. And if we are to say that "no man ever so felt in himself the deficiency and poverty of mere nature, or ever so confessed in himself the impotency and insufficiency of the human will for the higher purposes of holiness, righteousness and life, as did Jesus Christ" (p. 160),—this, in harmony with the Scriptural representation, can mean nothing more than that it is a part of righteousness to know and to feel to the inmost core of the being the "utter dependence" of all His creatures on God, and therefore to know "what in God there is to depend on"—as the foundation and source of all that is good in His creatures. Christ whose heart was right towards God by nature and was held right towards Him by unbroken habit, did all He did, of course, in conscious, loving dependence on God; and thus

He was righteous in all His thought and feeling and act. But this was not that other dependence on God's grace which is the part of sinners and sinners only: and the confusion of the ontological and soteriological dependence can work nothing but ruin to our whole body of conceptions of Him and His work.

We should like to go on and draw out in some detail Dr. Du Bose's conception of the Incarnation itself, with respect both to the incarnating and to the incarnated element,—and indeed to its ultimate effects, which lead him to remark in that not very lucid language which this type of thinking seems to find congenial: "We now are the incarnation, not only incarnated but incarnating; we are the atonement, atoned and atoning" (pp. 115-116). It is not very clear how he would have us think of the Deity incarnated in Jesus Christ; and the "universal humanity" postulated as the incarnated element—is, to speak brusquely, just unthinkable. Nothing of this, however, is peculiar to Dr. Du Bose; it is the common characteristic of the type of religious thought he represents; and we are admonished that even a book-notice should observe some limits. We content ourselves, therefore, merely with noting that in all such matters Dr. Du Bose gives the common thought of his school exceptionally able and emphatic expression, and turn to remark in closing upon a quality of the work before us much more pleasing to us to draw attention to. This is the power Dr. Du Bose exhibits in it of saying good things well. His pages are studded with sentences embodying truths of importance in almost proverbial form, and now and again a longer passage attracts the eye in which a thoroughly evangelical conception is given a most attractive statement. We can here offer only samples of these words fitly spoken. Take a few brief ones first:

"Nothing can dispense us from the humble and devout use of divine means except the fact of having through their appointed use as means attained the ends for which they were instituted" (p. 55). "If God be truly in me by His Word and His Spirit, He is so not to supplant or to displace my nature or my personality, but only to complete them in their own lines and perfect them in their own activities" (p. 81). "When you have made the law as high as God Himself, you will want God Himself to enable you to fulfil it" (p. 95). "I speak only for beings like ourselves when I say that the consummate joy of holiness would be incomprehensible and impossible save through a corresponding and equal sorrow for sin" (p. 99). "There is nothing in these days so presumed upon as the mercy of God: we confirm ourselves in our indolence and indifference, in our weaknesses and failures and neglects, in our faults, our vices, our sins, with the thought that God is merciful, that it is inconsistent with His goodness that we should reap the natural consequences of our omissions and our commissions" (p. 111). "One of the most beautiful of the many anomalies of Christian character is that the more righteous it becomes the less self-righteous it becomes; the greater it grows the more modest it grows" (p. 141). "Faith does not originate or create or give, it only receives and appropriates and realizes" (p. 177).

Now let us take one or two longer passages. We shall purposely choose some in which evangelical doctrine is set forth with very notable force and precision—although we are forced to allow that the purpose of Dr. Du Bose cannot be said to be to do this. The evangelical doctrine

of the necessity of "effectual calling" could scarcely be better expressed than in the following passage:

"The coming to us of a Gospel with power, is conditioned not only upon the fact of the objective communication, but upon that of a corresponding subjective response. The need of the latter as well as the former, as coequal and coördinate part of the gift or grace of God, is not only expressed implicitly in the necessity of a baptism with the Spirit, but is stated explicitly in the assurance that the gift in Christ includes the repentance prerequisite on our part as well as the remission consequent on God's part. . . . Deep answereth unto deep. The deep of God without us and above us is inaudible save as it is answered by the deep of God within us. There is no gospel of salvation for us which does not come by the Word through the Spirit. In a way, we may say that that means, by God through ourselves; but in a more true way, it means that while our salvation must be of ourselves as well as of God, we owe the *ourselves* in the matter as well as the divine part in it, to God, who there as elsewhere is All in all" (pp. 244, 246).

And certainly the evangelical doctrine of the substance of salvation as consisting in the sanctification of the soul could not be better put than in the following words:

"However far off it may be from us, or we from it, we cannot and ought not to think of our salvation as anything less than our own perfected and completed sinlessness and holiness. We may be to the depths of our souls grateful and happy to be sinners pardoned and forgiven by divine grace. But surely God would not have us satisfied with that as the end and substance of the salvation He gives us in His Son. Jesus Christ is the power of God in us unto salvation. It does not require an exercise of divine power to extend pardon; it does require it to endow and enoble us with all the qualities, energies and actualities that make for and that make holiness and life. See how St. Paul speaks of it when he prays, That we may know the exceeding greatness of God's power to uswards who believe, according to that working in Christ when He raised Him from the dead" (p. 175).

No doubt the reader, taking such passages in their context and interpreting them from their context, will perceive that they are not intended in quite the sense the evangelical reader will take them in, as they stand here in isolation. But they may at least stand as proofs that, despite Dr. Du Bose's erroneous general conceptions, there are the elements of evangelical truth gleaming through his less acceptable thought. And we wish to close this notice with the acknowledgment of the pleasure we have derived from the recognition of this fact. Dr. Du Bose has the qualities of his defects, if he has also the defects of his qualities; and when he comes to speak in such phrases as these we have quoted or as that beautiful passage on pp. 125 sq. in which he describes the heart of Jesus in the day of His trial, we read with our minds and hearts alike in his hands.

Princeton, July, 1906.

B. B. WARFIELD.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE SOCIAL CRISIS. By WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH, Professor of Church History in Rochester Theological Seminary. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1907. 8vo.; pp. xv, 429.

This is a plea for the Church to give herself to the propagation of Christian socialism. The author contends for this on the grounds, that

the Hebrew prophets were "the men to whose personality and teaching Jesus felt most kinship" and they were, first of all and above all, teachers of "social morality"; that though Jesus Himself was no more a socialist than an ecclesiastic, yet His aim was "the kingdom of God, a collective conception, involving the whole social life of man"; that the impetus and hope of primitive Christianity were characteristically social; that in its later history its capacities for reconstructing society along socialistic lines were paralyzed by alien influences such as the ascetic tendency, dogmatic interest, subservience to the state, etc.; that, on the one hand, the Church is now in large measure emancipated from all these alien influences and, on the other, Christian civilization has arrived at the great crisis of its history and is in the most urgent need of all moral power to overcome the glaring social inequalities and wrongs which must soon destroy it if not themselves righted; and that the Church itself has its own power and future at stake in the issues of social development. For these reasons the Church ought to gird herself at once for her supreme work of social evangelization. The ministry, like the Hebrew prophets, ought "to apply the teaching functions of the pulpit to the pressing question of public morality". Society must be revolutionized if it is to be regenerated. It is a new, not a renewed, industrial system that is demanded. The trouble is not so much that men are corrupt; it is rather that the present order is so essentially wrong that those living under it cannot become better until it has been changed. Christian love cannot long survive in the atmosphere of competition. Inequalities in wealth must be removed, not because a man's life consists in the abundance of the things which he possesses, but because the spiritual and so supreme good of life is impossible when the distribution of wealth is decidedly unequal.

This plea is urged with a vigor which compels attention, with a learning which commands respect, with a sincerity which prompts one to overlook its frequent onesidedness, and with a brilliancy of style which often blinds the reader, as we are sure that it does the author, to fallacies that otherwise would have been too palpable for either to tolerate.

Not to emphasize these one by one or enter on any discussion of Christian socialism, the following general criticisms of the argument must suffice:

1. Let it be admitted that the Hebrew prophets were the "men to whose personality and teaching Jesus felt most kinship". Still, it will not follow that Christian ministers ought to preach the Gospel of socialism. The office of the Christian minister and that of the Hebrew prophet are not the same. Under the Old Dispensation church and state were united. Under the New Dispensation they are separate. Therefore, while the office of the Hebrew prophet was civil as well as religious, that of the Christian minister is religious only. Were this not so, however, it would not weaken our position. Because the prophets taught social morality, we may not infer that they taught or that to-day they would teach socialism. The two are distinct. Social immorality is a sin against God even more than a crime against the state or a wrong

to the individual. Hence, the preacher of God under either dispensation is bound to lift up his voice against it. Socialism, however, is a theory of the state which may or may not be essential to the development of righteousness. If it is, then we may in this have a reason why the preacher of righteousness ought to be a preacher of socialism, but until this has been established we have no basis for the inference that he should. In a word, our author would found his proof on what is to be proved.

2. Let it be granted that the aim of Jesus was the kingdom of God and that the kingdom of God was "a collective conception, involving the whole social life of man". It may not be concluded from this that our Lord's aim embraced the reorganization of the industrial system. This might be inferred only when it had been shown that such reorganization was indispensable to social well-being. As in the former case, therefore, our author builds on the very foundation that he is trying to lay. Besides, is it not significant that Jesus is no more a socialist than an ecclesiastic? It is commonly allowed that His proximate mission was "the training of the twelve"; and that He intended them, in their sphere and according to their measure, to be like Himself appears in His words, "as thou didst send me into the world, even so sent I them into the world" (St. John xvii. 18). Unless, therefore, he meant them to be teachers of religion rather than champions of socialism, why was it that in that age of social inequality and corruption and in that day when all possible pressure was brought to bear on him to become a political leader, He persisted in confining His activity within the lines of religion. To us at least our author's position seems to deny that Jesus is in any real sense our example. Moreover, while the kingdom of God is "a collective conception, involving the whole social life of man", it is not true that our Lord regards it as a socialistic or even as a social conception. It embraces all the institutes and the interests of society: but he views them all from the standpoint of religion; he considers them as growing up "out of the regenerated life of the invisible church"; and, consequently, he would give himself, and he would have his servants give themselves, first of all and above all, to proclaiming the gospel of deliverance, not from social and pecuniary inequality, but from that spiritual deadness and corruption from which, no doubt, much of the social inequality of our day does result.

3. Let it be conceded that the impetus and hope of primitive Christianity were characteristically social. It will not follow from this that the aim of modern Christianity should be so, too. It is only apostolic Christianity that can furnish an authoritative model; and this model, our author allows, has to be doctored somewhat if it is to be what he wishes. For example, it is hinted that the earliest Christian literature, as the Epistle of James, which is ethical and social rather than dogmatic, is more authoritative than the Pauline epistles. Yet no reason for this seems to be given except that Paul, while "a radical in theology, was a conservative in sociology". Thus, as before, what is to be established is presupposed in the proof. Moreover, is not this view of the New Testament inconsistent with any true view of the development of

doctrine? It would find the best expression of truth, not in its fullest expression, but in its first and most partial. Probably our author feels the difficulty here. Otherwise, why does he say that "if there were any radical, political, or social ideas current in early Christianity, there was good cause for not writing them down or publishing them freely"? That is, why does he suggest that if the New Testament writers had said what they thought, its trend would have been throughout distinctly social and even socialistic? Or again, why does he make the astonishing intimation that "one purpose in Luke's mind when he wrote the Book of Acts for the use of Theophilus was to present an apologetic of Christianity to the upper classes; and when Paul exhorted the Romans to obey the government, he may have had in mind the possibility that in the capital of the world his letter might drop into influential hands"? If, however, such were the motives which entered into the preparation of the New Testament, what confidence can we have in it as the Word of God? In short, our author's use of Scripture for his argument destroys the authority of Scripture as effectually as we have just seen that his use of the example of Christ robs us of him as our supreme model.

4. With regard to the alien causes which, according to our author, kept the social development of early Christianity from becoming socialistic, turned it back upon itself, and rendered it individualistic, it is pertinent to ask whether they were really "alien to Christianity". Many of them, at least, would seem to have been inseparable from it. For example, the expectation of the second advent—while we must repudiate chiliasm whether ancient or modern, must we not grant that he is no true Christian who is not ever "looking for the blessed hope and appearing of the glory of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ" (Titus ii. 13)? "Hostility to the Roman Empire and its civilization"—can we recall what they were and conceive of any other attitude toward them as possible on the part of those who were charged, "Love not the world neither the things that are in the world" (1 Jn. ii. 15)? "The otherworldliness of Christianity"—must not this be an essential characteristic of it when its teaching is that "our citizenship is in heaven" (Phil. iii. 20)? "The dogmatic interest" of our religion—how could it be otherwise when Christ came into the world "to bear witness unto the truth" (Jn. xix. 37) and when it is "the truth that makes us free" (Jn. viii. 32)? Subservience to the state—must not this be obligatory if "the powers that be are ordained of God" (Rom. xiii. 1)? In a word, does not our author make the same mistake which Gibbon made in his famous fifteenth chapter when, trying to explain the rapid diffusion of early Christianity on other grounds than its own inherent energy, he accounts for it by causes which prove to be inseparable from Christianity itself? In like manner our author, in this which he considers the great chapter of his book, defeats himself. He shows that the reason why the social trend of early Christianity did not become socialistic was just Christianity itself.

5. The chapter on "The Present Crisis" is a terrible indictment of our boasted modern and Christian civilization. Yet it is not unnatural

that our author should make it. Anyone who could be a pastor for eleven years among the working people on the West Side of New York City, as he was, and could write of social evils less earnestly than he has, would be indeed hardhearted. Nor may his individual statements be questioned. The weakness of his presentation is that it is onesided. A good man will appear bad if his sins only are related, and it is in precisely this way that our author has described modern society. Perhaps such writers as Loring Bruce in his *Gesta Christi* and R. S. Storrs in his *The Divine Origin of Christianity indicated by its Historical Effects* have gone somewhat to the other extreme, but this is no reason why our author should resort to the campaign methods of politics. To do so is unwise, to say no more. It is sure to make the judicial reader discount the indictment. Moreover, it is a fair question whether the industrial system is the cause or only the occasion of the undoubtedly many and awful social evils of our day. We confess that in most cases the latter seems to us to be the truth. It is in human sin and particularly in human selfishness that we discover the cause of the chief ills of society, and therefore it is in the grace of God rather than in social reorganization that we would find the one remedy that will strike at the root of the evil. Nor does it seem to us a tenable position that the competitive system is essentially opposed to the grace of God. There is competition and there is competition. There is the selfish strife when every man's hand is against every man's hand, and there is the generous rivalry when each man makes the most of his powers and opportunities because God has given them to him and for the sake of others; and if there is far too little of the latter in the business world or anywhere in the world, it is not to be charged up to our industrial system so much as to "the wiles of the devil" and human sin.

6. Let it be admitted that the church itself has its own power and future at stake in the issues of social development. It will not follow from this that the present mission of the church is to propagate socialism. Even had the argument established that socialism is the cure-all for social ills, it would still be an open question whether the church is as well qualified to lecture on socialism as she is to preach the Gospel and whether failure in the former might not lead to failure in the latter. To confound different spheres Dorner has characterized as immoral; and it seems to us that no confusion of spheres could be so bad as that of which our author is guilty when he identifies religion (Vid. pp. 4, 7, and elsewhere) with morality and morality with political economy.

7. With reference to the whole discussion the reviewer would remark in closing:

a. It overlooks Providence. Inequalities in wealth and in social position are not all due to the sins of men. Often they are. A combine is formed; the market is manipulated; bread is made dear when God has given an abundant harvest; and the financiers fatten at the expense of the people. We have all seen this done and enormities just like it perpetrated again and again; and that, too, by robbers many of whom were church members. Such iniquity, of course, cannot be condemned

too unsparingly. The church is bound to lift up her voice continually against it. But there are inequalities which result from distinctions not artificial and which can be explained only on the ground that God makes men "to differ" and "divides to each one severally even as he will". This fact our author seems to overlook; and in so doing he sets himself not only against reason, but even against God.

b. The discussion ignores the Holy Spirit. The reviewer stands ready to be corrected, but he cannot recall a single direct reference to the necessity of his aid. The implication, if not the assertion, is that society will be regenerated, if only the industrial system be reorganized. This is much as if we were to be told that all that was required for the revival of a dead man was that the atmosphere around him should be purified. Nor would the case be different were it shown that the man had been asphyxiated. While it would then be true that he could not be revived without changing the air, it would be just as true that no change of air by itself could do it.

c. It is charged, and not unjustly, that the present industrial system fosters the error that a man's life does consist in the things that he possesses. Without raising the question whether this is a true consequence or a perversion of the system, it may be replied that Christian socialism makes a man's life depend on the things which he possesses. If it denies that the supreme good of life is in wealth, it conditions the spiritual and social development in which it does find it on the approximate equalization of wealth. If this be not to exalt property above men, is it not to subject God to property?

d. Finally, even Christian socialism is not a position of stable equilibrium. It is bound by its own logic to repudiate socialism or to degenerate into revolutionary socialism, anarchism, nihilism. Our author believes firmly in the right of the individual person, of the church, and especially of the family; but he has no sufficient foundation for such belief. If the state ought to appropriate the instruments of production and control the distribution of the products, it is not made clear why she should not arrogate supremacy in other spheres also nor why at last she should not usurp the throne of God himself. Indeed, Maitensen is not too severe when he says even of Christian Socialism, "the inmost core of a radically unreligious thinking becomes more and more manifest, and proves itself openly hostile to Christianity and the Church" (*Social Ethics*, p. 155).

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

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## PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

CHRISTIAN MISSIONS AND SOCIAL PROGRESS: A Sociological Study of Foreign Missions. By the REV. JAMES S. DENNIS, D.D., Students' Lecturer on Missions, Princeton, 1893 and 1896; Author of *Foreign Missions after a Century*; Member of the American Presbyterian Mission, Beirut, Syria. In three volumes. Volume III. Fleming H. Revell Company. 1906. 8vo., pp. xxvi. 675.

With this third portly volume Dr. Dennis brings to a close his monumental work on *Christian Missions and Social Progress*. As is well known, this noble enterprise had its inception in a course of six lectures delivered at Princeton Theological Seminary in 1893. The first four lectures, in greatly expanded form, were then published as Volume First of the present series. They bore the captions: (I) "The Sociological Scope of Christian Missions", (II) "The Social Evils of the Non-Christian World", (III) "Ineffectual Remedies and the Causes of their Failure", and (IV) "Christianity the Social Hope of the Nations". Lecture V, on "The Dawn of a Sociological Era in Missions", occupied the first one hundred pages of Volume Second, the remainder of this volume being devoted to a first installment of Lecture VI, on the "Contribution of Christian Missions to Social Progress"; the three specific topics here developed dealing with (I) the impress of missions upon individual character, (II) upon family life, and (III) upon humanitarian progress. Volume Third continues the discussion along four additional though somewhat arbitrarily differentiated lines of investigation, presenting the results of missions tending to develop the higher life of society (IV), touching national life and character (V), affecting the commercial and industrial status (VI), and marking reformed standards of religious faith and practice (VII).

This concluding volume, we need only remark in giving this purely formal notice concerning its appearance, is in scope and method, in form and content, a worthy companion to its predecessors. As the author's *Centennial Survey of Foreign Missions*—originally planned as an appendix to this work, but later published in advance as a supplemental issue—is still the most elaborate and serviceable body of missionary statistics ever published, so these three volumes themselves constitute the most thorough presentation we have of the facts pertaining to the social problems of missions in all lands. We have here the conclusion of a work which is nothing less than a comprehensive survey of missions as a world-force, an exhibition of the marvellous success with which in the opening years of this twentieth century Christianity is grappling with the stupendous task of discipling and disciplining the nations of the heathen world. The work as a whole is one of the most impressive "apologies" for the faith ever written, a masterful presentation of the argument from human experience concerning the power of the Gospel amidst the most diverse conditions of paganism. With the courage and zeal of an unwearied investigator, with a mind trained to take statesman-like views of the largest problems of social life and at the same time to collect, assess and tabulate in accurate and suggestive manner the minutest details of statistical information, with a never-failing skill in organizing and rationalizing a vast amount of heterogeneous material that must needs be looked at from many different points of sight in order to be duly appreciated, Dr. Dennis has produced a history—or perhaps we had better say a historical encyclopedia—of present-day missionary enterprise as conducted by all branches of the Church, in the most varied forms of activity, in all departments of the life of heathendom,—a truly inestimable work for all who would know to what

extent the "blessings of the kingly rule of Christ over the world he came to save" are to-day being realized even in the earth's darkest lands and remotest corners. It is the work of a highly gifted missionary specialist who has labored over a decade in exploring a field of research, the very immensity as well as the value and beauty of which he has done more than any one else to help us realize.

The press-work and the abundant illustrations are in keeping with the unique theme and the literary excellence of the work, while the elaborate hundred-page *Index*, the select *Bibliography* of recent missionary literature, the full outlines of the lectures in the *Table of Contents* and the helpful marginal captions greatly facilitate reference to the diverse riches in this store-house of missionary information.

*Philadelphia.*

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

VAN BETHANIE NAAR GOLGOTHA. Overdenkingen over het lyden en sterven onzes Heeren Jezus Christus, door P. BIESTERVELD, Hoogleeraar aan de Vrije Unsversiteit. Doesburg, J. C. Van Schenck Brill. 1906. Aflevering 1 en 2.

These meditations on the sufferings and death of Christ are, as far as I am able to judge from the first two parts, among the best of their kind. Professor Biesterveld's style is clear, forcible and elegant in the best sense of the word. It is a book for believers, who will enjoy the excellent exposition of Christ's passion and death. It leads them into the deep meaning of every item connected with the different scenes of Christ's atoning work. Of course I have to judge from the beginning of the work. But in this respect it is true, *ex ungue leonem*. I wish we had such kind of books for the common people. We need books which edify and strengthen the people in their most holy faith. But faith cannot grow when Christ's sufferings and death are placed in the background. We hear a great deal about the beauty of Christ's character, we need to hear a great deal more about the glory of Christ's atoning work. If anywhere then certainly in his last struggle, the beauty of his character appears in the calm majesty of self-sacrifice.

*Holland, Mich.*

NICHOLAS M. STEFFENS.

*The  
H.W.*







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